I. Background of the Case
In this case, the applicant and the respondent were in dispute over the allocation of debts of a joint venture. The applicant commenced emergency arbitration proceedings at the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Shanghai Sub-Commission ("CIETAC") and sought to freeze the respondent's liquidation distribution. The emergency arbitrator granted the applicant's request and issued an interim award. The applicant then applied to the Singapore court to enforce the interim award and quickly obtained an enforcement order. The respondent subsequently applied to set aside the enforcement order on the grounds, among others, that the interim award exceeded the scope of the arbitration agreement.
The core issue in this case was whether the interim award made by the CIETAC emergency arbitrator exceeded the scope of the arbitration agreement. The Singapore court ultimately ruled to set aside the enforcement order.
II. The Basic Logic of the Judgment
The reasoning of the judgment revolves around Article 23(2) of the CIETAC Rules, which provides: "(2) In accordance with the applicable law or the agreement of the parties, a party may apply to the Arbitration Court of the Arbitration Commission for emergency interim relief in accordance with the CIETAC Emergency Arbitrator Procedures (Appendix III to these Rules)."
On this basis, the court established the core logic of the case: the power of an emergency arbitrator to make an interim award derives either from the applicable law or from the agreement of the parties, and either one suffices.
Were these two conditions satisfied? First, the court held that, according to the expert opinions of the parties' respective Chinese law experts, the Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China does not expressly confer on arbitral tribunals or emergency arbitrators the statutory power to grant conservatory measures, which power belongs exclusively to the Chinese courts. Therefore, the "applicable law" condition was not satisfied. Second, the court further examined whether the parties had conferred such power on the emergency arbitrator by agreement, and concluded that the mere agreement to apply the CIETAC Rules did not constitute an express authorization of emergency arbitration. Therefore, the "agreement of the parties" condition was also not satisfied. Accordingly, the court ruled to set aside the applicant's enforcement order.
III. The Core Reasoning of the Judgment
In the above reasoning path, the issue that has aroused widespread discussion and attention in the industry is the court's finding on the second condition, that is, the Singapore court held that the CIETAC Rules' emergency arbitration procedures cannot automatically apply to the parties, and that the parties must separately and specifically agree to the application of the emergency arbitration rules.
The court's reasons are as follows:
First, paragraph 88 of the judgment states that if mere consent to the CIETAC Rules were deemed to constitute the parties' agreement that the emergency arbitrator has the power to take interim measures, then the phrase "in accordance with … the agreement of the parties" in the relevant provision would be superfluous, and all parties to CIETAC arbitrations would be presumed to have agreed to confer on emergency arbitrators the power to grant emergency relief.
Second, paragraph 89 of the judgment states: "While I accept that the parties cannot agree to override a statutory prohibition (contained within the lex arbitri) on the measures that may be ordered by a tribunal or an emergency arbitrator, that does not necessarily mean that the parties' express agreement — and not mere deemed consent to the CIETAC Rules — cannot cure a situation where the lex arbitri is silent on the granting of interim measures."
If we analyze the above sentence by sentence, we will find that it contains the following views:
First, a statutory prohibition cannot be excluded by agreement. If the lex arbitri expressly prohibits, by mandatory provision, arbitral tribunals or emergency arbitrators from issuing interim measures, the parties cannot exclude it by agreement, that is, the power conferred on arbitrators by the parties must not violate the mandatory provisions of the lex arbitri.
Second, "legal silence" is a different legal state. The court expressly distinguishes "statutory prohibition" from "legal silence." In the case of silence, the court did not rule out the possibility that the parties' agreement may constitute an independent source of power.
Third, in the case of "legal silence," there must be an "express agreement" sufficient to constitute an independent source of power; "deemed consent" cannot constitute an independent source of power. What the choice of the CIETAC Rules produces is "deemed consent," whereas the "agreement of the parties" required by Article 23 of the CIETAC Rules points to a separate express agreement beyond the choice of rules.
IV. Problems in the Reasoning of the Judgment
In the author's view, the reasoning logic of the judgment has the following two relatively obvious problems.
1. The "characterization" step of legal application is incomplete, so its conclusion lacks sufficient support
"Characterization" is the first step in the process of legal application. It refers to the court's legal characterization of the facts or issues of the case before invoking conflict rules, classifying them into a certain legal category in order to determine the applicable conflict rules and the governing law. That is, the court must first answer "what kind of issue this is" before it can answer "what law applies."
Starting from paragraph 47 of the judgment, the court first confirmed that the lex arbitri is Chinese law, which is not problematic. The court then asked whether the tribunal's power to make an interim award could be established under Singapore law. The court answered in the negative — but the Singapore law here is the law of the place of enforcement. Next, the court began to discuss why the law of the place of enforcement could not be the applicable law. It should be noted, however, that the basis used by the court here was the opinions of the two Chinese law experts submitted by the applicant and the respondent respectively. Finally, the court, on the ground that the applicant's expert's "evidence was insufficient," found that the applicant had failed to prove that Chinese law supported the application of the law of the place of enforcement. Therefore, the law of the place of enforcement was not applied.
There are at least two questionable points here.
First, the expert opinions on Chinese law are of course made on the basis of Chinese law. They should be substantive evidence to be considered after characterization is completed and after Chinese law is determined to be applicable, rather than the basis for dealing with the characterization issue itself. This reasoning appears to put the cart before the horse.
Second, the Singapore court confirmed in CVG v CVH [2022] SGHC 249 that an interim award of a foreign emergency arbitrator is in principle enforceable in Singapore. The reasoning basis of that case was the broad definition of "arbitral award" in section 27(1) of Singapore's International Arbitration Act, rather than whether the lex arbitri authorized it. The judgment in this case departs to a certain extent from the reasoning path of CVG v CVH by treating the determination of power under the lex arbitri as the decisive reason for refusing enforcement. If the court had devoted more space to explaining why, under the "formal enforcement review" framework established in CVG v CVH, this case should turn to a review of the source of power under the lex arbitri, the judgment would, it is believed, be more persuasive.
2. Insufficient basis for deriving the need for an "express agreement" from "legal silence"
As stated above, the conclusion in paragraph 89 of the judgment is that in the case of "legal silence," there must be an "express agreement," rather than "deemed consent," sufficient to constitute an independent source of power. The court provided no corresponding basis for this proposition.
First, the statement of "deemed consent" has no sufficient basis. Paragraph 88 of the judgment explains that, in its view, the CIETAC Rules mean "express agreement." In that case, according to the court's logic, there can only be two outcomes: there is an express agreement, or there is no express agreement. Its reasoning does not include the possibility of "deemed consent."
Second, in practice, the parties' choice of a set of arbitration rules is generally regarded as acceptance of all the provisions of those rules, including the provisions on the powers of emergency arbitrators. The court downgraded this ordinary understanding to "deemed consent" without explaining the relevant basis.
Third, paragraph 91 of the judgment also states: "In my view, whether the parties' agreement to institutional arbitral rules per se should be taken to amount to an agreement on the arbitrator's power to issue interim measures depends on the wording of the institutional arbitral rules." This sentence appears to reinforce the earlier discussion, but on closer examination it actually undermines the court's position on "deemed consent": if an "express agreement" must exist, then any "deemed consent" should not be accepted by the court, regardless of the specific wording of the rules. The court both requires an "express agreement" and uses "the wording of the rules" as the criterion, and it is puzzling what connection or standard should exist between the two.
V. Practical Implications
In the author's view, this judgment of the Singapore court, unless overturned by other cases, may have the following relatively far-reaching implications.
1. Choice of dispute resolution strategy for Chinese enterprises
The direct consequence of this case is to tell parties and arbitration practitioners that emergency arbitration with mainland China as the seat may encounter obstacles at the cross-border enforcement stage. For Chinese companies going global that have counterparties abroad, this directly affects their ability to protect their claims. The judgment in this case may lead to: either companies, when negotiating dispute resolution clauses, need to treat "whether the seat recognizes the emergency arbitrator's powers" as an assessment factor independent of "whether the arbitration institution has an emergency arbitration procedure"; or they avoid domestic arbitration institutions and turn to international arbitration as the dispute resolution method.
2. Institutional competition as China builds an international arbitration center
In recent years, China has been committed to building an international arbitration center. According to the 2025 International Arbitration Survey, Beijing became the fourth most preferred seat in the world for the first time, after London, Singapore and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Over the past five years, CIETAC's number of cases accepted, amount in dispute and number of countries involved have consistently ranked among the top three among major international arbitration institutions globally, and in 2025 the amount in dispute exceeded 200 billion yuan for the first time. Emergency arbitration procedures have been accepted by major domestic arbitration institutions, and there are precedents for recognition abroad.
However, the reasoning of this judgment—the enforcing court takes whether the law of the seat authorizes it as a precondition for enforcing an emergency arbitration award, and CIETAC's emergency arbitration requires the parties' explicit agreement—places mainland China in a disadvantageous competitive position: when the parties to a dispute need cross-border interim relief, the attractiveness of choosing mainland China as an international arbitration seat may therefore be weakened.
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Questions and answers
Why did the Singapore court set aside the enforcement order for the CIETAC emergency arbitrator's interim award?
The court found that the emergency arbitrator's power to issue the interim award was not established. Chinese law, as the lex arbitri, does not expressly confer such power on arbitrators, and the parties' mere agreement to apply the CIETAC Rules did not constitute the express agreement required by Article 23(2) of those Rules.
What is the difference between 'statutory prohibition' and 'legal silence' in the Singapore judgment on CIETAC emergency arbitration?
The court distinguished a statutory prohibition, which the parties cannot override by agreement, from legal silence, where the lex arbitri does not address the issue. In the case of silence, the court did not rule out that the parties' express agreement could constitute an independent source of power for an emergency arbitrator.
What practical implications does the Singapore judgment have for Chinese enterprises choosing dispute resolution clauses?
The judgment indicates that emergency arbitration seated in mainland China may face obstacles at the cross-border enforcement stage. Companies may need to assess whether the seat recognizes emergency arbitrator powers as a separate factor, or avoid domestic arbitration institutions and choose international arbitration instead.
How might the Singapore judgment affect China's efforts to build an international arbitration center?
The reasoning places mainland China in a disadvantageous competitive position because the enforcing court treats authorization under the law of the seat as a precondition for enforcement and requires explicit party agreement for CIETAC emergency arbitration. This may weaken the attractiveness of choosing mainland China as a seat for cross-border interim relief.
Laws and cases cited
Laws
- Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China
- International Arbitration Act
Cases
- CVG v CVH [2022] SGHC 249
Other
- CIETAC Rules
