Introduction
When a standby letter of credit expressly stipulates that it is issued subject to the UCP600, how exactly should Chinese courts characterise the legal nature of the standby letter of credit and how should they apply the law? This is the question this article explores.
01. When a standby letter of credit stipulates that it is issued under the UCP600, should characterisation and identification preferentially follow the choice of letter of credit terms?
The UCP600 is essentially a set of international letter of credit rules formulated and promulgated by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), and its object of regulation is primarily commercial letter of credit transactions. If the terms of a standby letter of credit themselves expressly stipulate that it is issued subject to the UCP600, the parties' expression of intent is in fact already very clear: they intend to treat the standby letter of credit as a letter of credit and bring it within the system of letter of credit rules. Therefore, in such circumstances, whether Chinese courts should still, as in the precedent of the Supreme People's Court in the case of "ANZ Bank Manila Branch v. Bank of Jiangsu", merely rely on the fact that a standby letter of credit has a guarantee function[1] and thus still characterise it as an independent guarantee and apply the judicial interpretation on independent guarantees is a question worthy of study.
Judging from other cases that Chinese courts have already heard, different Chinese courts have in fact not formed a unified adjudicative view. Some Chinese courts treat standby letters of credit issued under the UCP600 as letters of credit and apply the Supreme People's Court's judicial interpretation, the "Provisions on Several Issues Concerning the Trial of Letter of Credit Dispute Cases"; however, other Chinese courts have characterised them as legal relationships of a guarantee nature and even ultimately applied the judicial interpretation on independent guarantees. It can be seen that there are obvious differences between the adjudicating courts, which further shows that the characterisation of the legal nature of standby letters of credit in Chinese judicial practice in fact still involves a certain degree of uncertainty.
1.1 One type of case: standby letters of credit issued under the UCP600 are characterised as letters of credit, with letter of credit law applied
First, one such case is the "Ningxia Tianyuan Manganese Industry case"[2], a second-instance reconsideration ruling by the Higher People's Court of Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region in 2014. This was an early case involving standby letter of credit fraud and injunctive relief against payment. In the case, China Construction Bank issued a standby letter of credit involving an amount of approximately USD 50 million. However, judging from the publicly available court judgment documents, the court did not clearly state under which set of international rules the standby letter of credit was issued, nor did it clearly state whether the ISP98 or the UCP600 applied.
It is worth noting, however, that when the Ningxia High Court dealt with the application for an injunction against payment in the case, it directly applied the Supreme People's Court's judicial interpretation, the "Provisions on Several Issues Concerning the Trial of Letter of Credit Dispute Cases", and dealt with the fraud and injunction issues concerning the standby letter of credit in accordance with the legal provisions on letter of credit cases. That is to say, although the standby letter of credit involved in the case was called a standby letter of credit, the court did not characterise it from the perspective of its guarantee function, but directly characterised it as a letter of credit and applied letter of credit law in ruling to suspend the standby letter of credit.
This case is of great significance because it reflects that, before the Supreme People's Court's judicial interpretation on independent guarantees took effect, Chinese courts' traditional understanding of standby letters of credit was still to bring them within the letter of credit legal system for characterisation. Because at that time, when Chinese courts faced standby letter of credit disputes, the only law they could apply was the judicial interpretation on letters of credit; the judicial interpretation on independent guarantees was still in the process of being drafted and discussed at that time (and was ultimately promulgated and took effect in 2016), so courts naturally tended to characterise and apply the law in accordance with letter of credit cases.
Subsequently, a related case heard by the Beijing No. 3 Intermediate People's Court in 2015[3] further reflected a clear judgment in which a Chinese court characterised and dealt with a standby letter of credit issued under the UCP600 as a letter of credit.
In that case, Standard Chartered Bank Beijing Branch issued a standby letter of credit to Standard Chartered Bank Hong Kong Branch, and the standby letter of credit expressly stipulated the application of the UCP600. The background of the case likewise involved a domestic guarantee for overseas lending financing transaction. When handling the case, the court did not characterise the standby letter of credit as an independent guarantee because it had a guarantee function, but instead characterised and dealt with it in accordance with the legal relationship of a letter of credit, and ultimately applied China's judicial interpretation on letters of credit.
From this case it can be seen that if a standby letter of credit expressly stipulates the application of the UCP600, then the court's treatment of it as a letter of credit is, in terms of legal logic, more consistent with the principle of party autonomy. Because the UCP600 itself is a set of letter of credit rules, the parties' choice of the UCP600 itself indicates that their expectation is to apply letter of credit law rather than the judicial interpretation on independent guarantees.
Thereafter, in the "Minsheng Bank and ICBC (Asia) case"[4] heard by the Guangzhou Intermediate People's Court in 2016, the background was likewise a domestic guarantee for overseas lending transaction. Minsheng Bank issued a standby letter of credit to ICBC (Asia) in Hong Kong, but the parties agreed that the UCP600 would apply to the standby letter of credit. At that time, the Supreme People's Court's judicial interpretation on independent guarantees had also not yet formally taken effect, so the Guangzhou Intermediate Court in that case expressly applied the judicial interpretation on letters of credit.
This case is even more noteworthy because it in fact further confirms that even if a standby letter of credit is similar to an independent guarantee in commercial function, as long as the parties expressly agree on the application of the UCP600, Chinese courts will still characterise it as a letter of credit and apply letter of credit law to handle it. In other words, in that case the court did not simply characterise the standby letter of credit as having a guarantee nature on the basis that it itself has a guarantee function; the court's judgment respected the parties' choice of rules and thus correctly applied letter of credit law. This differs to a certain extent from the later approach in the "ANZ Bank Manila v. Korea case", which emphasised the guarantee-function attribute of standby letters of credit.
Thereafter, in a standby letter of credit financing case involving the Export-Import Bank of China heard by the Beijing No. 4 Intermediate People's Court in 2018[5], issues of characterisation of the nature of the standby letter of credit and choice of law were also involved. In that case, the Export-Import Bank of China issued a standby letter of credit to an overseas branch of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and the standby letter of credit expressly stipulated the application of the UCP600. From the perspective of the transaction structure, the case likewise involved a typical domestic guarantee for overseas lending financing arrangement.
In that case, after the overseas branch of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China advanced funds and obtained reimbursement from the Export-Import Bank of China under the standby letter of credit, the Export-Import Bank of China then sought recourse against the applicant for the advanced funds. The Beijing No. 4 Court ultimately recognised the parties' agreement on payment and recourse, but did not elaborate in detail on whether the standby letter of credit was a letter of credit or an independent guarantee. However, judging from the outcome of the case, the court in fact accepted the validity of the parties' transaction arrangement under the UCP600. It is worth noting that the judgment document in this case was issued after the independent guarantee judicial interpretation took effect, that is, after 2016.
1.2 The second type of case: standby letters of credit issued under the UCP600 are characterised by courts as transactions of a guarantee nature
Thus, from the above cases it can be seen that, at least in the judicial practice of some important courts, Chinese courts characterise standby letters of credit issued under the UCP600 as letters of credit and apply letter of credit law to deal with them. At the same time, however, there are also some individual courts that adopt a completely different position on characterisation and choice of law.
For example, in a second-instance case heard by the Shandong High Court[6], a situation arose in which a standby letter of credit issued under the UCP600 was characterised as a contract of a guarantee nature. For example, in the case heard at first instance by the Yantai Intermediate People's Court and on second instance by the Higher People's Court of Shandong Province[7], the standby letter of credit in the case was expressly issued under the UCP600, but the court did not deal with it in accordance with the legal relationship of a letter of credit; instead, it characterised it as a guarantee and further dealt with the relevant issues in accordance with a suretyship relationship. This approach by the Shandong court may involve relatively major problems, because the guarantee it characterised was not an independent guarantee but an accessory suretyship guarantee.
Since the standby letter of credit had already expressly stipulated the application of the UCP600, then from the perspective of the parties' expression of intent, their clear intention was to have it characterised as a letter of credit and to apply the legal rules on letters of credit. If the Shandong court, merely because the standby letter of credit has a guarantee function, changed its legal nature, characterised it as an accessory suretyship and applied the traditional law on accessory suretyship to deal with it, that judgment clearly contravenes the parties' intent, and its interpretation of the parties' agreement, that is, their true intent, and its characterisation of the legal nature are clearly erroneous and unreasonable.
1.3 The third type of case: characterisation and choice of law when the standby letter of credit does not expressly stipulate which rules or which law applies
In addition, in some cases the courts did not even ascertain as a matter of fact the law under which the standby letter of credit was issued or applied; the courts in their judgment documents actually forgot to record the rules and law that the standby letter of credit stipulated as the basis for its issuance or as applicable. For example, in some cases the courts did not state at all in their judgment documents whether the standby letter of credit was subject to the UCP600, the ISP98 or other legal rules, nor did they state the governing law of the standby letter of credit, but instead directly dealt with it as an ordinary creditor-debtor relationship. From the perspective of international financial transactions, this is not a professional judgment in a commercial dispute case. Because a standby letter of credit itself is highly internationalised, its legal effects depend heavily on the applicable international rules and on the arrangements for the applicable governing law and judicial jurisdiction. If a court does not first clarify which rules apply to the standby letter of credit, then subsequent issues concerning the issuing bank's payment obligation, the fraud exception, the standard for injunctive relief against payment, and counter-guarantee liability will all lose their yardstick for lack of clear applicable rules or law. These cases further show that when Chinese courts deal with standby letter of credit disputes, their understanding of whether a standby letter of credit is a letter of credit or an independent guarantee, and which legal rules should apply, is unclear in individual cases.
For example, in a case heard by the Supreme People's Court, "Kabushiki Kaisha Haiyan Sogo Architects Office v. Jincheng International Group and Jiangyin Jinsheng Hotel"[8], the standby letter of credit at issue was issued by a Hong Kong bank in China upon the applicant's application, with CITIC Bank within mainland China as beneficiary. The background of the case was in fact based on an "overseas guarantee for domestic lending" structure, the opposite direction to the "domestic guarantee for overseas lending" transactions discussed earlier. However, in the Supreme People's Court's final judgment document, the court did not clearly state under which rules the standby letter of credit was issued, nor did it state which governing law should apply, nor did it clearly state whether Hong Kong law or the law of mainland China applied.
02. Brief summary: characterising standby letters of credit subject to the UCP600 differently leads to different legal consequences
In matters such as the priority right over the margin for the issuance of a letter of credit, different characterisations of the legal nature of a standby letter of credit that is agreed to be governed by UCP600 will directly affect the court's final ruling. If it is characterised as a letter of credit, the judicial interpretation on letters of credit applies; if it is characterised as an independent guarantee, the relevant legal rules in the judicial interpretation on independent guarantees may apply; if it is further characterised as an ordinary accessory contract of guarantee, then a completely different legal regime will apply, such as the accessory guarantee rules in the Civil Code or the former Guarantee Law. The court's judgment will be entirely different. This is precisely one of the biggest problems in the current judicial practice concerning standby letters of credit in China: there is still a lack of uniform adjudicative standards for identifying the legal nature of, and applying the law to, standby letters of credit issued subject to UCP600. There is an obvious conflict between the two approaches.
Appendix
Questions and answers
How do Chinese courts characterise a standby letter of credit that stipulates application of UCP600?
Chinese courts are divided. Some characterise it as a letter of credit and apply the Supreme People's Court's judicial interpretation on letter of credit disputes, respecting party autonomy. Others characterise it as an independent guarantee or even accessory suretyship and apply the corresponding guarantee rules, despite the UCP600 stipulation.
What are the consequences of characterising a standby letter of credit as a letter of credit versus a guarantee?
Characterisation determines the applicable legal regime. If treated as a letter of credit, the judicial interpretation on letters of credit applies; if as an independent guarantee, the judicial interpretation on independent guarantees may apply; if as an accessory suretyship, the Civil Code or former Guarantee Law rules apply. The court's ruling, including on priority rights over margin, will differ accordingly.
Why do some Chinese courts treat standby letters of credit as letters of credit when UCP600 is chosen?
Because UCP600 is a set of letter of credit rules, the parties' choice of UCP600 indicates their intention to apply letter of credit law. Courts that respect party autonomy therefore characterise the standby letter of credit as a letter of credit and apply the judicial interpretation on letter of credit disputes, rather than the independent guarantee rules.
What problems arise when courts fail to ascertain the rules or law applicable to a standby letter of credit?
If a court does not clarify whether UCP600, ISP98 or other rules apply, and does not determine the governing law, subsequent issues such as the issuing bank's payment obligation, the fraud exception, injunctive relief standards and counter-guarantee liability lack a clear yardstick. Such judgments are not professional in commercial dispute cases.
Laws and cases cited
Laws
- Civil Code
- Guarantee Law
Judicial interpretations
- Provisions on Several Issues Concerning the Trial of Letter of Credit Dispute Cases
Standards
- UCP600
- ISP98
Cases
- ANZ Bank Manila Branch v. Bank of Jiangsu
- Ningxia Tianyuan Manganese Industry case
- Minsheng Bank and ICBC (Asia) case
- Kabushiki Kaisha Haiyan Sogo Architects Office v. Jincheng International Group and Jiangyin Jinsheng Hotel
References
- See in detail the series of civil judgments of the Supreme People's Court in "China Power Engineering Co., Ltd., Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited, Manila Branch and others, letter of credit fraud dispute". Case numbers: (2020) Zui Gao Fa Shang Chu No. 2 and No. 3. Members of the collegial panel: Shen Hongyu, Xi Xiangyang, Sun Xiangzhuang, Yu Xiaohan, Guo Zaiyu.
- For the first instance of this case, see in detail the first-instance civil ruling of the Yinchuan Intermediate People's Court of Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region in "Ningxia Tianyuan Manganese Industry Co., Ltd. v. MANGANESE TRADING LIMITED, China Construction Bank Corporation Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region Branch, application for suspension of payment under a letter of credit" (3 September 2014). Case number: (2014) Yin Min Shang Wai Chu Zi No. 3-1. Members of the collegial panel: Niu Youcheng, Shen Yu, Zhang Jing. For the second instance of this case, see the second-instance civil ruling of the Higher People's Court of Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region on pre-litigation preservation in "MANGANESE TRADING LIMITED v. Ningxia Tianyuan Manganese Industry Co., Ltd." (4 December 2014). Case number: (2014) Ning Min Shang Wai Zhong Zi No. 2. Members of the collegial panel: Li Fengying, Tao Aizhen, Luo Weijiang.
- See in detail the first-instance civil judgment of the Beijing Third Intermediate People's Court in "Hebei Kaiyuan Real Estate Development Co., Ltd. v. Standard Chartered Bank (China) Limited Beijing Branch, agricultural bank letter of credit issuance dispute" (20 March 2015). Case number:
- See in detail the first-instance civil ruling of the Guangzhou Intermediate People's Court of Guangdong Province in "China Minsheng Bank Corporation Guangzhou Branch v. Guangzhou Yatong Metal Co., Ltd., China Metal Recycling (Holdings) Limited, Environmental Protection Steel Co., Ltd., Zhonghuan Steel (Macau Offshore Commercial Services) Co., Ltd., right of recourse dispute" (20 May 2016). Case number: (2013) Sui Zhong Fa Min Si Chu Zi No. 42. Members of the collegial panel: Xu Yubao, Luo Yi, Chen Zhongjie.
- See in detail the first-instance civil judgment of the Beijing Fourth Intermediate People's Court in "The Export-Import Bank of China v. Wang Qiao'er and others, letter of credit financing dispute" (6 June 2018). Case number: (2017) Jing 04 Min Chu No. 21. Members of the collegial panel: Gao Jing, Wen Zhijun, Zhao Guilan.
- See in detail the enforcement ruling of the Yantai Intermediate People's Court in "Woori Bank (China) Limited Shenzhen Branch, China Great Wall Asset Management Corporation Jinan Office v. Shoubao Real Estate (Yantai) Co., Ltd." (21 January 2015). Case number: (2015) Yan Zhi Yi Zi No. 2. Members of the collegial panel: Fu Guangbo, Wu Guorong, Tan Lili.
- See in detail the enforcement ruling of the Higher People's Court of Shandong Province in "China Great Wall Asset Management Corporation Jinan Office, Korea Development Bank Guangzhou Branch v. Seoul Xingbao Real Estate (Yantai) Co., Ltd., application for recognition and enforcement of court judgments and arbitral awards" (8 April 2015). Case number: (2015) Lu Zhi Fu Zi No. 18. Members of the collegial panel: Ma Xiangwei, Liu Shuhong, Chen Jushan.
- See in detail the retrial civil ruling of the Supreme People's Court in "K.K. Haiyan General Architects Office, Jincheng International Group Co., Ltd., Jiangyin Jinsheng Hotel Co., Ltd., guarantee recourse dispute" (24 December 2012). Case number: (2012) Min Ti Zi No. 182. Members of the collegial panel: Gao Xiaoli, Shen Hongyu, Wu Guangrong.
