In February 2025, U.S. President Trump, citing the need to address drug inflows and trade deficits, declared a national emergency under IEEPA, imposing a 25% tariff on imports from Canada and Mexico, tariffs ranging from 10% to 145% on imports from China, and a "reciprocal tariff" of at least 10% on global trading partners. The above tariff measures triggered multiple lawsuits, and ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court consolidated the Learning Resources case and the V.O.S. Selections case and issued its judgment on February 20, 2026, finding that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.) does not authorize the President to unilaterally impose tariffs[1]. Chief Justice Roberts, in the majority opinion, pointed out that tariffs are essentially within the taxing power that the Constitution grants to Congress, that the phrase "regulate...importation" in IEEPA is insufficient to support tariff imposition without time limits, scope limits, or amount limits, and that the case applies the "major questions doctrine," under which major economic decisions of an administrative nature must obtain explicit authorization from Congress.

After the judgment was issued, the U.S. Court of International Trade, on March 4, 2026, in Atmus Filtration, Inc. v. United States, No. 26-01259 (Ct. Int'l Trade Mar. 4, 2026), ordered CBP to stop liquidating IEEPA tariffs and to reliquidate already-liquidated entries, and this universal relief applies to all importers that have paid IEEPA tariffs, regardless of whether they separately filed refund lawsuits[2]. According to the official statement CBP submitted to the court in that case, this refund involves more than 330,000 importers and 53 million import records; CBP estimates the total tariffs collected at approximately $166 billion, and with statutory interest the total scale is approximately $175 billion, making it the largest refund proceeding in U.S. customs history[3].

01. Causes of Consumer Class Actions and Bases of Claims

(1) The Mismatch Between the Refund Right and the Economic Burden

The Supreme Court judgment resolved the legality of tariffs between the government and importers, but thereby gave rise to a new dispute between importers and consumers: under U.S. customs law, the refund claim belongs exclusively to the importer of record, and ordinary consumers have no right to apply directly to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for a refund. This institutional arrangement has created a serious mismatch between rights and burdens: consumers are the actual bearers of the tariffs but do not hold the refund claim; importers are the taxpayers in law and, although entitled to apply for refunds, have already passed the tariff costs on to consumers through price increases. It is precisely this institutional mismatch that has become the root of this round of consumer class actions.

(2) Consumers' Litigation Logic

Within months after the Supreme Court judgment, dozens of consumer class actions have emerged in federal courts across the United States, covering multiple industries such as logistics, retail, consumer electronics, apparel, home goods, and food. Although the defendant industries differ, the plaintiffs' litigation logic is highly consistent, with the core being the so-called "double recovery" claim: the defendants passed costs on to consumers through price increases during the tariff period, and after the tariffs were found invalid they applied to the government for refunds; retaining both parts of the benefit simultaneously constitutes unjust enrichment.

Judging from the publicly available complaints, the plaintiffs' organization of evidence usually revolves around the following steps: first, proving the defendant's status as importer and that the products at issue fall within the tariff coverage; second, proving through price data, public company statements, etc., that the tariff costs were passed through to consumers via price increases; finally, proving that the defendant has applied for or is eligible to apply for a refund and has made no arrangement to return it to consumers.

It is worth noting that the scope of the plaintiffs' claims is continuously expanding. Early cases targeted only the situation where "the defendant actually obtained a refund and did not return it," whereas recent cases have brought "the defendant is entitled to apply for a refund but chooses not to apply" within the scope of attack. In the Amazon case, the plaintiffs explicitly argued that a company's decision to forgo a refund for commercial or political considerations cannot shift the adverse consequences onto consumers who actually bore the costs[4].

02. Typical Cases

(1) Nintendo Case

Hoffert et al. v. Nintendo of America Inc., W.D. Wash., Case No. 2:26-cv-01360 (filed April 21, 2026) is a relatively representative case in this round of litigation.

The plaintiffs allege that, at the supply chain level, almost all of Nintendo's hardware products are manufactured in China, Vietnam, and Cambodia, all within the coverage of the IEEPA tariffs; at the pricing conduct level, Nintendo in April 2025 postponed Switch 2 pre-orders on the grounds of "assessing the impact of tariffs," then announced accessory price increases of $1–10 (the Pro Controller from $79.99 to $84.99, the Dock Set from $109.99 to $119.99), and in August of the same year again raised prices of the Switch series consoles[5]; most critically, Nintendo President Shuntaro Furukawa publicly stated at the May 2025 earnings briefing, "For tariffs imposed by any country or region, we treat them as part of our costs and incorporate them into prices"[6]; and after the Supreme Court judgment, Nintendo on March 6, 2026 filed a refund lawsuit with the Court of International Trade.

The plaintiffs argue that Nintendo, while making consumers bear the tariff costs through price increases, simultaneously applied to the government for refunds of the same tariffs, constituting typical unjust enrichment. The proposed class period in this case is February 1, 2025 to February 24, 2026, covering all consumers across the United States who purchased Nintendo products whose prices were raised, with an estimated scale of millions.

(2) Amazon Case

In Markland et al. v. Amazon.com, Inc., W.D. Wash., Case No. 2:26-cv-01670-TL (filed May 15, 2026), unlike Nintendo, Amazon publicly stated that it would not apply for IEEPA tariff refunds. But the plaintiffs did not withdraw the suit on that basis; instead, through price-tracking data for specific products (such as the Bissell handheld vacuum rising from $41 to $45), they proved that Amazon had actually passed tariff costs on to consumers; the plaintiffs also cited public reports that Amazon had considered separately listing tariff amounts on the checkout page but abandoned the idea due to political pressure, thereby proving that Amazon is capable of identifying the tariff component in prices; ultimately the plaintiffs argued that Amazon's forgoing of refunds was a voluntary choice made in exchange for political and commercial benefits, that this choice cannot harm consumers' rights, and that regardless of whether Amazon actually applies for a refund, it is obligated to return the portion of tariffs that consumers overpaid[7].

The warning significance of the Amazon case lies in the fact that companies cannot naturally avoid class action risk by "not applying for refunds." As long as the plaintiffs can complete the proof of "cost pass-through," even if the company chooses not to apply for a refund, there may still be a risk of being held liable for restitution.

03. Which Companies Are More Likely to Be Targeted

As of June 2026, at least 30-plus class actions against well-known companies have been filed, and the case samples that have emerged cover multiple fields such as athletic footwear and apparel, gaming hardware, consumer electronics, food, home retail, e-commerce platforms, and cross-border e-commerce platforms. Companies or platforms such as Nike, Sony, Del Monte, IKEA, Mondelez, Amazon, Temu, and Nintendo have all appeared in relevant litigation or publicly searchable samples.

As for the law firms involved, leading U.S. consumer class action firms such as Emery Reddy, Hagens Berman, and Milberg have all entered this field, indicating that this is not a scattered attempt by individual lawyers but organized, template-based, batch case development. For brands with a certain reputation in the U.S. market, the risk of receiving similar complaints within the next 1–2 years cannot be ignored.

Based on the current complaints and case samples, the following companies are more likely to be targeted:

1. Companies that sell their own-brand products directly to consumers in the United States, especially those with online DTC stores, Amazon self-operated/platform sales, and simultaneous offline retail distribution;

2. Companies that are highly dependent on supply chains in China, Southeast Asia, or other overseas production, and that adjusted U.S. retail prices, platform prices, accessory prices, or shipping/import fees during the tariff period;

3. Companies or platforms that separately list fees such as tariff surcharge, import fee, duty, or customs fee in orders, invoices, checkout pages, or customer service explanations;

4. Companies that have explicitly stated in announcements, financial reports, investor Q&A, media interviews, or social media that "tariffs have led to price increases" or "tariffs will be incorporated into costs/prices";

5. Companies that have applied for, intend to apply for, or are eligible to apply for IEEPA tariff refunds but have not yet established a consumer restitution mechanism, accounting treatment plan, or external communication approach.

It must be emphasized that plaintiffs do not necessarily require companies to separately itemize a tariff surcharge. If a company has left a public trace of "price increases due to tariffs," or if the product price curve highly coincides with the timing of tariff implementation, there is a certain possibility that it will be asserted as evidence of tariff pass-through. For Chinese-funded clients expanding overseas, the focus of risk management should shift from "whether every dollar of tariffs was actually passed on to consumers" to "whether external materials could potentially be adopted by plaintiffs/consumers and used to file lawsuits."

04. Risk Prevention Recommendations

(1) Immediately conduct an evidence-chain review

For overseas-expanding companies of a certain scale in the U.S. market, it is recommended to immediately conduct an internal review: first, review external promotional materials, including website announcements, press releases, social media, customer service scripts, investor communication records, and earnings call minutes, for single-attribution statements that "tariffs caused price increases," so as to avoid leaving evidence unfavorable to the company; second, fully preserve the basis for pricing decisions during the tariff period, including analysis records of multiple cost factors such as exchange rates, logistics, raw materials, and competitive conditions, to break the plaintiff's single narrative that "tariffs = price increases"; third, review the fee presentation on checkout pages, and for separately labeled items such as "tariff surcharge" and "import fee," assess their legal nature and refundability, to avoid their being directly characterized as tariffs collected on behalf of others.

(2) Make good use of arbitration clauses to block class actions

For such small-amount, dispersed consumer class actions, the most effective procedural defense is to design a well-developed arbitration clause in consumer contracts that expressly excludes class procedures.

The U.S. Federal Arbitration Act (FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) establishes a strong federal policy favoring arbitration. The Supreme Court has clarified the enforceability of arbitration clauses and class action waivers in a series of landmark cases: in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011), the Supreme Court held by 5:4 that the FAA preempts state law and that a clause in a consumer contract prohibiting class arbitration and permitting only individual arbitration is enforceable, even if the cost of individual arbitration may exceed the amount of an individual consumer's claim[8]; in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. 228 (2013), the Supreme Court further held that even if the plaintiff proves that individual arbitration is economically infeasible, the class action waiver remains valid[9].

In practice, a common misunderstanding needs to be clarified: the United States does not completely reject class arbitration, but the Supreme Court has clearly stated that an arbitral tribunal has no authority to order class arbitration without the parties' explicit consent. As long as the contract clearly provides for "individual arbitration only, no class arbitration," the court must enforce that provision. Considering that an individual consumer's tariff price-difference loss is usually only tens of dollars or even a few dollars, without a class procedure, almost no consumer would have the incentive to initiate arbitration individually, and the economic foundation of such litigation would be fundamentally undermined.

(3) Prudently handle tax refunds and external communications

For companies that intend to apply, or have already applied, for IEEPA refunds, it is recommended to formulate in advance a plan for handling the benefits of refunds: for businesses that directly charged consumers a clear tariff surcharge, consider establishing an appropriate return mechanism (such as shopping points, future purchase credits, etc.); in external communications, avoid absolute statements on the refund issue, objectively explain the complexity of pricing, and do not proactively link refunds to price adjustments; at the same time, establish a monitoring mechanism for relevant cases in U.S. state courts, and in advance select and retain a team of international trade lawyers familiar with consumer class actions and with extensive experience.

Conclusion

Consumer class actions triggered by IEEPA tariff refunds are a new wave of litigation that has emerged after the Supreme Court's ruling. In essence, plaintiffs' lawyers are exploiting the misalignment of rights and obligations in the tariff system to transform "tariffs are invalid" into a narrative of "companies' unjust enrichment," thereby pressuring importers and retailers.

For Chinese companies expanding into the United States, such risks are not uncontrollable. In the short term, they should immediately conduct an evidence-chain review and prudently handle refund applications and consumer communications; in the medium and long term, they should embed well-designed arbitration clauses in user agreements and transaction terms, procedurally block the path of class actions, and fundamentally resolve such mass litigation risks.

It should be noted that all consumer cases are currently at the filing or early procedural stage, and many of the plaintiffs' legal theories have not yet been substantively tested by the courts. However, given the inherent deterrent effect of the U.S. class action system, companies should still adhere to the principle of prevention first and complete the construction of a compliance system before risks fully erupt.

Article Appendix

Questions and answers

What did the U.S. Supreme Court decide about IEEPA tariffs in February 2026?

The Supreme Court held that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act does not authorize the President to unilaterally impose tariffs. The Court found tariffs are a taxing power reserved to Congress and applied the major questions doctrine, requiring explicit congressional authorization for major economic decisions.

Who is entitled to an IEEPA tariff refund and how large is the refund process?

Under U.S. customs law, only the importer of record may claim a refund; consumers have no direct right to apply to CBP. The Court of International Trade ordered CBP to stop liquidating and to reliquidate entries, covering over 330,000 importers and 53 million records, with total refunds estimated at $166 billion, or $175 billion with interest.

Why are consumers suing importers like Nintendo and Amazon over IEEPA tariff refunds?

Consumers allege unjust enrichment: importers raised prices to pass on tariffs, then sought refunds after tariffs were invalidated, retaining both benefits. In the Nintendo case, plaintiffs cite price increases and refund claims; in the Amazon case, plaintiffs argue that forgoing refunds does not eliminate the obligation to return overcharges.

Can an arbitration clause with a class action waiver block consumer class actions over tariff refunds?

Yes, if properly drafted. The Federal Arbitration Act favors arbitration, and the Supreme Court in Concepcion and Italian Colors upheld class action waivers in consumer contracts, even if individual arbitration is economically infeasible. A clause requiring individual arbitration only can procedurally bar class actions.

What steps should companies take to reduce risk from IEEPA tariff refund consumer class actions?

Companies should immediately review external statements and pricing records to avoid evidence of tariff pass-through, consider arbitration clauses with class waivers, and prudently handle refund applications and communications. For direct tariff surcharges, consider a return mechanism and avoid absolute statements linking refunds to price adjustments.

Laws and cases cited

Laws

  • International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.)
  • Federal Arbitration Act (FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.)

Cases

  • Learning Resources case
  • V.O.S. Selections case
  • Atmus Filtration, Inc. v. United States, No. 26-01259 (Ct. Int'l Trade Mar. 4, 2026)
  • Hoffert et al. v. Nintendo of America Inc., W.D. Wash., Case No. 2:26-cv-01360
  • Markland et al. v. Amazon.com, Inc., W.D. Wash., Case No. 2:26-cv-01670-TL
  • AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011)
  • American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. 228 (2013)

References

  1. Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 607 U.S. ___ (2026)
  2. Atmus Filtration, Inc. v. United States, No. 26-01259 (Ct. Int'l Trade Mar. 4, 2026)
  3. Declaration of CBP Official in Atmus Filtration, March 12, 2026; see also Skadden, Tariff Refund Mechanism Takes Shape After Supreme Court's IEEPA Ruling (April 8, 2026). CBP officially estimates that approximately US$166 billion in tariffs have been collected, and the Penn Wharton Budget Model estimates a total scale of approximately US$175 billion including interest.
  4. Markland et al. v. Amazon.com, Inc., W.D. Wash., Case No. 2:26-cv-01670-TL, Complaint ¶¶ 1-15
  5. Hoffert et al. v. Nintendo of America Inc., W.D. Wash., Case No. 2:26-cv-01360, Complaint ¶¶ 40-46
  6. Nintendo Financial Results Briefing for Fiscal Year Ended March 2025 (May 8, 2025) at 3, 5
  7. Same as note 4
  8. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011)
  9. American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. 228 (2013)