Enterprises going global cannot avoid "domestic guarantee for offshore lending", and where an offshore enterprise raises financing onshore, "offshore guarantee for onshore lending" is used. Besides independent guarantees, the standby letter of credit is another widely accepted form of financing guarantee or performance security. This article discusses two practical and legal issues that commonly arise where a standby letter of credit stipulates that it is issued subject to the UCP600.

Whether, where a standby letter of credit stipulates that it is issued under the UCP600, it should be characterised and identified in priority according to the terms of the letter of credit

The UCP600 is essentially a set of international letter of credit rules formulated and promulgated by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), and its object of regulation is primarily commercial letter of credit transactions. If the terms of a standby letter of credit themselves expressly stipulate that it is issued subject to the UCP600, the parties' intention is in fact already very clear, namely to treat the standby letter of credit as a letter of credit and bring it within the system of letter of credit rules. Therefore, in such circumstances, whether a Chinese court should still, as in the precedent of the Supreme People's Court in the case of "ANZ Bank Manila Branch v. Bank of Jiangsu", merely on the basis that a standby letter of credit has a guarantee function[1], still characterise it as an independent guarantee and apply the judicial interpretation on independent guarantees is a question worthy of study.

Case type one: standby letters of credit issued under the UCP600 are characterised as letters of credit, with the law on letters of credit applied

First, the case in point is the "Ningxia Tianyuan Manganese Industry case[2]", a second-instance reconsideration ruling by the Higher People's Court of Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region in 2014. This is an early case involving standby letter of credit fraud and injunctive relief against payment. In the case, China Construction Bank issued a standby letter of credit involving an amount of approximately USD 50 million. However, judging from the publicly available court judgment documents, the court did not clearly state which set of international rules the standby letter of credit was issued under, nor did it clearly state whether the International Standby Practices (ISP98) or the UCP600 applied.

It is noteworthy, however, that when the Ningxia High Court dealt with the application for an injunction against payment in that case, it directly applied the Supreme People's Court's judicial interpretation, the Provisions on Several Issues Concerning the Trial of Cases of Disputes over Letters of Credit, and dealt with the fraud and injunctive relief issues concerning the standby letter of credit in accordance with the legal provisions governing letter of credit cases. That is to say, although the instrument involved in the case was named a standby letter of credit, the court did not characterise it from the perspective of its guarantee function, but directly characterised it as a letter of credit and applied the law on letters of credit in ruling to suspend the standby letter of credit.

This case is of great significance because it reflects that, before the Supreme People's Court's judicial interpretation on independent guarantees took effect, Chinese courts' traditional understanding of standby letters of credit was still to bring them within the legal regime of letters of credit for characterisation purposes. Because at that time, when Chinese courts were faced with standby letter of credit disputes, the only law they could apply was the judicial interpretation on letters of credit; the judicial interpretation on independent guarantees was still in the process of being drafted and discussed at that time (and was ultimately promulgated and took effect in 2016). Therefore, courts naturally tended to characterise and apply the law in accordance with letter of credit cases.

Subsequently, a related case heard by the Beijing No. 3 Intermediate People's Court in 2015[3] further demonstrated a clear judgment in which a Chinese court characterised and dealt with a standby letter of credit issued under the UCP600 as a letter of credit.

In that case, Standard Chartered Bank Beijing Branch issued a standby letter of credit to Standard Chartered Bank Hong Kong Branch, and the standby letter of credit expressly stipulated the application of the UCP600. The background of the case likewise involved a domestic guarantee for offshore lending financing transaction. When dealing with the case, the court did not characterise the standby letter of credit as an independent guarantee because of its guarantee function, but characterised and dealt with it in accordance with the legal relationship of a letter of credit, and ultimately applied China's judicial interpretation on letters of credit.

It can be seen from this case that if a standby letter of credit expressly stipulates the application of the UCP600, then the court's treatment of it as a letter of credit is, in terms of legal logic, more consistent with the principle of party autonomy. Because the UCP600 is itself a set of letter of credit rules, the parties' choice of the UCP600 itself indicates that their expectation is the application of the law on letters of credit rather than the judicial interpretation on independent guarantees.

Thereafter, in the 2016 case of "Minsheng Bank and ICBC (Asia)"[4] heard by the Guangzhou Intermediate People's Court, the background was likewise a domestic guarantee for offshore lending transaction. Minsheng Bank issued a standby letter of credit to Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (Asia) in Hong Kong, but the parties agreed that the UCP600 would apply to the standby letter of credit. At that time, the Supreme People's Court's judicial interpretation on independent guarantees had not yet formally taken effect, so the Guangzhou Intermediate Court expressly applied the judicial interpretation on letters of credit in that case.

This case is even more noteworthy because it in fact further confirms that even if a standby letter of credit is commercially similar to an independent guarantee, as long as the parties expressly agree on the application of the UCP600, Chinese courts will still characterise it as a letter of credit and apply the law on letters of credit to deal with it. In other words, in that case the court did not simply characterise the standby letter of credit as having a guarantee nature on the basis that it itself has a guarantee function; the court's judgment respected the parties' choice of rules and thus correctly applied the law on letters of credit. This differs to some extent from the later approach in the "ANZ Bank Manila v. Korea" case, which emphasised the guarantee-function attribute of standby letters of credit.

Thereafter, in a 2018 standby letter of credit financing case involving the Export-Import Bank of China heard by the Beijing No. 4 Intermediate People's Court[5], the characterisation and choice of law of the standby letter of credit were also involved. In that case, the Export-Import Bank of China issued a standby letter of credit to an offshore branch of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and the standby letter of credit expressly stipulated the application of the UCP600. From the transaction structure, the case was likewise a typical domestic guarantee for offshore lending financing arrangement.

In that case, after the offshore branch of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China advanced the funds and obtained reimbursement from the Export-Import Bank of China under the standby letter of credit, the Export-Import Bank of China then sought recourse against the applicant for the advanced funds. The Beijing No. 4 Court ultimately recognised the parties' agreement on payment and recourse, but did not elaborate in detail on whether the standby letter of credit was a letter of credit or an independent guarantee. Nevertheless, judging from the outcome of the case, the court in fact accepted the validity of the parties' transaction arrangement under the UCP600. It is noteworthy that the judgment document in this case was issued after the independent guarantee judicial interpretation took effect, that is, after 2016.

Case type two: standby letters of credit issued under the UCP600 are characterised by courts as transactions of a guarantee nature

At the same time, there are also a few courts that adopt a completely different position on characterisation and choice of law. For example, in a second-instance case heard by the Shandong High Court[6], a situation arose in which a standby letter of credit issued under the UCP600 was characterised as a contract of a guarantee nature. For example, in the case at first instance before the Yantai Intermediate People's Court and at second instance before the Higher People's Court of Shandong Province[7], the standby letter of credit in the case was expressly issued under the UCP600, but the court did not deal with it in accordance with the legal relationship of a letter of credit; instead, it characterised it as a guarantee and further dealt with the relevant issues in accordance with a suretyship relationship. This approach of the Shandong court may be seriously problematic, because the guarantee it found was not an independent guarantee but an accessory suretyship guarantee.

Because since the standby letter of credit expressly stipulated the application of the UCP600, then from the perspective of the parties' expression of intent, their clear intention was to have it characterised as a letter of credit and to have the legal rules on letters of credit applied. If the Shandong court, merely because the standby letter of credit has a guarantee function, changed its legal nature, characterised it as an accessory suretyship and applied the traditional law on accessory suretyship to deal with it, such a judgment clearly contravenes the parties' intent, and its interpretation of the parties' agreement, that is, their true intent, and its characterisation of the legal nature are clearly erroneous and unreasonable.

Case type three: characterisation and choice of law where the standby letter of credit does not expressly stipulate which rules or which law apply

In addition, in some cases the court did not even ascertain as a matter of fact the rules under which the standby letter of credit was issued or the law that applied to it; the court's judgment document actually failed to record the rules and law that the standby letter of credit stipulated as the basis for its issuance or as applicable. These cases further show that when Chinese courts deal with standby letter of credit disputes, their understanding of whether a standby letter of credit is a letter of credit or an independent guarantee, and which legal rules should apply, is unclear in individual cases.

For example, in a case heard by the Supreme People's Court, "Kabushiki Kaisha Haiyan Sogo Architects Office v. Jincheng International Group and Jiangyin Jinsheng Hotel"[8], the standby letter of credit at issue was issued by a Hong Kong bank in China upon the applicant's application, with CITIC Bank within mainland China as beneficiary. The background of the case was in fact based on an "offshore guarantee for onshore lending" structure, the opposite direction to the "domestic guarantee for offshore lending" transactions discussed earlier. However, in the Supreme Court's final judgment document, the court did not clearly state the rules under which the standby letter of credit was issued, nor did it state which governing law should apply, nor did it clearly state whether Hong Kong law or the law of mainland China applied.

Summary: different characterisations and choices of law for standby letters of credit subject to the UCP600 produce different legal consequences

Where issues such as the priority right over the margin for the issuance of the letter of credit are involved, a different legal characterisation of a standby letter of credit that stipulates the application of the UCP600 will directly affect the court's final adjudication outcome. If it is characterised as a letter of credit, the judicial interpretation on letters of credit applies; if it is found to be an independent guarantee, the relevant legal rules in the judicial interpretation on independent guarantees may apply; if it is further characterised as an ordinary accessory suretyship contract, then a completely different legal system will apply, such as the accessory suretyship rules in the Civil Code or the former Guarantee Law. The court's judgment outcome will be entirely different. This is precisely one of the biggest problems in the current judicial practice concerning standby letters of credit in China: there is still a lack of uniform adjudication standards for the legal characterisation and choice of law of standby letters of credit issued under the UCP600. It is hoped that the Supreme People's Court will further clarify this in future cases.

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Questions and answers

How do Chinese courts characterise a standby letter of credit that stipulates application of the UCP600?

Chinese courts are divided. Some courts, such as the Ningxia High Court, Beijing No. 3 Intermediate Court, Guangzhou Intermediate Court, and Beijing No. 4 Intermediate Court, characterise such standby letters of credit as letters of credit and apply the judicial interpretation on letters of credit. Others, such as the Shandong High Court, characterise them as independent guarantees or accessory suretyships.

What are the legal consequences of different characterisations of a standby letter of credit under UCP600?

If characterised as a letter of credit, the judicial interpretation on letters of credit applies. If found to be an independent guarantee, the judicial interpretation on independent guarantees may apply. If characterised as an ordinary accessory suretyship contract, the accessory suretyship rules in the Civil Code or the former Guarantee Law apply. The court's judgment outcome will be entirely different.

Why do some Chinese courts treat a standby letter of credit under UCP600 as a letter of credit rather than an independent guarantee?

Because the UCP600 is a set of letter of credit rules, the parties' choice of the UCP600 indicates their expectation that the law on letters of credit applies. Courts respecting party autonomy therefore characterise the standby letter of credit as a letter of credit, especially where the instrument expressly stipulates application of the UCP600.

Laws and cases cited

Laws

  • Civil Code
  • Guarantee Law

Judicial interpretations

  • Provisions on Several Issues Concerning the Trial of Cases of Disputes over Letters of Credit
  • judicial interpretation on independent guarantees

Standards

  • UCP600

Cases

  • ANZ Bank Manila Branch v. Bank of Jiangsu
  • Ningxia Tianyuan Manganese Industry case
  • Minsheng Bank and ICBC (Asia)
  • Kabushiki Kaisha Haiyan Sogo Architects Office v. Jincheng International Group and Jiangyin Jinsheng Hotel

References

  1. See in detail the series of civil judgments of the Supreme People's Court in "China Power Engineering Co., Ltd., Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited Manila Branch and others letter of credit fraud dispute". Case numbers: (2020) Zui Gao Fa Shang Chu No. 2 and No. 3. Members of the collegial panel: Shen Hongyu, Xi Xiangyang, Sun Xiangzhuang, Yu Xiaohan, Guo Zaiyu.
  2. For the first-instance judgment in this case, see the first-instance civil ruling of the Yinchuan Intermediate People's Court of Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, "Ningxia Tianyuan Manganese Industry Co., Ltd. v. MANGANESE TRADING LIMITED and China Construction Bank Corporation Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region Branch, application to suspend payment under a letter of credit" (3 September 2014). Case No.: (2014) Yin Min Shang Wai Chu Zi No. 3-1. Members of the collegial panel: Niu Youcheng, Shen Yu, Zhang Jing. For the second instance in this case, see the pre-litigation preservation second-instance civil ruling of the Higher People's Court of Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, "MANGANESE TRADING LIMITED v. Ningxia Tianyuan Manganese Industry Co., Ltd." (4 December 2014). Case No.: (2014) Ning Min Shang Wai Zhong Zi No. 2. Members of the collegial panel: Li Fengying, Tao Aizhen, Luo Weijiang.
  3. For details, see the first-instance civil judgment of the Beijing Third Intermediate People's Court, "Hebei Kaiyuan Real Estate Development Co., Ltd. v. Standard Chartered Bank (China) Limited Beijing Branch, dispute over Agricultural Bank letter of credit issuance" (20 March 2015). Case No.:
  4. For details, see the first-instance civil ruling of the Guangzhou Intermediate People's Court of Guangdong Province, "China Minsheng Banking Corp., Ltd. Guangzhou Branch v. Guangzhou Yatong Metal Co., Ltd., China Metal Recycling (Holdings) Limited, Environmental Protection Steel Co., Ltd., and Zhonghuan Steel (Macau Offshore Commercial Services) Co., Ltd., dispute over right of recourse" (20 May 2016). Case No.: (2013) Sui Zhong Fa Min Si Chu Zi No. 42. Members of the collegial panel: Xu Yubao, Luo Yi, Chen Zhongjie.
  5. For details, see the first-instance civil judgment of the Beijing Fourth Intermediate People's Court, "Export-Import Bank of China v. Wang Qiao'er and others, letter of credit financing dispute" (6 June 2018). Case No.: (2017) Jing 04 Min Chu No. 21. Members of the collegial panel: Gao Jing, Wen Zhijun, Zhao Guilan.
  6. For details, see the enforcement ruling of the Yantai Intermediate People's Court, "Woori Bank (China) Limited Shenzhen Branch and China Great Wall Asset Management Corporation Jinan Office v. Shoubao Real Estate (Yantai) Co., Ltd." (21 January 2015). Case No.: (2015) Yan Zhi Yi Zi No. 2. Members of the collegial panel: Fu Guangbo, Wu Guorong, Tan Lili.
  7. For details, see the enforcement ruling of the Higher People's Court of Shandong Province, "China Great Wall Asset Management Corporation Jinan Office and Korea Development Bank Guangzhou Branch v. Seoul Xingbao Real Estate (Yantai) Co., Ltd., application for recognition and enforcement of court judgments and arbitral awards" (8 April 2015). Case No.: (2015) Lu Zhi Fu Zi No. 18. Members of the collegial panel: Ma Xiangwei, Liu Shuhong, Chen Jushan.
  8. For details, see the retrial civil ruling of the Supreme People's Court, "Kaiyan Sogo Architects & Engineers Co., Ltd., Jincheng International Group Co., Ltd., and Jiangyin Jinsheng Hotel Co., Ltd., dispute over guarantee right of recourse" (24 December 2012). Case No.: (2012) Min Ti Zi No. 182. Members of the collegial panel: Gao Xiaoli, Shen Hongyu, Wu Guangrong.