1.1 Background of the Letter of Credit Blow-up Case in a Certain Northwest Locality and Its Impact on the Entire Domestic Letter of Credit and Forfaiting Business Market

So this afternoon, we will focus on only one big issue, and of course this one big issue, when expanded, will involve several small specific issues. Before raising this issue, I want to first describe a major case we encountered at the end of last year. This major case is still under criminal investigation by the public security bureau, and the persons in custody involved in the case are still being detained. At that time, a senior executive of one of the banks involved was at large; as to whether he has now been captured and brought to justice, there is still no definite news. But the case had at that time developed to the point where one of China's top large banks refused to honour the payment at maturity of forfaiting, thereby causing a huge shock to the entire forfaiting market, and many domestic banks were also involved. A now even more serious problem is that some of the letters of credit were issued by a certain local city commercial bank and have now been directly cancelled by the local regulatory authority or criminal investigation authority.

Of course, the consequences of cancellation are very serious, because a series of banks in various places have already negotiated these letters of credit, and a series of banks in various places have already purchased them by way of forfaiting, including both primary purchases and secondary purchases. These banks that have already handled the purchases are now basically in a complete panic given that the letters of credit have been cancelled. Because once a letter of credit is cancelled, it means the issuing bank may in the future refuse to bear the final payment liability under the letter of credit. So under such cancellation, exactly how to make the issuing bank bear the final payment liability, how the negotiating bank and the forfaiting purchasing bank can protect their own rights and interests, and how the secondary purchasing bank can require the primary purchasing bank to repurchase the forfaiting, while the primary purchasing bank in turn requires the previous bank, such as the issuing bank or the negotiating bank, to repurchase, has evolved into a very thorny problem. This situation has never occurred in the course of China's banking and commercial practice, so this issue deserves a special hour for us to discuss this topic.

According to the transaction records I have seen, the amount involved in this major domestic letter of credit case occurring in a certain northwest locality has reached or exceeded RMB 2 billion, and there are many transactions I may not have seen, so the total amount of transactions for which acceptance was completed through the sending of messages should be more than RMB 2 billion. This also reflects a problem in the sharp surge in domestic letter of credit business volume last year. This domestic letter of credit and forfaiting market is said to have three "3 trillion" or "4 trillion"[2], namely 4 trillion in credit-chain transactions (electronic accounts receivable certificates), 4 trillion in domestic letter of credit and forfaiting transactions, and 4 trillion in the balance of bank acceptance bills, so the business volume of these "three carriages" is all around RMB 4 trillion. Therefore, last year my conclusion was that the product of domestic letters of credit and forfaiting was still quite good, because no major blow-up had occurred; but by the end of last year, reality "slapped me in the face" with actual cases.

1.2 Transaction Structure and Circular Trade Model Involved in the Case

The diagram of the legal relationships involved in the case is shown in the figure below. The transaction structure of the case is as follows: there was an applicant company X, which requested a local city commercial bank A in the northwest to issue a letter of credit, but because this city commercial bank had a low credit rating in the market and relatively low market acceptance, it requested N branch of a large bank in another bank's locality to issue the domestic letter of credit on its behalf. Because this bank is very large in scale and a major player in the domestic letter of credit and forfaiting market, the letter of credit issued on behalf of N bank was one for which many banks in the market were willing to handle negotiation financing or to conduct forfaiting financing business; in forfaiting there also existed transfer transactions of primary purchase and secondary purchase. This is the overall transaction situation of this case.

The sale contract of the underlying transaction consisted of a series of transactions of goods in warehouses, manifested as A selling to B, B selling to C, C selling to D, and D possibly selling back to A, with the goods being delivered or offset in the warehouses. According to the statements of the parties, the goods originally existed, but by the time of the current investigation the goods no longer existed; if an inspection had been made at that time, however, the goods would all have been real and actually existing, and the company issuing the waybills and warehouse receipts (the warehouseman marked in yellow in the middle) was a large company, so if the goods had been verified at that time, the goods should have existed.

Of course, this is what the parties said in front of me; what they said to the public security organ I do not know at present. But the persons involved in the case are all still at the public security bureau of that northwest city, and the case is currently in the investigation stage. The amount involved in this case is so huge, and the core problem now is that bank A requested bank N to issue the letter of credit on its behalf; bank N initially, because the "blow-up" incident occurred, when it needed to advance funds, at first sent messages saying it did not want to advance funds, but later, under pressure from all sides, bank N has now probably advanced all the funds of several billion yuan under the letters of credit it issued on behalf of bank A. So the situation has now evolved into: after this bank N has advanced the money, can it recover it from bank A? That is one question. The second type of transaction is that bank A itself also issued some letters of credit; it issued some itself and had some issued on its behalf by bank N. Those letters of credit it issued itself have now been cancelled by the public security bureau, which has left the primary purchasing banks and secondary purchasing banks that handled negotiation or forfaiting purchases for this bank A not knowing how to handle matters now that the letters of credit have been cancelled.

So let us use this typical and genuinely existing case, and based on past cases and practical experience, conduct a "war game" exercise on how this problem should be resolved in the future, and what legal consequences and possible legal procedures it may give rise to. This is the core content of what I will discuss today.

The first issue that needs to be clarified is whether a domestic letter of credit can be cancelled at all. As is well known, a letter of credit itself is irrevocable, but the Measures for Settlement of Domestic Letters of Credit contain clear provisions on when a letter of credit may be cancelled[3]. Please note that the letter of credit in this case, on the one hand, is irrevocable under the provisions of the Measures for Settlement of Domestic Letters of Credit; once issued, it may not be revoked without the consent of the beneficiary and other relevant parties. But the same rules also provide that under certain specific conditions it may be cancelled. Because Article 4 of the Measures for Settlement of Domestic Letters of Credit[4] provides that the issuance of a letter of credit must not involve illegal or criminal activities, must not involve fraud, must not harm the public interest, and the letter of credit shall have a genuine trade background. Article 14[5] provides that the mandatory terms of the letter of credit must clearly state its irrevocable nature, and if the issuing bank has already issued the letter of credit, it accepts the constraints of the contents of the letter of credit. Article 7 of the Settlement Measures[6] provides that a letter of credit is independent, that the parties deal with documents rather than goods, and that the letter of credit and the underlying contract are mutually independent. Section 9, Article 49 of the Settlement Measures also clearly states that a letter of credit may be cancelled in the following three circumstances (the provision actually stipulates two, and I have added the third myself): the first circumstance stipulated in the provision is that the issuing bank, confirming bank or negotiating bank has not received documents within the validity period of the letter of credit, that is, the beneficiary has not submitted documents to claim payment within the validity period; then once the validity period of the letter of credit expires, the issuing bank may cancel it one month after the expiry date. This is the case where the beneficiary has not submitted documents, the documents have not arrived, and once the validity period arrives the letter of credit becomes invalid upon expiry; then one month after the expiry of the validity period it may be cancelled. This is the first circumstance. The second circumstance is that in other circumstances, cancellation may be made after the expiry of the letter of credit by the issuing bank only upon consultation and agreement between the issuing bank, any confirming bank that has confirmed, any negotiating bank that has negotiated, any transferring bank that has transferred, and the beneficiary, or upon the confirming bank, negotiating bank or transferring bank declaring agreement to cancel the letter of credit and reaching a consensus with the issuing bank on the recovery of the full set of original letters of credit. This means that in general a letter of credit cannot be cancelled; if after the letter of credit is issued negotiation has been handled, someone has negotiated, or someone has confirmed or someone has transferred it, and the relevant parties do not agree to cancellation, then it absolutely cannot be cancelled at that time. But the "proviso" is that if all parties reach a consensus, it may still be revoked.

We can see that in this case in the Northwest, because a bank has already handled negotiation and a bank has already done forfaiting (purchase of receivables), if one were to request these negotiating banks and purchasing banks to agree to cancel the letter of credit, to obtain their consent or reach a consensus, that would be absolutely impossible, because the forfaiting financing bank has not even gotten its money back—how could it possibly agree to cancel the letter of credit? So these are the two cancellation scenarios determined by the rules.

In addition, I think there may be a third scenario, which is my own speculation: namely, if a letter of credit involves a criminal offense, such as where the issuing bank, negotiating bank, and confirming bank are all criminals in the criminal offense, and the beneficiary and applicant are also criminals, then in such a case, cancelling the letter of credit would not be a problem at all. This is also the third scenario I speculated about, namely that among all the parties to the transaction there is no bona fide third party, and everyone is colluding to use the letter of credit to commit fraud; the public security bureau determines that this whole group used the letter of credit to commit fraud, and therefore directly cancels the letter of credit involved—this is also a possible extreme scenario.

In addition, for example in this case, if the local public security bureau, the regulatory authority, or the issuing bank forcibly claims that the letter of credit must be cancelled, once it is actually cancelled, four keywords will be triggered: first, the term "repurchase" that we often encounter in forfaiting agreements, which will trigger the "repurchase clause" under the forfaiting agreement; second, at this point the issuing bank must reimburse the negotiating bank on the maturity date, which involves the issue of "recovery" by the negotiating bank against the issuing bank; third, at the same time the negotiating bank may also exercise "recourse" against the next party to it, if it originally reserved the right of recourse; fourth, any bank that suffers loss, such as the issuing bank or the negotiating bank, may seek "recovery" from the beneficiary; fifth, the party that suffers loss, such as a bank, may also "claim damages." For example, if the applicant and the beneficiary have colluded, as in this case where the essence is that the applicant and the beneficiary colluded with each other, then the issuing bank, negotiating bank, and confirming bank that suffered loss may all claim against the applicant and the beneficiary. If these parties constitute a criminal offense, criminal asset recovery is involved; or if they constitute a civil tort, then these victims may file lawsuits against all parties, demanding that the parties at fault compensate for the losses they suffered. So this will intertwine multiple legal relationships such as repurchase, recovery, recourse, and damages. Damages include both tort damages and asset recovery in criminal cases.

1.5 Judicial remedies available to the issuing bank, negotiating bank, and purchasing bank

If the letter of credit is ultimately actually cancelled, what rights and obligations will the issuing bank, the negotiating bank, the forfaiting purchaser, and the secondary forfaiting purchaser each have, both substantively and procedurally?

First, as the issuing bank, if it ultimately suffers loss, is sued by the negotiating bank, and is finally forced to assume reimbursement liability to the negotiating bank, then it has the right to sue the applicant for the letter of credit, demanding recovery of its advance payment—this is the issuing bank's right; if the issuing bank is sued by the forfaiting purchaser, because the purchaser purchased the receivables directly from the issuing bank, the issuing bank may be sued by the forfaiting purchaser; in such litigation, if the issuing bank loses and after paying compensation must in turn seek recovery from the applicant, then this also involves the issue of the purchaser demanding that the issuing bank repurchase, and after the issuing bank advances funds, it can in any event seek recovery from the applicant; after the issuing bank itself advances funds, it may also, based on the assigned rights, exercise recourse against the beneficiary in subrogation of the negotiating bank. If it ultimately pays compensation to a certain party, it may require that party to assign the right of recourse to the issuing bank, and the issuing bank will ultimately assert the right of recourse against the beneficiary. Because the issuing bank's own payment is legally final (finality), it can only obtain the right of recourse by assignment from the negotiating bank and then seek recovery and recourse against the beneficiary. The above are several legal avenues the issuing bank may choose.

As for the negotiating bank's avenues: if it genuinely handled negotiation, then it may sue the issuing bank for recovery—on this point there are already many cases in judicial practice, such as the Shanghai Xiangdian International case [7] and others, all of which have successful precedents; the negotiating bank's second avenue is that it may sue the beneficiary to exercise recourse—if it cannot get money from the issuing bank, it may still exercise recourse against the beneficiary, although the beneficiary usually no longer has the ability to pay at that time; the negotiating bank's third avenue is that if the beneficiary and the applicant are ultimately proven to have colluded in fraud, the negotiating bank may sue the beneficiary and the applicant for compensation, and even if the issuing bank's staff also participated in the fraud and were likewise at fault, it may also sue them together for compensation for losses. In short, the negotiating bank can pursue upward, pursue downward, and also claim damages. On this point, there was previously the Bank of East Asia case [8] as a precedent; these are all real cases that have occurred, including ones I have already tried to practice in courts in the Shanghai area.

As for the forfaiting purchaser, i.e., the forfaiting purchasing bank, if it originally purchased the receivables directly from the issuing bank, then it may directly sue the issuing bank, demanding that it perform its repurchase obligation; if the forfaiting purchasing bank purchased from the negotiating bank, it should demand that the negotiating bank repurchase. If both the issuing bank and the negotiating bank are liable for the losses caused to the forfaiting purchasing bank, then the purchaser may, as plaintiff, sue both the issuing bank and the negotiating bank at the same time, demanding that the two banks compensate for the losses; and if the purchaser reserved the right of recourse against the beneficiary in the agreement, it may also separately sue the beneficiary to exercise the right of recourse; if the beneficiary and the applicant colluded to commit fraud, and the various banks involved in the middle were not at fault, then the purchaser may sue the applicant for the letter of credit and the beneficiary, demanding that they compensate for the losses.

1.6 The series of lawsuits and judicial uncertainty triggered by cancellation of a letter of credit

Therefore, we can foresee that if such litigation strategy is adopted, once a letter of credit is cancelled, it will trigger a chain of lawsuits, and this will be a series of cases linked one after another: at that time the negotiating bank will sue the issuing bank, the first-tier purchaser will demand repurchase from the negotiating bank, the second-tier purchaser will demand repurchase from the first-tier purchaser, and everyone will be drawn into a chain of lawsuits because of the cancellation of the letter of credit.

Therefore, the summary on this issue is: first, a series of cross-court lawsuits will occur; second, the outcome of the litigation is highly uncertain, because in judicial practice there is no clear precedent for the outcome of litigation after a letter of credit is cancelled. Among the cases I collected over the past decades, not a single case was a lawsuit arising from the cancellation of a letter of credit; therefore, the trial outcome of this type of case depends entirely on the specific circumstances of the individual case (case by case). This is the content of this first part.

02. The contest over jurisdiction in domestic letter of credit disputes and an analysis of the similarities and differences with the legal nature of forfaiting

2.1 Jurisdictional conflicts and the litigation "battlefield transfer" strategy

In the second part, if the purchaser, negotiating bank, and other parties need to go to a certain place in the Northwest and other areas of the Northwest to litigate, because the bank involved is under the local protectionist government and judicial organs in that place, the local public security bureau, procuratorate, and court may all tend to protect the interests of that local bank. Therefore, if the purchaser goes to that place to file a lawsuit, objectively it is basically equivalent to "walking into a trap." Because the local government or public security bureau will usually directly cancel the letter of credit or take stop-payment measures, and the posture it adopts is obviously to protect the interests of the local bank as much as possible. The logic is that the local bank believes it has been defrauded, so after the criminal suspect is brought to justice, if the purchaser directly goes to the local court to sue the local issuing bank, demanding that the issuing bank bear the ultimate reimbursement liability, the local court, as a judicial organ in the Northwest region, may have a judicial environment significantly different from that of the Shanghai Financial Court and the Jiangsu region. Therefore, if one voluntarily "delivers oneself to the door" to litigate, based on my experience as a lawyer, it may basically be a "dead end."

In view of this, the purchaser, first-tier purchaser, second-tier purchaser, or negotiating bank must act quickly and adhere to the principle of "striking first." Here, I offer two specific response strategies: the core point is never to go to the Northwest region to sue, otherwise one will easily fall into a passive position or a desperate situation—this is precisely determined by the uncertainty risk that may exist in the local judicial environment. Therefore, the first thing we need to resolve is the issue of jurisdiction over the case you are involved in. The purchaser should strike first and file a lawsuit against the issuing bank or the negotiating bank in the court where it itself is located. If it is a second-tier purchaser, it should also sue first; and as a first-tier purchaser, it should immediately sue the negotiating bank in the court where the purchaser's place of business is located. If it is itself the negotiating bank, it should sue the issuing bank in the court where the negotiating bank is located. Through this litigation strategy, the litigation "battlefield" can be successfully transferred to the court where the purchaser or negotiating bank itself is located. These purchasers are themselves local financial institutions, and the local judicial organs will relatively speaking inevitably consider and protect their lawful rights and interests when adjudicating. Conversely, if one goes to the Northwest region to litigate, the other side's court may take an unfair stance out of protection of the interests of its local financial institution. Therefore, in this case the transfer of the litigation battlefield is of crucial significance. In current cases of this type, my advice is that all types of purchasers must quickly strike first; if they do not take the initiative in time, they will subsequently fall into an extremely passive position, and may even face the tragic outcome of suffering huge losses with nowhere to complain.

2.2 Reflections on successful cases in Shanghai courts and the adjudication case of the Jiangsu High People's Court

On how to fight for court jurisdiction, I not only have theoretical support but also several actual positive and negative cases as a basis. Here, two typical successful cases can serve as references. The first case is the case of a negotiating bank suing the issuing bank, namely the famous Xiangdian International case mentioned above [9]. In that case, the negotiating bank in Shanghai directly filed a lawsuit in the Shanghai Financial Court against the issuing bank, for example, the Xiangtan Branch of Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, as the defendant. In the process, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank raised an objection, arguing that the bank's letter of credit dispute case had already been accepted by the Xiangtan Intermediate People's Court and that the Xiangtan Intermediate Court had issued a ruling on the stop-payment order, so the Xiangtan Intermediate Court should have prior jurisdiction over the case, and the negotiating bank's litigation in the Shanghai court therefore lacked jurisdiction. The Shanghai Financial Court's adjudicative position was clear: the plaintiff, as a negotiating bank located in Shanghai, had the right to sue the Xiangtan issuing bank in the Shanghai Financial Court. Therefore, the breakthrough point in the litigation procedure of this Xiangtan electric power case lay in these negotiating banks and forfaiting banks located in Shanghai choosing to directly file lawsuits in the Shanghai Financial Court against the issuing bank in Xiangtan, Hunan, and having the cases heard. Before they filed suit, the Xiangtan court had in fact already taken stop-payment measures against all the letters of credit involved, and in the jurisdiction objection procedure and appeal filed by the negotiating bank, the Hunan Provincial High People's Court also upheld the Xiangtan Intermediate Court's stop-payment ruling. However, the litigation strategy adopted by these banks was precisely planned by me for them, namely that it was possible to obtain the money early only by suing the issuing bank in Shanghai in the name of the negotiating bank. Ultimately, the Shanghai High People's Court held that when the Shanghai negotiating bank sued the Xiangtan issuing bank in the Shanghai Financial Court, the Shanghai court enjoyed judicial jurisdiction according to law. Even though the Xiangtan court had stopped payment on the letters of credit and had prior jurisdiction, the Shanghai Financial Court still lawfully enjoyed jurisdiction when accepting the plaintiff's separate lawsuit filed according to law against the issuing bank. Whether in the Xiangdian International case or in the subsequent Bank of East Asia case handled by us, the Shanghai courts basically firmly demonstrated their clear position that they have jurisdiction over such cases.

The core legal basis for the Shanghai Financial Court's exercise of jurisdiction lies in the following: the plaintiff sues the issuing bank as a negotiating bank, and because the underlying legal relationship in dispute in this case is a debt of monetary payment, and the negotiating bank, as the party receiving the currency, has its location as one of the places of contract performance. Therefore, the Shanghai Financial Court on this basis determined that it enjoys jurisdiction. Its logic is: the issuing bank should pay the funds to the negotiating bank on the payment due date, and the negotiating bank is the party receiving the currency, so the court at its location, the Shanghai Financial Court, naturally has jurisdiction over the case.

The other case, the Bank of East Asia case [10], is the same. Therefore, the Shanghai courts have already accumulated two or three such successful precedents, which fully shows that as long as a financial institution negotiating a domestic letter of credit strikes first and sues the issuing bank at its own location, it can completely and effectively avoid the judicial jurisdiction of the court at the issuing bank's location. Therefore, with respect to this case in the Northwest region, if any bank business personnel involved hold letters of credit that have been forcibly cancelled or stopped from payment by the local regulatory authority or judicial authority, I strongly recommend that everyone file suit against the issuing bank as soon as possible in the court at the negotiating bank's location, or demand reimbursement or repurchase from the forfaiter or negotiating bank from which they previously purchased the asset. I must clearly warn everyone that once you act too late, you may subsequently fall into an extremely passive position. Therefore, in this response, everyone must increase the speed of action. The above are all successful experiences of the Shanghai courts, but in practice there are also lessons of failure, for example in a case heard by the Jiangsu Provincial High People's Court [11]. After the letter of credit involved was subjected to stop-payment measures by the Wuhan Maritime Court, the negotiating bank chose to go to the Nanjing Intermediate Court, located where the issuing bank is, to sue the issuing bank; however, the Nanjing Intermediate Court ruled to dismiss the plaintiff's claims.

Therefore, we can roughly draw a conclusion: the courts in Jiangsu may objectively be unwilling, unlike the Shanghai Financial Court, to actively and proactively intervene and exercise jurisdiction according to law; and even if they exercise jurisdiction, the trend of their judgments against negotiating banks is unfavorable. Therefore, local negotiating banks in Jiangsu, when facing such disputes, will probably find themselves in a desperate situation, precisely because the Nanjing court and the Jiangsu High Court, in circumstances where the letter of credit has already been subjected to stop-payment measures by a court in another locality, lack the judicial responsibility of the Shanghai Financial Court and do not dare to exercise jurisdiction according to law. In my view, these judges of the Jiangsu courts are very confused in their adjudicative thinking. As financial institutions lawfully operating locally, banks contribute such enormous tax revenue to the locality every year, yet at the critical moment the courts cannot effectively provide judicial protection for the lawful rights and interests of local enterprises; this is undoubtedly unacceptable. Therefore, I believe that the judicial position of the Jiangsu High Court in such cases is seriously deviated and has even, to a certain extent, harmed the vital interests of local market entities in Jiangsu. The adjudicative tendency of these judges is very dangerous. On the contrary, the judicial view of the Shanghai Financial Court is very worthy of praise. Its attitude is clear: how the parties run wild in the Xiangtan court is your business, but the rule-of-law order and rules of the Shanghai financial sector absolutely do not permit out-of-town judiciaries to arbitrarily subvert market rules; the rules must operate reasonably and lawfully as they should. By contrast, in the Bank of East Asia case in the Jiangsu courts, we believe that the adjudicative thinking of the Jiangsu High Court judges should be condemned by the industry. This ultimately leaves Jiangsu's financial enterprises at the mercy of others, at the mercy of the Wuhan Maritime Court in Hubei, and deprived of judicial protection. The position of the Jiangsu courts in this case is anti-law and wrong, while the position of the Shanghai Financial Court is correct, reasonable and lawful.

Therefore, Jiangsu's financial institutions have suffered greatly in this respect in the past, and this is also because Jiangsu did not establish a local maritime court in the past. Now that a maritime court has finally been established, they finally no longer need to suffer judicial interference from maritime courts in other provinces; however, whether the adjudicative thinking and judicial cognition of the judges actually hearing cases are clearer and more mature than in the past still needs to be verified in specific adjudicated cases.

This is a course accompanied by painful lessons and successful experience. Therefore, once a letter of credit is cancelled or stopped from payment, the negotiating bank or forfaiting purchaser involved must act swiftly without hesitation to fight for judicial jurisdiction. Otherwise, if the case is allowed to fall into the hands of the Northwest region or another adjudicative team holding a position similar to that of the Jiangsu courts, the negotiating bank and forfaiting purchasing bank may then face an irreparable desperate situation. The above are the two successful examples in Shanghai, while the Bank of East Asia case in Jiangsu left regret because the judges refused jurisdiction. Therefore, after the crisis of a letter of credit being cancelled occurs, fighting for jurisdiction is the first and most important priority. If even the jurisdiction of the local court cannot be established, subsequent litigation in the Northwest court will be extremely passive; if the amount involved is huge, the losses of the financial institutions involved may be even more unimaginable. Therefore, I suggest that banks in Jiangsu, in future business practice, try to avoid agreeing in contracts that the court of jurisdiction be a Jiangsu court; even for forfaiting transactions carried out within Jiangsu, the contract should stipulate that jurisdiction be vested in the Shanghai court, or legal means should be used to assign or transfer jurisdiction to a Shanghai institution so that it may obtain the proper jurisdiction of the Shanghai court. For example, if you are a compliance officer of a certain Bank of China Jiangsu Provincial Branch, when handling forfaiting business, although the transaction takes place in Jiangsu, the contract may clearly stipulate: "All disputes arising from this transaction shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Shanghai Financial Court." This is because the Shanghai Financial Court is not merely a local financial court of Shanghai in the narrow sense; it actually radiates to and has jurisdiction over relevant major financial cases in the areas surrounding Shanghai and even in the Yangtze River Delta region. The parties may choose the jurisdiction of the Shanghai Financial Court. Therefore, forfaiting financial transactions occurring in Jiangsu can fully stipulate the jurisdiction of the Shanghai Financial Court. In order to completely avoid the Jiangsu High Court, which is unwilling to proactively perform its jurisdictional duties, this can be tried in future business contracts, and this is also a core practical operation point that I must repeatedly emphasize to you in Part II.

Next, we need to discuss a core legal issue involved in the Shanghai Xiangdian case, the Bank of East Asia case, and the Zhejiang Zhoushan Bank of Communications case [12]. In such cases, all the business documents signed by Ping An Bank and its customers literally reflected entirely a forfaiting legal relationship, and not a single contract clause used the legal term "negotiation." As a result, when the matter went to court, the bank side was completely "stunned." Bank of Communications and Ping An Bank then discovered that what they had signed with their customers was indeed a pure "forfaiting agreement," but under China's current legal framework and judicial interpretations, only the specific subject of the "negotiating bank" can obtain protection in good faith.

Therefore, during the court hearing and debate, the lawyers representing the banks that had conducted forfaiting business performed extremely arduously. This is because they had to carry out highly difficult legal persuasion before the judges, attempting to "call a stag a horse" in order to prove that the "stag" of "forfaiting" is legally and substantively the "horse" of negotiation. Yet, astonishingly, this seemingly strained legal persuasion ultimately succeeded in some courts. In the Xiangdian case, the Shanghai judges ultimately accepted the bank's view and determined that Ping An Bank had "conducted negotiation in the form of forfaiting." You can carefully savor how awkward the judge's wording in the judgment was: "conducted negotiation in the form of forfaiting." In the Bank of Communications case in the Zhejiang Zhoushan Intermediate Court, the judge encountered by Bank of Communications likewise made the ridiculous determination that it had "conducted negotiation in the form of forfaiting"; the result was that the ridiculous trick of "calling a stag a horse" actually succeeded in persuading the judge. However, when the Sichuan Provincial High People's Court heard similar cases, the judges' judicial view was extremely rigorous. The Sichuan High Court clearly pointed out: forfaiting is forfaiting, and negotiation is negotiation; the two belong to different legal relationships and financial products and must never be confused [13].

Therefore, the core point of debate in the substantive trial of such cases is whether, at the legal level, forfaiting is in fact equivalent to negotiation? Or, conversely, whether negotiation can be equated with forfaiting? Regarding negotiation under letters of credit, the Measures for the Settlement of Domestic Letters of Credit (2016 edition), although it contains a series of very detailed business rules, regrettably, China currently has no dedicated legislation specifically addressing forfaiting business. Therefore, I suggest here that market entities representing the forfaiting industry jointly draft a set of Domestic Forfaiting Business Rules in the future, so as to form a reasonable, lawful and appropriate unified set of rules and texts within the industry for everyone's reference and use. When the time is ripe and conditions are in place, efforts should then be made to elevate it to a formal departmental rule of the People's Bank of China. We can actively refer to the relevant rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the International Forfaiting Association (IFA) to compile a set of industry rules suited to China's national conditions. As far as I understand, no clear law or administrative regulation has yet been issued in this area in China. Regarding negotiation under letters of credit, in addition to the Measures for the Settlement of Domestic Letters of Credit, the Supreme People's Court has in fact already issued a complete set of judicial interpretations on letters of credit [14]. As for the most core underlying legal foundation of forfaiting business, it is reflected in the specific provisions of the current Civil Code on the assignment of contractual claims and the chapter on factoring contracts. This is because what is involved under a letter of credit is the circulation of accounts receivable, which in essence belongs to assignable monetary debts. This legal basis is found in Article 545 of the Civil Code [15]: for the assignment of a monetary claim, it is only necessary for the creditor or the assignee creditor to give notice of the assignment to the debtor, and the assignment then takes legal effect against the debtor.

In addition, thanks to my personal efforts, I also participated in proposing the addition of a dedicated chapter to the current Civil Code, namely Chapter 16, the "Chapter on Factoring Contracts." In the chapter on factoring contracts, the law clearly sets out the rules on establishing priority in relation to the assignment of accounts receivable and on its effect against third parties, namely following the principle of "notice first, right first; registration first, right first." Therefore, the fundamental legal concept concerning the assignment of accounts receivable under a letter of credit still derives from the legal principles on assignment of claims in the Civil Code.

However, there is an essential difference between "negotiation" under a letter of credit and the general "assignment of claims" provided for in the Civil Code. Negotiation refers to the act by which a bank, expressly designated or authorized by the issuing bank, purchases documents under a complying presentation from the beneficiary and pays consideration. Therefore, the negotiating bank enjoys an extremely advantageous legal position in the legal relationship of the letter of credit, namely that the rights and status of the negotiating bank are substantively superior to the original status of the beneficiary, that is, the legal principle that "the rights of the subsequent holder are superior to the rights of the prior holder." The reason is that the negotiating bank receives the issuing bank's nomination to negotiate under the letter of credit and thereby buys out the complying documents under the letter of credit from the beneficiary. If the documents submitted by the beneficiary are forged or fraudulent, so long as the negotiating bank itself did not participate in the fraud and was completely unaware of it, and at the same time it purchased this set of documents that appear on their face to be complying from the beneficiary as nominated by the issuing bank and paid reasonable consideration, then the rights and status of the negotiating bank as the subsequent holder are legally superior compared with those of the prior holder beneficiary who committed the fraud. This produces the legal effect of "cutting off the right of defence," which is precisely the so-called "exception to the fraud exception principle" established by Article 10 of the Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues Concerning the Trial of Cases Involving Letter of Credit Disputes (hereinafter referred to as the "Letter of Credit Judicial Interpretation") [16]. Therefore, the position of a negotiating bank under a letter of credit is clearly superior to that of the beneficiary, exhibiting the characteristic that the subsequent holder is superior to the prior holder.

By contrast, forfaiting in its legal nature mainly involves the assignment of accounts receivable claims or monetary claims. In an ordinary legal relationship of assignment of claims, the rights of the subsequent holder who takes the assignment can never be superior to the status of the prior holder who assigns the right. To give a very vivid example: the "feet" of the forfaiting purchaser are, in legal substance, standing in the beneficiary's "boots." If the beneficiary's "boots" themselves carry the germs of "Hong Kong foot," then such "germs" will inevitably infect the purchaser's "feet." In other words, the purchaser must fully bear the original defects and the counterparty's defences existing in the prior holder's claim, and its status as subsequent holder cannot be superior to that of the prior holder, nor can the right of defence be cut off in the interim. At this point, based on this principle, the legal conclusion of our discussion today is ready to emerge.

2.4 The application dilemma of the exception to the fraud exception and a penetrating trial review

The principle of the "exception to the fraud exception" provided in Article 10 of the Supreme Court's Letter of Credit Judicial Interpretation legally protects only specific subjects in a targeted manner, that is, it protects only subjects such as bona fide negotiating banks, and does not directly protect pure forfaiting purchasers. Therefore, if one is merely a purchaser under forfaiting, it will be extremely difficult in legal principle to be recognized as a "bona fide third party" as referred to in Article 10 of the Letter of Credit Judicial Interpretation, and thus it cannot obtain the legal protection of the exception to the fraud exception principle. In view of this, when conducting business and facing litigation, banks will inevitably try every means to shape their own positioning as a "negotiating bank." This is precisely the fundamental reason why the several banks mentioned above struggled desperately at trial and exhausted every argument to persuade the judges to accept the "calling a stag a horse" view that "forfaiting is negotiation." Because if it is characterized as forfaiting, the rights of the forfaiting bank have a fatal legal defect; whereas once it is characterized as negotiation, the negotiating bank can obtain a legally "indestructible body."

This is also the core point of the fierce attack and defence in court in the dozens of such letter of credit lawsuits in current judicial practice. In some cases, the judges actually accepted this set of arguments by the banks in their judgments and made the absurd ruling of "negotiating in the form of forfaiting." So, in my view, these judges were indeed misled by the financial industry's technical terminology, and this judgment result is utterly ridiculous.

The provisions on the exception to the fraud exception in Article 10 of the Letter of Credit Judicial Interpretation or related clauses show that if a bank is legally confirmed as a bona fide third party, the issuing bank must unconditionally pay first or perform its acceptance advance responsibility, which is the manifestation of "the subsequent holder being superior to the prior holder." As an ordinary forfaiting purchaser, however, it does not possess the statutory status of a bona fide third party and is therefore not protected by the legal principle of Article 10. Of course, as analysed above, this litigation strategy of confusing concepts may succeed in the courts of Zhejiang, may also gain support in the courts of Shanghai, but met with failure in the courts of Sichuan. Therefore, such cases exhibit a strongly "case-by-case" characteristic in judicial practice. The judges of the Sichuan High People's Court clearly stated in their judgment: forfaiting is forfaiting, negotiation is negotiation; if what the bank does in its business is forfaiting, it shall be determined as forfaiting, and if what it does is negotiation, it shall be determined as negotiation. The two are completely different.

So, what exactly is statutory negotiation? What exactly is pure forfaiting? We might as well look at the Xiangdian case. This case is a typical example of judges being successfully persuaded by the banking sector and obtaining a lucky victory. It gave rise to multiple related cases. According to the data I retrieved on the China Judgments Online, with respect only to the first-instance and second-instance proceedings on the jurisdictional objection in the Xiangdian case, several rounds of confrontation took place in the Xiangtan Intermediate Court and the Henan High People's Court; subsequently, in the Shanghai Financial Court there were again first-instance and second-instance jurisdictional contests, as well as the subsequent first-instance and second-instance substantive trials. For the Xiangdian series of cases alone, as many as dozens of judicial documents were produced in judicial practice, which shows how complex the process was. But I must tell you clearly that the reason why financial institutions such as Ping An Bank and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China in Shanghai were ultimately able to win was, to a large extent, highly fortuitous. The premise of their fortuitous success lies in the fact that the trial judges at the time lacked a deep understanding of the underlying financial logic and legal differences between forfaiting and negotiation, and it was the stupid result of their brainless "copying the cat and drawing the tiger" following the erroneous judgment of the Zhejiang High People's Court, thereby being persuaded by the banks' seemingly reasonable but actually specious and confused arguments; at the same time, the opposing party Xiangdian Company's lawyers also had relatively weak ability to counter in this professional field. Therefore, this was a fortuitous success full of contingency. In this batch of cases in Shanghai, if the defendant had hired extremely senior and formidable professional lawyers in the field of international finance, whether the banks could ultimately still win would inevitably be a huge question mark. Xiangdian's lawyers did not explain clearly to the judges the legal and banking business logic of negotiation and forfaiting.

The second core legal issue that needs to be discussed next in the Xiangdian case is: if an issuing bank under a letter of credit designates a particular branch (for example, Branch A) as the negotiating bank in the letter of credit, but the party that ultimately actually handles the negotiation business is Branch B under the same bank's name (which is the superior bank of Branch A of the same bank), can this situation still be legally recognized as "the same bank having been designated to carry out negotiation"? Regarding this view, my opinion differs from that of other experts. My personal view tends to hold that: under the framework of the unitary legal personality system, neither the Measures for the Settlement of Domestic Letters of Credit nor the relevant laws and regulations of our country contain any provision stating that "a branch established by a bank in another region should be regarded as an independent legal person," nor any rule similar to that of UCP600 [17]. The rules of our country's domestic letters of credit are not like the International Chamber of Commerce's Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP), which explicitly treats branches located in different countries or regions as independent banks. Therefore, if the legal personality of branches established by a bank in different regions all belongs to the same legal person entity, then it is entirely reasonable in legal principle to determine that they belong to the same designated bank. But if judicial adjudication forcibly splits them under a letter of credit into two completely independent bank legal persons, that would create a huge logical loophole. To illustrate this point, let me give a relatively extreme example: suppose the letter of credit expressly designates the Shanghai Branch of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China to carry out negotiation, but the party that ultimately actually handles the negotiation and advances the funds is the Urumqi Branch of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China in Xinjiang. Then, legally speaking, does the Xinjiang Branch count as a negotiating bank also designated by the issuing bank? Does it belong, together with the Shanghai Branch, to the same legal person, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China? If it is not agreed that the Urumqi Branch is a negotiating bank, then in the Xiangdian case the two banks would belong to different banks, and if Bank A is designated to negotiate, only Bank A can be the negotiating bank, and Branch B would not be the designated negotiating bank. This is a problem arising from the absence of rules.

Many people will raise the question: the issuing bank clearly designated ICBC Shanghai Branch as the negotiating bank when issuing the letter of credit, so how did a Xinjiang Urumqi Branch suddenly appear to assert the rights of a negotiating bank? On what basis does the Xinjiang Branch determine that it is the designated negotiating bank? But the core dispute in the case heard by the Shanghai Financial Court lies precisely here. If the Shanghai court's determination that they belong to the same legal person, and thus its support for the bank's reasoning, is correct, then the Zhejiang Provincial Higher People's Court's earlier relevant precedent [18] was clearly wrongly decided.

Conversely, if the Zhejiang High Court's judgment is correct, then the Shanghai court's determination is erroneous. Because in that Zhejiang case, Minsheng Bank Ningbo Branch was the issuing bank, while the entity that ultimately handled the negotiation was Minsheng Bank Suzhou Branch. If the judiciary determines that different branches belong to the same legal person, then a stop-payment order issued by the issuing bank cannot, as a matter of law, enjoin a negotiation conducted within that same legal person; but if they are determined to be mutually independent legal subjects, then the stop-payment order can take effect according to law. The Zhejiang High Court's ultimate reasoning was precisely to hold that: Minsheng Bank Ningbo Branch and Minsheng Bank Suzhou Branch should be regarded as two independent banks in the letter of credit legal relationship, and on that basis it permanently terminated payment under the letter of credit. Therefore, if the Shanghai High Court's judgment is correct, then the Zhejiang High Court's judgment is wrong, and vice versa. Hence my view is that the negotiating banks' victories in this batch of Shanghai High Court cases were indeed highly fortuitous; the fundamental reason is that even the judges of the Shanghai Financial Court, when faced with such professional and complex domestic letter of credit and forfaiting dispute cases, have areas in which they are not adept and do not understand well.

In fact, many courts in other regions of the country have already expressly held in their judgments that forfaiting and negotiation are fundamentally different in product nature and legal relationship, are two completely independent financial products, and must never be conflated in judicial adjudication [19]. Negative precedents already objectively exist. Therefore, in such disputes, we must pay close attention to whether the judge hearing the case possesses a spirit of legal study. If a judge is very keen on delving into cutting-edge financial law, the bank's set of confusing rhetoric will probably be difficult to pass off easily.

2.5 The six identification prerequisites for genuine letter of credit negotiation and the penetration of the fraud exception into the independence principle

2.5.1 The Supreme Court erroneously treated silent confirmation as negotiation in the ANZ Bank case

Next, let us return to fundamentals and explore what genuine letter of credit negotiation is in law and business practice, and what genuine forfaiting transactions are. Over the past twenty years, I have repeatedly expounded this view on many occasions, which can be traced back to the ANZ Bank series of cases I was involved in handling. Because the concept of "negotiation" has an extremely clear textual definition in the UCP rules, in the ANZ Bank case the court equated "silent confirmation" under a letter of credit with letter of credit negotiation. In the more than thirty cases involving ANZ Bank that year, the core dispute was precisely whether tripartite confirmation constituted negotiation. Today, this focus of dispute has merely evolved into: "whether forfaiting constitutes letter of credit negotiation." In fact, there is a clear definition that silent confirmation does not itself constitute negotiation, because under silent confirmation, the confirming bank, without designation and authorization by the issuing bank in the letter of credit, is obviously not a nominated bank, whereas a negotiating bank is invariably a nominated bank designated and authorized by the issuing bank in the letter of credit. The distinction between the two is clear at the source, so even in the Supreme Court's authoritative judgment, treating a silent confirming bank as a negotiating bank is in fact erroneous.

2.5.2 The seven steps to becoming a qualified letter of credit negotiation

Because the legal rules and substantive requirements for determining whether a financing business under a letter of credit constitutes a legally valid and qualified negotiation are very clear, the following seven core conditions must be satisfied simultaneously:

First, there must be an express negotiation authorization and negotiation designation in the terms of the letter of credit issued by the issuing bank.

Second, in the written notice by which the advising bank, in its capacity as advising bank, advises the beneficiary of the issuance of the letter of credit, if the advising bank is willing to accept the issuing bank's negotiation designation, it must expressly make a written declaration to the beneficiary, for example stating in the covering letter of advice: "Our bank has accepted the issuing bank's negotiation designation and welcomes your company to submit documents to our bank to apply for negotiation." That is, it must perform this express notification obligation toward the beneficiary; merely advising the letter of credit does not constitute negotiation.

Third, the beneficiary must transfer or sell the documents under the letter of credit to the presenting bank, and on that basis submit an application for negotiation. If the beneficiary has no intention at all to sell conforming documents to a negotiating bank, an advising bank or other unrelated bank cannot automatically transform itself into a negotiating bank for no reason;

Fourth, the negotiating bank and the beneficiary, as the two parties to the transaction, must formally sign a clear negotiation agreement, and the bank must agree to negotiate in accordance with the agreement and actually pay, or agree to pay, the negotiated proceeds to the beneficiary without recourse. That is to say, not only must both parties sign a written negotiation agreement, but the negotiation must also strictly comply with the strict provisions on negotiation in the settlement measures for letters of credit. A more important and clear practical detail is that the settlement measures also provide that, formally, the negotiating bank shall expressly record the fact of negotiation on the letter of credit documents or covering letter, and affix the bank's special seal for negotiation business;

Fifth, the beneficiary's presentation must satisfy the conforming presentation conditions of the letter of credit regarding surface conformity of documents and conformity between documents. If the documents submitted by the beneficiary themselves contain obvious discrepancies or documentary defects, then the negotiating bank cannot, as a matter of law, become a lawful negotiation; because negotiation is premised on conformity of documents.

Sixth, in the written document by which the negotiating bank presents documents to the issuing bank and requests the latter to pay against conforming presentation, namely the covering letter of presentation, it must also expressly inform the issuing bank that it has negotiated in accordance with the negotiation authorization or designation under the letter of credit and the beneficiary's application for negotiation.

Seventh, the negotiating bank must ultimately have actually completed payment of the negotiated proceeds to the beneficiary.

None of the above seven steps can be omitted.

2.5.3 Omissions in banking practice and the erroneous judgments courts often render

However, in a recent litigation case that we have noted, the court of first instance once again rendered a completely erroneous judgment. The judge hearing the case objectively appeared rather lax: he neither thoroughly investigated the underlying legal relationship nor carefully considered the legal principles of letters of credit; he merely mechanically leafed through some earlier precedents of the Zhejiang courts, the Shanghai courts and the Hunan courts, and, to save trouble, copied into the judgment the erroneous adjudicative formulation that "negotiation was carried out in the form of forfaiting." Because the judge lacked practical experience in hearing domestic letter of credit forfaiting dispute cases, he merely blindly and lazily copied the homework of the Shanghai Financial Court, the Zhejiang courts and the Hunan courts.

So what were the actual circumstances of that case? On the surface, the letter of credit at issue did indeed contain a negotiation designation clause, providing that "this credit is negotiable by any bank," which made the first condition appear to be satisfied. However, a serious error appeared at the second step: when the advising bank advised the beneficiary of the letter of credit, not a single word in the message it contained mentioned that "our bank is willing to accept the issuing bank's designation and undertake this negotiation business"; it simply did not give the beneficiary any notice of consent to the negotiation designation. The substance of what the advising bank stated to the beneficiary in the letter of advice was clear: "Beneficiary, our bank hereby performs only the duty of advising the letter of credit; our bank has not undertaken to negotiate business under this credit." Therefore, when the process reached the second step, the second condition for the establishment of a negotiating bank was already completely unsatisfied.

Turning to the third step, when the beneficiary in that case submitted the documents under the letter of credit to the issuing bank, although it enclosed a document entitled "Application for Negotiation of Letter of Credit Presentation," which from the title appeared to be an application by the applicant to the bank for negotiation, the key facts of a case are often hidden in the details of the document. On careful examination of the inner text of that application, in the core business selection column, two different check boxes were in fact designed side by side; the form clearly set out two check boxes, and whether the beneficiary, when submitting the documents to the advising bank, actually ticked the "negotiation" box is a very important detail. In that presentation application document, the beneficiary ticked only the option "forward documents for reimbursement." It can thus be seen that the beneficiary, when presenting documents, had no clear intention to sell the documents to a negotiating bank and require the latter to negotiate.

In fact, the beneficiary simply did not tick the "negotiation" option. The beneficiary's true intention in handing the documents to your advising bank was merely to entrust you with the ordinary presenting bank's duty of presentation. Yet the judge of the court of first instance failed to notice even such a crucial customized detail, and merely because he saw the words "application for negotiation" in the document title, he arbitrarily determined that the plaintiff had come to apply for negotiation. The judge completely ignored the ironclad evidence that the beneficiary had not ticked "negotiation" at all. The beneficiary's true expression of intent was merely to require the advising bank, as presenting bank, to assist in forwarding the documents and claiming reimbursement from the issuing bank; the beneficiary had not formally raised any request for a negotiating bank to negotiate and provide financing. In courtroom debate, victory or defeat often depends on this one small check box. If it is ticked, the bank may win; if it is not ticked, the bank loses completely as a matter of law. This case clearly shows that the plaintiff did not tick "negotiation"—how could the court then conclude out of thin air that the parties had formed a negotiation legal relationship?! Is this not turning a blind eye!

Moreover, an even more fatal and crucial practical defect is that the bank's own document examination record for the beneficiary's presentation expressly recorded a major discrepancy, namely that "the date of presentation is clearly later than the latest presentation period stipulated in the letter of credit." This shows that the presentation under the letter of credit was itself a presentation of documents containing a substantive discrepancy. According to the clear definition in China's Measures for the Settlement of Domestic Letters of Credit [20], if the conforming presentation conditions of the letter of credit are not satisfied and a discrepancy exists, the bank is absolutely unable, as a matter of law, to handle negotiation. Even if the bank forcibly advances funds, it cannot constitute a qualified letter of credit negotiation in the legal sense.

Faced with such a crystal-clear discrepancy, the judge turned a blind eye, which fully exposes the problem that the judge was seriously misled by the bank's arguments due to a lack of professional knowledge. Of course, the lawyers on both sides also behaved extremely unprofessionally here. Faced with such an obvious substantive discrepancy, they were unexpectedly unable to deliver a forceful, penetrating counterattack. Even more absurd is that the documents involved in this case not only had this one discrepancy; upon closer examination, the documents actually contained as many as five major substantive discrepancies, and together with the late presentation mentioned earlier, a total of six documentary discrepancies had accumulated. Yet the so-called "negotiating bank," when examining the documents, was unexpectedly completely unable to identify the numerous discrepancies. Where a letter of credit contains as many as six discrepancies, the negotiating bank is simply not qualified to claim that it is a lawful negotiation and a negotiating bank. As some experts have accurately put it: if the presentation under a letter of credit itself contains discrepancies, the bank cannot talk glibly about negotiation; this completely violates the industry common sense of banking practice shared by both international letters of credit and domestic letters of credit. Where the presentation contains five or six major discrepancies and the negotiating bank failed to identify them, the bank, in the "Covering Schedule" (presentation covering letter) sent to the issuing bank, also made no mention whatsoever of the discrepancies that should have been disclosed, which objectively constitutes the presenting bank's concealment of documentary discrepancies from the issuing bank.

Penetrating the "Covering Schedule" submitted by the presenting bank in this case. In the covering schedule, the "negotiating bank" did not expressly indicate to the issuing bank any documentary discrepancy. It was only after the issuing bank received the documents and carried out document examination that the issuing bank issued to the applicant its examination conclusion and notice that "the date of presentation is clearly later than the latest presentation period stipulated in the letter of credit." Looking through all the telexes exchanged between the presenting bank and the issuing bank in this case, not a single word mentions "Negotiation" or the facts thereof; in all the documents signed by the presenting bank and the beneficiary, the wording and characterization of the business from beginning to end are entirely "Forfaiting" and "assignment of receivables." And at the final stage of the business process, the documents signed by the bank and the customer also clearly show that what the bank took by assignment was the receivable claim, not the purchase of documents under the letter of credit. Because a letter of credit is legally a pure documentary transaction, only when a bank buys out the documents representing title to the goods and pays consideration can it constitute negotiation under a letter of credit. The relevant measures of the People's Bank of China on domestic letter of credit settlement explain this very thoroughly: a letter of credit is a documentary transaction, and buying the documents is the act of negotiation; whereas if what the bank substantively takes by assignment is a receivable and what it buys is a receivable, then its legal nature is assignment of claim and is fundamentally not negotiation under a letter of credit. Yet the bank, while clearly aware of this fact, still chose to vigorously mislead the judge in court. Therefore, the first-instance judgment in this first-instance case is undoubtedly a typical erroneous ruling, and likewise a case of a "bumpkin monk judging a muddled case"—a "Hulu Monk judging a Hulu case"—rendered by a "layman" judge after being hoodwinked by an "insider" bank deploying a set of specious financial rhetoric.

2.6 Banks' compliant operations, criminal risks and practical recommendations: the "clean hands principle"

2.6.1 Banks turning to suspected participation in or knowledge of the criminal offence of letter of credit fraud

As for a letter of credit being stopped from payment by a court, or fraud giving rise to recourse and repurchase issues, the characterization at the legal level is relatively clear. From the typical case between Industrial Bank and Postal Savings Bank of China heard by the Tianjin Higher People's Court, it can be seen [21] that the court ultimately ruled in favor of Postal Savings Bank and clearly held that the "repurchase clause" agreed in the business contract was lawful and valid. The legal effect of this judgment is currently not much disputed in judicial practice and banking practice. The real practical core of forfaiting today lies in this: when banks carry out such interbank trade financing or forfaiting business, they must absolutely not let the counterparty or the judicial authorities seize any substantive evidence proving that "the bank subjectively knew the underlying trade background was false" or that "the bank knew the letter of credit documents were forged." If the bank's subjective "knowledge" or "constructive knowledge" is confirmed by conclusive evidence in the counterparty's hands, then the bank will instantly lose in law the protective cloak of "bona fide third party" and be converted into a "non-bona fide subject," thereby losing the protection of the bona fide third party principle.

In the Tianjin court case cited above, the reason Postal Savings Bank was ultimately able to win was fundamentally that it successfully withstood the other side's proof regarding its "subjective knowledge." Once again I must repeatedly warn you all: when carrying out business, banks must absolutely not let the counterparty seize upon evidence that they already subjectively knew in advance that the trade background was false or fraudulent or that the documents contained false records. Once the counterparty proves with definite evidence that bank staff already knew in advance of letter of credit fraud and colluded or cooperated therein, the bank will not only be unable to recover the money but may even sink deep into the mire of criminal offences. These are often intertwined with many serious financial criminal charges such as money laundering, financial fraud, contract fraud, letter of credit fraud, and fraud in obtaining loans, bill acceptance, financial instruments and financial certificates. This directly involves the question of whether the bank subjectively knew or had a collusive false expression of intent with the criminal suspect.

2.6.2 Domestic letter of credit cases involving Hengfeng Bank and Bank of China

On this issue, let us look at another domestic letter of credit case involving Hengfeng Bank [22]. In that case, Hengfeng Bank had its "soft rib" seized by the other side through solid evidence. The evidence showed that when the bank opened the relevant letter of credit, it was fully aware in advance that there was fundamentally no real underlying physical trade background behind the business, and that the true purpose of opening the credit was purely to repay, on behalf of the local government, a maturing financing payment. Ultimately, because the court ascertained this collusive false expression of intent, it directly ruled in accordance with law to dismiss Hengfeng Bank's lawsuit. In another case [23], the court directly held: "There was no real transaction under the letter of credit between Linhai Company and Changli Cooperative, and the Changyi Sub-branch of Bank of China knew or ought to have known this, thereby proving that the Changyi Sub-branch of Bank of China colluded with Linhai Company to handle a false letter of credit transaction; payment under the letter of credit could not be returned in cash after the goods were sold through normal transactions, which increased the risk of liability of Hongda Company in providing a guarantee for the letter of credit financing, ran counter to Hongda Company's true expression of intent, and constituted fraud against Hongda Company. According to Article 30, Item 1 of the Guarantee Law of the People's Republic of China, the guarantor does not bear civil liability; at the same time, financing under a false letter of credit transaction also does not fall within the scope of guarantee covered by the maximum amount guarantee provided by Hongda Company, and the Changyi Sub-branch of Bank of China's request that Hongda Company bear guarantee liability also has no contractual basis."

By contrast, in another typical case involving Bank of China [24], after the incident came to light Bank of China was subjected to years-long, deeply penetrating criminal investigation and inquiry by the public security authorities. During those years, the entire business process, internal systems and handling personnel of that Bank of China branch were thoroughly "turned upside down" by the criminal investigation department. The counterparty also consistently asserted in the court and at the investigation stage during the civil proceedings that "Bank of China subjectively knew fully in advance and was deeply involved in this trade fraud." However, because Bank of China's internal compliance and risk control were relatively solid, it ultimately withstood the high-intensity, all-round scrutiny and test of the judicial authorities; not only did the criminal investigation results fail to prove any subjective collusion between the customer and the bank, but ultimately Bank of China successfully escaped danger in this "storm" and won the litigation. Therefore, when banks carry out trade financing business such as forfaiting and domestic letters of credit, front-line business personnel and management personnel must "keep their hands extremely clean" in their daily operations [25].

In yet another case, the parties signed a financial leasing contract, but then applied to China Zheshang Bank for the opening of a domestic letter of credit for financial financing; their true purpose was not financing materials but to obtain financing under the domestic letter of credit. The court ultimately determined that the case involved a collusive false expression of intent between the parties and ultimately held the signed contract invalid. [26]

2.6.3 Key points for attention for non-professional bank staff handling sensitive dispute cases

Therefore, in practice, I have several extremely critical compliance lessons that must be conveyed to you all: in the course of communicating with customers about business, bank staff must absolutely be prohibited from using WeChat or text messages to contact and communicate with customers, especially when trouble arises or there are signs of a dispute. In particular, never discuss on WeChat or in text messages those topics that cannot be clearly explained on compliance issues and that are baffling. Once these chat records are extracted by the other side as evidence in subsequent criminal investigation or civil dispute proceedings and submitted to the court, these unprofessional and imprecise communications may become evidence extremely unfavorable to the bank, causing the bank's lawful rights involving tens of millions or hundreds of millions in funds to be completely unrecoverable as a result. Before the bank and the customer sign the final written documents, try as far as possible not to let the handling personnel leave behind any written documents or traceable traces. Bank account managers and business personnel must strictly abide by professional ethics when facing customers; bank staff must "keep their hands clean." When advancing a project, never provide any non-compliant "technical pointers" or non-compliant promises to customers on WeChat. For example, you must absolutely not say to a customer: "If you write the materials this way, they definitely won't be approved; you should adopt such-and-such and such-and-such methods to package it; if you provide invoices this way, our risk control and compliance review definitely won't pass; you have to find another way." Never let your staff teach customers such crooked tricks to evade review. Once such WeChat traces of "pointers" and "packaging" are retained, what awaits you in the future is not only severe criminal liability; the bank may also bear corresponding fault liability in civil terms as a result. In the course of practice we have witnessed far too many such cases.

In the Bank of China case mentioned earlier, although it ultimately escaped, the entire investigation process was extremely perilous, and the bank's internal business processes and procedures were turned upside down. In that case, the customer involved, after being subjected to compulsory measures and imprisoned, ultimately under criminal pressure confessed all the facts completely in the interrogation room. He confessed that all the VAT invoices he had submitted to the bank back then for the opening of the credit and the handling of financing were, without exception, forged fake invoices. And when the bank originally examined these invoices, it not only failed to strictly verify the original invoices, but did not even properly carry out the most basic due diligence and authenticity penetration work. The legal representative of the legal person revealed all these circumstances in prison. So there is now a slightly joking yet extremely realistic saying circulating in the industry: when account managers in the credit department and trade finance department go to do business with customers and handle credit facilities, unless you are "sworn brothers" with that account manager who would "die for each other," able to smear blood as an oath at the critical moment and hold out to the end; otherwise, once that customer goes in because of other fraud or a blow-up, in order to seek meritorious service and a reduced sentence, the first thing he often confesses inside is the non-compliant conduct of your bank's handling personnel.

Another related case in Wenzhou likewise involved pure fake-invoice fraud [27]. Although in that case, through certain local-level coordination and efforts, the court showed leniency and let the bank scrape through, this is absolutely a non-replicable exception. In another case, however, the court held that when the issuing bank was confronted with repeatedly issued false invoices submitted by the beneficiary: "According to the provisions of the Measures for Settlement of Domestic Letters of Credit, the opening and transfer of a letter of credit shall be based on a genuine trade background. Industrial Bank Co., Ltd. also has explicit provisions on the opening of letters of credit, requiring the applicant to submit special VAT invoices (including the invoice copy and the deduction copy), waybills, original goods receipts, and original warehouse-out slips. Other clauses provide that tax invoice dates and shipment dates earlier than the letter of credit issuance date are not accepted. However, in the course of opening the letter of credit for Difeng Company, Industrial Bank Harbin Branch was remiss in examining the authenticity of the relevant materials and did not carefully review Difeng Company's VAT invoices. Difeng Company, in order to fraudulently procure the opening of the letter of credit by Industrial Bank Harbin Branch, used forged VAT invoices repeatedly, and the dates of issuance of the VAT invoices were November 2011 and February 2012, all earlier than the letter of credit issuance time. Industrial Bank Harbin Branch, when Difeng Company did not meet the conditions for the issuance of a letter of credit, violated its internal letter of credit issuance rules in issuing the letter of credit for Difeng Company. Industrial Bank Harbin Branch, in circumstances where the beneficiary Harbin Difeng Polyester Trading Co., Ltd. and Difeng Company were affiliated companies, failed to carefully review the purchase contracts, VAT invoices, transport documents, warehouse-in documents, etc. of the two parties to confirm whether the two parties had a genuine transaction relationship. This resulted in the success of the criminal acts of fraudulently obtaining the letter of credit by Sun Yanwang, the legal representative of Difeng Company, and others. The first-instance court's finding that Industrial Bank Harbin Branch was negligent in signing, reviewing and performing the contract is not inappropriate, and this Court confirms it." [28]

03. Conclusions and Recommendations

Therefore, from this lecture we can draw the following four final conclusions and opinions:

First, as to the determination of the validity of the repurchase clause in a forfaiting agreement, judicial practice generally tends to find it lawful and valid;

Second, where forfaiting and letter of credit negotiation coexist, China's current laws and judicial interpretations only provide targeted protection to the "good-faith negotiating bank," while the "forfaiting purchaser" cannot, as a matter of legal doctrine, directly obtain the protection of the legal principle of the good-faith third party. If in substance no lawful good-faith negotiation has been carried out, but merely the assignment of forfaiting receivables has been accepted in form, then once fraud is encountered and the domestic letter of credit or forfaiting transaction is enjoined from payment by a court, the letter of credit involved may, as a matter of law, be fully cancelled or ultimately terminated as to payment by the judicial authorities in accordance with law. In such circumstances, the bank's subsequent efforts to protect its rights will become extraordinarily difficult, because at that point the scales of law may not tip in your favor. If the forfaiting purchasing bank, to save trouble, directly takes the path of accepting an assignment of receivables from the beneficiary, the legal risks and asset gaps it faces will multiply, and its situation will be even more dangerous;

Third, the most core recommendation of today's lecture, and the one with the greatest practical guiding value, is that when a crisis erupts, everyone must at the fastest speed seize judicial jurisdiction over the case; seizing jurisdiction is the first battlefield that determines survival or death;

Fourth, and the last core compliance recommendation, is that banks must ensure that their own internal conduct throughout the entire business process is absolutely clean and free of defects.

At present, judicial practice has successively seen the emergence of some new types of domestic letter of credit and forfaiting dispute cases of larger scale and more complex circumstances, involving more deep-seated conflicts of legal doctrine and practice. Owing to time constraints, we will stop here today, and as for the remaining, more in-depth topics, we will, if there is an opportunity later, further exchange with you at tomorrow's Hangzhou conference. Thank you all.

Appendix to the Article

[1] This article is a transcript of a recording of a lecture by Lawyer Jin Saibo at an offline conference hosted by ICC China on May 22, 2026. For ease of reading and understanding, Jin Saibo himself revised and organized the text and added subheadings. The court case materials mentioned in the lecture, "Seminar Case Materials on Fraud in Domestic Letter of Credit Negotiation and Forfaiting and the Judicial Response to Court Injunctions - 20260525-8-Jin-Tianjin use-with cover," e-book link: https://jinsaibo.yunzhan365.com/books/kmad/mobile/index.html

[2] The data come from the annual operation report of the Digital Supply Chain Financial Service Platform (DSFP) of the Clearing Center of the People's Bank of China, see https://www.zhongzhico.cn/ywfw/xxgg/dsfp/202601/P020260124583991672694.pdf

[3] Article 49 of the Measures for Settlement of Domestic Letters of Credit (Announcement No. 10 [2016] of the People's Bank of China and the China Banking Regulatory Commission): Cancellation of a letter of credit means the act by which the issuing bank releases its payment liability for the unused amount of the letter of credit.

(1) Where the issuing bank, confirming bank or negotiating bank has not received documents within the validity period of the letter of credit, the issuing bank may cancel the letter of credit one month after the expiry of the validity period. The specific handling measures shall be determined by each bank itself.

(2) In other circumstances, the letter of credit may be cancelled only after the issuing bank, any confirming bank that has confirmed, any negotiating bank that has negotiated, and any transferring bank that has transferred have consulted and agreed with the beneficiary, or the beneficiary and the aforesaid confirming bank (negotiating bank, transferring bank) have declared their agreement to cancel the letter of credit and have reached agreement with the issuing bank on the return of the full set of original letters of credit.

[4] Article 4: All parties to a letter of credit business shall abide by the laws and regulations of the People's Republic of China and the provisions of these Measures, observe the principle of good faith, conscientiously perform their obligations, and shall not use letters of credit to engage in fraud or other illegal and criminal activities, and shall not harm the public interest of society.

[5] Article 14: Basic clauses of a letter of credit

A letter of credit shall be opened in Chinese and shall record the following clauses:

......

(8) Irrevocable letter of credit.

......

[6] Article 7: A letter of credit is independent of the underlying trade contract on which it is based. Even if the letter of credit contains any reference to such contract, banks are not concerned with it and are not bound by it.

[7] See in detail the first-instance civil ruling of the Shanghai Financial Court in "Ping An Bank Co., Ltd. Shanghai Branch v. Bank of Communications Co., Ltd. Xiangtan Branch and Shanghai Xulin International Trade Co., Ltd., other letter of credit dispute" (July 22, 2019). Case No.: (2019) Hu 74 Min Chu No. 1136. Presiding Judge: Cui Jie; Judge: Zhou Xin. For the second-instance judgment of the Shanghai High People's Court, see in detail the case materials e-book "Seminar Case Materials on Fraud in Domestic Letter of Credit Negotiation and Forfaiting and the Judicial Response to Court Injunctions - 20260525-8-Jin-Tianjin use-with cover," e-book link: https://jinsaibo.yunzhan365.com/books/kmad/mobile/index.html

[8] See in detail the civil ruling of the Supreme People's Court on retrial review and trial supervision in "Bank of East Asia (China) Limited Shanghai Branch and Jiangsu Puhua Co., Ltd., letter of credit fraud dispute" (December 18, 2020). Case No.: (2020) Zui Gao Fa Min Shen No. 2937. Members of the collegial panel: Wang Shumei, Yang Xingye, Guo Zaiyu. For the specific case materials, see "Seminar Case Materials on Fraud in Domestic Letter of Credit Negotiation and Forfaiting and the Judicial Response to Court Injunctions - 20260525-8-Jin-Tianjin use-with cover," e-book link: https://jinsaibo.yunzhan365.com/books/kmad/mobile/index.html

[9] See in detail the first-instance civil ruling of the Shanghai Financial Court in "Ping An Bank Co., Ltd. Shanghai Branch v. Bank of Communications Co., Ltd. Xiangtan Branch and Shanghai Xulin International Trade Co., Ltd., other letter of credit dispute" (July 22, 2019). Case No.: (2019) Hu 74 Min Chu No. 1136. Presiding Judge: Cui Jie; Judge: Zhou Xin. This case has a second-instance judgment. See the specific case materials "Seminar Case Materials on Fraud in Domestic Letter of Credit Negotiation and Forfaiting and the Judicial Response to Court Injunctions - 20260525-8-Jin-Tianjin use-with cover," e-book link: https://jinsaibo.yunzhan365.com/books/kmad/mobile/index.html

[10] See in detail the civil ruling of the Supreme People's Court on retrial review and trial supervision in "Bank of East Asia (China) Limited Shanghai Branch and Jiangsu Puhua Co., Ltd., letter of credit fraud dispute" (December 18, 2020). Case No.: (2020) Zui Gao Fa Min Shen No. 2937. Members of the collegial panel: Wang Shumei, Yang Xingye, Guo Zaiyu. For the specific case materials, see "Seminar Case Materials on Fraud in Domestic Letter of Credit Negotiation and Forfaiting and the Judicial Response to Court Injunctions - 20260525-8-Jin-Tianjin use-with cover," e-book link: https://jinsaibo.yunzhan365.com/books/kmad/mobile/index.html

[11] See in detail the second-instance civil judgment of the Jiangsu Provincial High People's Court in "Bank of East Asia (China) Limited Shanghai Branch v. Bank of Beijing Co., Ltd. Nanjing Branch, letter of credit negotiation dispute" (January 21, 2019). Case No.: (2018) Su Min Zhong No. 1385. Members of the collegial panel: Wang Tianhong, He Yonghong, Chen Liang. For the specific case materials, see "Seminar Case Materials on Fraud in Domestic Letter of Credit Negotiation and Forfaiting and the Judicial Response to Court Injunctions - 20260525-8-Jin-Tianjin use-with cover," e-book link: https://jinsaibo.yunzhan365.com/books/kmad/mobile/index.html

[12] See in detail the second-instance civil judgment of the Zhejiang Provincial High People's Court in "Zhejiang Xingye Group Co., Ltd. and Ningbo Huaju International Trade Co., Ltd., letter of credit fraud dispute" (April 29, 2019). Case No.: (2018) Zhe Min Zhong No. 321. Members of the collegial panel: Zhang Hengzhu, Wang Jianfang, Kong Fanhong. For the specific case materials, see "Seminar Case Materials on Fraud in Domestic Letter of Credit Negotiation and Forfaiting and the Judicial Response to Court Injunctions - 20260525-8-Jin-Tianjin use-with cover," e-book link: https://jinsaibo.yunzhan365.com/books/kmad/mobile/index.html

[13] Civil Judgment of the Sichuan Provincial High People's Court in the contract dispute case of "Dalian Bank Co., Ltd. Chengdu Branch v. Sichuan Keheng Mining (Group) Co., Ltd." (2 September 2015). In this case, the Sichuan High People's Court clearly held that forfaiting is not equivalent to negotiation under a letter of credit.

[14] Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues Concerning the Trial of Letter of Credit Dispute Cases (Fa Shi [2005] No. 13), effective as of 1 January 2006. It filled the gap of the lack of specialized legislation in the field of letters of credit in China and is the fundamental basis for courts at all levels in trying letter of credit dispute cases.

[15] Article 545 of the Civil Code of the People's Republic of China: A creditor may assign all or part of its claim to a third person, except in any of the following circumstances:

(1) the claim may not be assigned according to its nature;

(2) the claim may not be assigned according to the agreement of the parties;

(3) the claim may not be assigned according to the provisions of law.

Where the parties agree that a non-monetary claim may not be assigned, such agreement may not be asserted against a bona fide third person. Where the parties agree that a monetary claim may not be assigned, such agreement may not be asserted against any third person.

[16] Article 10 of the Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues Concerning the Trial of Letter of Credit Dispute Cases (Fa Shi [2005] No. 13): Where the people's court determines that letter of credit fraud exists, it shall rule to suspend payment or enter a judgment terminating payment of the funds under the letter of credit, except in any of the following circumstances:

(1) the nominated person or authorized person of the issuing bank has already made payment in good faith in accordance with the instructions of the issuing bank;

(2) the issuing bank or its nominated person or authorized person has already accepted the instruments under the letter of credit in good faith;

(3) the confirming bank has already performed its payment obligation in good faith;

(4) the negotiating bank has already negotiated in good faith.

Questions and answers

Can a domestic letter of credit be cancelled under the Measures for Settlement of Domestic Letters of Credit?

Yes, but only in limited circumstances. Article 49 allows cancellation one month after expiry if no documents were received, or at any time with the agreement of the issuing bank, confirming bank, negotiating bank, transferring bank and beneficiary. If negotiation or forfaiting has already occurred, those parties are unlikely to consent.

What legal protection does a bona fide negotiating bank have under the Letter of Credit Judicial Interpretation?

Article 10 of the Letter of Credit Judicial Interpretation protects a negotiating bank that has negotiated in good faith. If the negotiating bank did not participate in fraud and bought complying documents from the beneficiary as nominated by the issuing bank, its rights as subsequent holder are superior and cut off the beneficiary's defences.

Why is a forfaiting purchaser not protected as a bona fide third party under the fraud exception?

Forfaiting is essentially an assignment of receivables. The purchaser stands in the beneficiary's shoes and takes the claim subject to the same defects and defences. Article 10 of the Letter of Credit Judicial Interpretation only protects bona fide negotiating banks, not pure forfaiting purchasers, so the purchaser cannot invoke the fraud exception.

What jurisdiction strategy should a negotiating bank or forfaiting purchaser adopt after a letter of credit is cancelled?

They should file suit first at their own location against the issuing bank or the party from which they purchased. Shanghai courts have accepted jurisdiction because the negotiating bank is the party receiving currency, making its location a place of contract performance. Suing in the Northwest region risks local protectionism.

What are the seven conditions for a qualified letter of credit negotiation?

The seven conditions are: express negotiation authorization in the letter of credit; advising bank's written acceptance of the negotiation designation; beneficiary's transfer of documents and application for negotiation; a signed negotiation agreement and actual payment without recourse; conforming presentation; covering letter informing the issuing bank of negotiation; and actual completion of payment to the beneficiary.

Laws and cases cited

Laws

  • Guarantee Law of the People's Republic of China

Regulations

  • Measures for Settlement of Domestic Letters of Credit

Judicial interpretations

  • Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues Concerning the Trial of Cases Involving Letter of Credit Disputes

Cases

  • Bank of East Asia case
  • Zhejiang Zhoushan Bank of Communications case
  • ANZ Bank case
  • Tianjin Higher People's Court case between Industrial Bank and Postal Savings Bank of China
  • Industrial Bank Harbin Branch case
  • Sichuan Provincial High People's Court case
  • Jiangsu Provincial High People's Court case

References

  1. See Article 3 "Interpretations" of the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP600): "Branches of a bank in different countries are considered to be separate banks." That is, "branches of the same bank established in different countries shall be regarded as mutually independent banks." This rule is merely a rule for identifying entities under the business rules of letters of credit, and does not of course mean that branches have independent legal personality in the sense of company law or banking supervision law.
  2. Civil judgment of second instance of the Zhejiang Provincial High People's Court in "appellant China Minsheng Bank Co., Ltd. Suzhou Branch v. appellees Zhejiang Huamao International Trade Co., Ltd., defendants of first instance Shanghai Yuyudu Steel Trade Co., Ltd. and Changshu Xingdao Emerging Building Materials Co., Ltd., and third party of first instance China Minsheng Bank Co., Ltd. Ningbo Branch, letter of credit fraud dispute" (16 September 2011). The full text of the case judgment is available in the specific case materials "Seminar Case Materials on Fraud in Domestic Letter of Credit Negotiation and Forfaiting and the Judicial Response to Court Payment Stops - 20260525-8-Jin-Tianjin Use-With Cover", e-book link: https://jinsaibo.yunzhan365.com/books/kmad/mobile/index.html
  3. Civil Judgment of the Sichuan Provincial High People's Court in the contract dispute case of "Dalian Bank Co., Ltd. Chengdu Branch v. Sichuan Keheng Mining (Group) Co., Ltd." (2 September 2015). See also the first-instance civil judgment of the Xuzhou Intermediate People's Court of Jiangsu Province in the case of "Industrial Bank Co., Ltd. Xuzhou Branch v. Xuzhou Jinnuo Decoration Engineering Co., Ltd., Xuzhou Dayalin Hotel Co., Ltd. and others, financial loan contract dispute" (5 December 2014). See also the first-instance civil judgment of the Wuxing District People's Court of Huzhou City, Zhejiang Province in the case of "Shanghai Pudong Development Bank Co., Ltd. Huzhou Branch v. Zhejiang Huifeng Industry and Trade Co., Ltd., Sixian Huifeng Real Estate Co., Ltd. and others, financial loan contract dispute" (17 March 2014). The full text of the case judgments is available in the specific case materials "Seminar Case Materials on Fraud in Domestic Letter of Credit Negotiation and Forfaiting and the Judicial Response to Court Payment Stops - 20260525-8-Jin-Tianjin Use-With Cover", e-book link: https://jinsaibo.yunzhan365.com/books/kmad/mobile/index.html
  4. Chapter VI Negotiation, Article 35 of the Measures for Domestic Letter of Credit Settlement: Negotiation means, under a negotiable letter of credit, where the documents are in compliance or where the issuing bank or confirming bank has confirmed payment at maturity, the act of the negotiating bank, before receiving payment from the issuing bank or confirming bank, of purchasing the documents, acquiring the right to claim payment under the letter of credit, and advancing funds or agreeing to advance funds to the beneficiary. A negotiating bank's examination and forwarding of documents without advancing funds or agreeing to advance funds does not constitute negotiation.
  5. See in detail the civil judgment of second instance of the Tianjin First Intermediate People's Court in "Industrial Bank Co., Ltd. Tianjin Branch and Postal Savings Bank of China Co., Ltd. Heilongjiang Branch, contract dispute" (24 May 2021). Case No.: (2021) Jin 01 Min Zhong No. 1840. Members of the collegial panel: Liu Fang, Yang Arong, Zhang Zhiguo. The full text of the case judgment is available in the specific case materials "Seminar Case Materials on Fraud in Domestic Letter of Credit Negotiation and Forfaiting and the Judicial Response to Court Payment Stops - 20260525-8-Jin-Tianjin Use-With Cover", e-book link: https://jinsaibo.yunzhan365.com/books/kmad/mobile/index.html
  6. See in detail the first-instance civil judgment of the Shaoxing Intermediate People's Court of Zhejiang Province in "Hengfeng Bank Co., Ltd. Shaoxing Branch v. Zhejiang Kelite Machinery Co., Ltd., Luo Chuguan and others, letter of credit financing dispute" (12 June 2016). Case No.: (2015) Zhe Shao Shang Wai Chu Zi No. 65. Members of the collegial panel: Qin Shankui, Zhou Ying, Zhang Wanjiang. The full text of the case judgment is available in the specific case materials "Seminar Case Materials on Fraud in Domestic Letter of Credit Negotiation and Forfaiting and the Judicial Response to Court Payment Stops - 20260525-8-Jin-Tianjin Use-With Cover", e-book link: https://jinsaibo.yunzhan365.com/books/kmad/mobile/index.html
  7. Civil judgment of second instance of the Weifang Intermediate People's Court of Shandong Province in "Bank of China Co., Ltd. Changyi Branch v. Shandong Hongda Ginger Market Co., Ltd., financial loan contract dispute" (30 November 2017).
  8. See in detail the civil judgment of second instance of the Jiangsu Provincial High People's Court in "Nanjing Yuangang Petrochemical Co., Ltd., Jiangsu Xingdi Real Estate Co., Ltd. and others v. Bank of China Co., Ltd. Danyang Branch, Jiangsu Runyang Weiye Technology Co., Ltd. and others, letter of credit issuance dispute" (11 December 2020). Case No.: (2019) Su Min Zhong No. 174. Members of the collegial panel: Li Daoli, Chen Jun, Guo Qun. See also the civil judgment of second instance of the Zhejiang Provincial High People's Court in "Zhejiang Jiyang Construction Group Co., Ltd. v. China Everbright Bank Co., Ltd. Shaoxing Branch, guarantee contract dispute" (25 October 2019), in which the bank's staff member had been convicted of a criminal offence and the court nevertheless held the guarantee contract involved to be valid. The full text of the case judgment is available in the specific case materials "Seminar Case Materials on Fraud in Domestic Letter of Credit Negotiation and Forfaiting and the Judicial Response to Court Payment Stops - 20260525-8-Jin-Tianjin Use-With Cover", e-book link: https://jinsaibo.yunzhan365.com/books/kmad/mobile/index.html
  9. For a case in which the underlying transaction involved a criminal offence but the contract was nevertheless valid, see the civil judgment of second instance of the Shandong Provincial High People's Court in "Shenyang Langqin Real Estate Co., Ltd. v. Shandong Provincial Financial Asset Management Co., Ltd., letter of credit dispute" (16 September 2019).
  10. Civil judgment of second instance of the Guangzhou Intermediate People's Court of Guangdong Province in "Guangzhou Suihao Financial Leasing Co., Ltd. v. Hebei Shenghua Chemical Co., Ltd., contract dispute" (30 December 2020) [in name a financial leasing financing but in substance a loan; the act of collusive false expression of intent is invalid].
  11. See in detail the first-instance civil judgment of the Wenzhou Intermediate People's Court of Zhejiang Province in "Shanghai Pudong Development Bank Co., Ltd. Wenzhou Branch v. Zhejiang Dongchen Industry Co., Ltd., Zhejiang Oumailun Machinery Co., Ltd. and others, letter of credit dispute" (8 May 2014). Case No.: (2012) Zhe Wen Shang Wai Chu Zi No. 208. Presiding judge: Cao Xinxin; judge: Zheng Ye.
  12. Civil judgment of second instance of the Harbin Intermediate People's Court of Heilongjiang Province in "Industrial Bank Co., Ltd. Harbin Branch v. Harbin Enterprise Credit Financing Guarantee Service Center, financial loan contract dispute" (25 January 2017).