Core judgment: Proof in securities misrepresentation cases should complete three piercings—from public data to real operations, from corporate violation to individual conduct, and from position and signature to subjective intent and actual role.
Introduction
Since July 2024, the governance of financial fraud in the capital market has clearly entered a stage in which administrative, civil, criminal, delisting and industry accountability proceed in parallel. As of June 30, 2026, regulatory authorities had cumulatively investigated and handled 247 financial fraud cases, made 156 administrative penalties, imposed fines and confiscations of more than 9.051 billion yuan, and transferred 134 leads on suspected financial fraud crimes to public security organs; procuratorial organs initiated public prosecution against 267 persons involved in 95 cases. During the same period, more than 1,500 leads on third parties cooperating in fraud were transferred. Behind the numbers is a clear trend: cases have extended layer by layer along issuers, listed companies, actual controllers, directors, senior managers, intermediary institutions, customers, suppliers and financial institutions.[1]
At the policy level, "pursuing the chief culprits," "cracking down on accomplices" and "investigating third parties" have been written into the comprehensive punishment and prevention framework, and fraudulent issuance, continuous disclosure fraud, abuse of accounting policies, and third-party cooperation in "circular transactions" and "pass-through transactions" are all listed as key governance targets. For criminal lawyers, the increase in enforcement intensity does not change the basic requirements of criminal law: the establishment of a crime still requires item-by-item proof of the constitutive elements, individual liability still requires grounding in specific facts, and administrative conclusions still must withstand the test of criminal evidence rules.[2]
In handling several criminal and civil-criminal crossover matters involving listed companies, the author's most direct impression is that cases are often summarized early on by the phrase "the company committed financial fraud," yet once they enter the case file they split into completely different individual stories: some decided on targets and mobilized resources, some possessed the true data and then altered the presentation, some discovered anomalies yet still pushed disclosure forward, and some only had access to screened materials. Rank, whether one signed, and whether one received bonuses can only provide investigative leads. A criminal conviction ultimately depends on the joint closure of five dimensions: authority, knowledge, conduct, role and evidence.
This article addresses three questions: first, which criminal law offenses correspond to securities misrepresentation, and what threshold exists between administrative violation and criminal offense; second, how overall corporate distortion is pierced into individual intent, and how the liability of key positions and intermediary personnel is distinguished; third, how the first round of handling after risk exposure can avoid evidence destruction, conflicting accounts and confusion of corporate and individual interests.
01. Securities misrepresentation is not a single offense
(1) Two main lines: the issuance stage and the continuous disclosure stage
Misrepresentation in the context of the Securities Law generally includes false records, misleading statements and material omissions. Once criminal proceedings begin, it is first necessary to identify the stage and vehicle in which the conduct occurred. The core offense at the issuance stage is the crime of fraudulent issuance of securities under Article 160 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China; periodic reports, interim announcements and matters required by law to be disclosed after listing or quotation mainly correspond to the crime of irregular disclosure or non-disclosure of important information under Article 161. Intermediary personnel such as accountants, auditors, legal service providers, sponsors and asset appraisers may also be involved in the crime of providing false supporting documents or the crime of issuing supporting documents with major inaccuracies under Article 229, and those who participate in joint fraud by an issuer or listed company may also be evaluated as accomplices to the aforementioned securities crimes.[3]
This distinction is of substantive significance. False content in issuance documents must be linked to a specific issuance act; in continuous disclosure cases, it is necessary to identify the statutory disclosure obligation, the reporting period, and the time when the material matter formed and was made public. Credit materials submitted by an enterprise to a bank, business plans provided to investors, internal budgets and statutory securities issuance documents have different legal status and cannot be directly subjected to the same offense merely because their content is similar.
Table 1 Basic differences among the three liability tracks
Article 78 of the Securities Law of the People's Republic of China establishes the basic requirements that disclosed information be true, accurate, complete, timely and fair; Article 80 provides for the obligation to make interim reports on major events; and Article 82 requires directors and senior managers to sign written confirmation opinions on periodic reports. The current Measures for the Administration of Information Disclosure by Listed Companies further refines the reporting, cooperation and disclosure duties of listed companies, controlling shareholders, actual controllers, directors and senior managers. The above norms are used to identify "who bears what obligation"; criminal liability still must return to the provisions of the Criminal Law and evidentiary proof.[4]
(2) Both information disclosure crimes require intent
Neither the crime of fraudulent issuance of securities nor the crime of irregular disclosure or non-disclosure of important information provides for a negligent form in the Criminal Law. Article 15 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China makes clear that negligent crimes are criminally punishable only where the law so provides. Therefore, ordinary work negligence, inadequate review, erroneous professional judgment, failure of internal controls or mere failure to perform duties diligently cannot be directly transformed into these two crimes. A criminal charge must prove that the actor knew that the issuance documents or disclosed content contained material distortion, or knew that a material matter should be disclosed according to law, yet still organized, instigated, implemented, confirmed, concealed or acquiesced in the relevant result.[5]
The practical difficulty is that investigating authorities rarely rely on an actor's direct admission that "I knew it was false." Intent is usually inferred from objective facts: whether the actor had access to internal true data, whether the actor attended meetings on anomalous matters, whether the actor received audit adjustments or inquiry reminders, whether the actor requested deletion of risk statements, whether the actor pushed for supplementary contracts, altered working papers or fund round-tripping, and whether the actor continued to sign after anomalies were clearly pointed out. The focus of defense work also shifts from abstract statements to item-by-item examination of the evidence chain.
(3) Boundary issues of related offenses
Table 2 Plain comparison of misrepresentation, insider trading and market manipulation
The same material matter may simultaneously give rise to multiple risks. For example, if a listed company already possesses information on major losses or regulatory investigation but delays disclosure, information disclosure obligations are involved; if insiders reduce holdings or notify relatives and friends to trade before the announcement, insider trading may also be triggered; if the company's information release coordinates with account groups to ramp up prices, conduct matched trades or distribute shares, the crime of manipulating the securities market must also be examined. Distinguishing among offenses should proceed around the object of conduct, the actus reus, subjective purpose and infringement of legal interests.[6]
02. From administrative violation to criminal conviction
(1) Whether the information at issue enters statutory documents or statutory disclosure obligations
A criminal case must first answer "which document, which point in time, which obligation." The crime of fraudulent issuance of securities should be anchored to prospectuses, subscription forms, offering memoranda and other issuance documents and the corresponding issuance acts; the crime of irregular disclosure or non-disclosure of important information should be anchored to annual reports, semi-annual reports, interim announcements or material matters subject to statutory disclosure obligations. If the charge cannot identify the specific vehicle and source of obligation, subsequent materiality, intent and causal role all lack a stable foundation.
The SiErXin case provides a sample worth distinguishing. The CSRC found that in its STAR Market IPO application documents it inflated 2020 operating revenue by 15.3672 million yuan and inflated total profit by 12.4617 million yuan, and emphasized that "filing creates liability, and withdrawal does not eliminate liability." This case constitutes an administrative violation of fraudulent issuance under the Securities Law; because the company withdrew its application before obtaining registration and before actual issuance, criminal evaluation still requires further discussion of the issuance elements under Article 160 of the Criminal Law, the commencement of the actus reus, and issues of attempt or discontinuation. Administrative characterization cannot directly replace the above criminal law analysis.[7]
(2) Whether the degree of distortion reaches the criminal prosecution standard
The Provisions of the Supreme People's Procuratorate and the Ministry of Public Security on the Standards for Filing and Prosecuting Criminal Cases under the Jurisdiction of Public Security Organs (II) set out multiple alternative prosecution paths for fraudulent issuance of securities and for irregular disclosure or non-disclosure of important information. Common figures in practice include illegal fundraising of more than 10 million yuan, inflation or deflation of assets, operating revenue or profit reaching more than 30% of the corresponding total for the period, amounts of material matters reaching a certain proportion of net assets, and direct economic losses of more than 1 million yuan caused to investors or other persons. Different paths are not required to be satisfied simultaneously.[8]
Prosecution standards determine whether a case enters the scope of criminal prosecution; conviction still requires proof of subjective intent, actus reus, individual role and evidentiary legality.
Calculation itself is an important issue. For the numerator, it is necessary to examine which amounts truly constitute inflation or deflation, and whether there is double counting, cross-period adjustments, differences in accounting estimates and already corrected matters; for the denominator, it is necessary to confirm whether consolidated statements or parent company statements are used, and whether the total for the period or the adjusted total is used; for the period, it is necessary to distinguish single periods, consecutive periods and continuous cross-period conduct. A figure adjusted from 35% to 28% may directly change the prosecution path. Every basis in a forensic accounting report should be traceable to the underlying transactions and accounting grounds.
The Supreme People's Procuratorate's 2024 case-handling guidance makes clear that cross-period recognition in genuine transactions, "reverse adjustment" after prior fraud, and continuous concealment of material matters may all enter criminal evaluation; at the same time, investigating authorities still need to distinguish the room for judgment permitted by accounting standards from intentional manipulation for the purpose of circumventing issuance conditions, performance commitments, delisting risk and the like. That document is procuratorial case-handling guidance material, and in individual cases independent argument should still be based on the Criminal Law, judicial interpretations and evidence.[9]
(3) Whether overall corporate distortion can be attributed to specific individuals
Administrative cases often determine responsible persons around information disclosure obligations and duties of diligence, while criminal cases require more densely individualized proof. False company statements, distorted announcements and completed regulatory penalties can only prove that the case carries high risk. Whether an individual committed a crime still requires ascertaining the person's actual authority, information sources, participation process and role in the result. There is an indispensable evidentiary bridge between corporate liability and individual liability.
The special representative action for securities misrepresentation in the Kangmei Pharmaceutical case adopted a tiered approach to the signing individuals: those who organized and planned the financial fraud and the audit institution with significant fault bore full joint and several liability; some directors, supervisors and senior managers who did not directly participate in the fraud but signed off on the financial reports bore liability within 20%, 10% or 5% of investor losses according to their degree of fault. This ruling is an assessment of civil liability, yet it clearly reveals that the probative force of a signature is tiered. Criminal liability still requires separate proof of knowledge and specific participation.[10]
(4) Can administrative materials be converted into evidence for criminal adjudication?
Replies to regulatory inquiries, on-site inspection records, interview transcripts, electronic data obtained in administrative investigations, audit working papers and bank statements often constitute the first batch of evidence in a criminal case. The 2024 working opinions of the four departments on securities and futures illegal and criminal activities strengthened coordination between administrative enforcement and criminal justice, and set requirements for evidence transfer, investigation and evidence collection, and case linkage. Objective materials such as physical evidence, documentary evidence, audio-visual materials and electronic data lawfully collected by administrative organs may, after examination and verification through criminal proceedings, be used as the basis for adjudication; evaluative conclusions and presumptions of liability in administrative penalty decisions still require independent review by judicial organs.[11]
From the defense perspective, the conversion of administrative evidence requires review of at least four matters: whether the acquiring subject and procedure are lawful, whether the original carrier is complete, whether the data extraction and analysis methods are reproducible, and whether there are differences in the protection of rights between administrative inquiries and criminal interrogations. As for professional analysis reports, further questions must be asked about the underlying data, model assumptions, margin of error, counter-explanations, and whether the analysts can appear in court to explain.
03. Personal liability of key persons
A position is only the starting point of an investigation. In handling similar matters, the author usually builds a personal liability matrix around five questions: what authority did he have, from when did he know, what specifically did he do, how much did his conduct contribute to the result, and can the prosecution's explanation exclude a reasonable counter-explanation. The five-axis model can prevent position, signature or organizational relationship from being directly treated as an element of the crime.
Table 3 Five-axis model of personal liability
(1) Actual controllers, chairmen and general managers
An actual controller, even if he does not hold a formal position or sign the reports, may bear direct liability by organizing or instructing the issuer or listed company to carry out false disclosure. Amendment (XI) to the Criminal Law strengthened accountability for controlling shareholders and actual controllers in Articles 160 and 161. The focus of evidence usually includes target instructions, performance pressure, fund arrangements, coordination with third parties, concealment of major matters, and actual control over finance and intermediaries.[12]
The high-risk situations for chairmen and general managers are concentrated in three aspects: deciding to use false performance to meet listing, financing, dividend or delisting indicators; requiring adjustment of the presentation after learning the true situation; and still pushing for approval and disclosure after audits and regulators raised clear anomalies. A management position and general duties alone are not sufficient to automatically prove intent. The prosecution still needs to explain through which meetings, instructions, approvals or resource allocations he entered the fraud chain.
(2) Person in charge of finance
The person in charge of finance usually controls the accounting books, consolidated statements, revenue recognition, cost carryover, impairment provisions and audit adjustments, and is a high-risk node in the review of personal liability. The risk does not arise from the words "chief financial officer" but from being able to see both the true operating data and the data to be disclosed. If he organizes the alteration of vouchers, designs fund circular flows, suppresses audit adjustments, requires subsidiaries to cooperate, or recognizes revenue while knowing that delivery conditions have not been met, the chain of proof of intent is easily formed.
In defense, it should be distinguished whether the accounting treatment proposals made by the person in charge of finance were based on real transactions and accounting standards, whether they were discussed with the auditors, whether there was a reasonable professional disagreement, and whether the final adjustment was forcibly decided by higher levels. For large groups, it should also be examined whether he could penetrate the subsidiary business systems, whether he was provided with false business documents, and whether the review procedures at the consolidation level had the ability to detect.
(3) Board secretary
The Regulatory Rules for Board Secretaries of Listed Companies, effective from May 24, 2026, make clear that the board secretary is responsible for the operation of the information disclosure system, coordination of periodic report preparation, collection of information on major events and organization of disclosure of interim reports, and should pay attention to material anomalies in financial data, operating matters and the preparation and publication procedures. The board secretary is therefore at a key node where internal facts travel to the public market.[13]
The liability of the board secretary still requires distinguishing two scenarios. In the first, the board secretary only had access to materials provided by the finance, business and audit departments, did not learn of the true anomalies, and performed the necessary inquiry, verification and reporting procedures; in the second, the board secretary directly participated in false transactions, altered disclosure presentations, suppressed major matters, organized backdated supplementary materials, or continued to push for disclosure after receiving clear risk warnings. The criminal law assessment of these two sets of facts differs enormously. The administrative penalty decision in the Sierxin case found that the then board secretary participated in the negotiation and signing of contracts for false sales business, and the basis of his liability went beyond merely signing the disclosure.[14]
(4) Independent directors and audit committee
Independent directors generally do not participate in daily operations and have no power to compel the production of bank statements or seize materials; their statutory tools are mainly review, inquiry, requesting supplementary materials, proposing verification, postponing deliberation, expressing dissent and reporting to regulators. The current independent director system and governance guidelines have strengthened the supervision duties of independent directors over matters involving major conflicts of interest, financial information and the audit committee. The review of criminal liability should respect their status as non-executive directors, while also paying attention to whether they actually used their supervisory tools after obvious anomalies appeared.[15]
The most valuable evidence of an independent director's performance of duties usually includes the time of receipt of pre-meeting materials, lists of specific questions, emails requesting supplementary working papers, records of communications with the audit institution, reasons for opposition or abstention, requests to postpone deliberation, and reports to regulators. An oral claim that "the company did not give me the materials" is difficult to turn into a stable defense; only proof of repeated requests, clear dissent and the process of being obstructed may explain his information boundary and subjective state.
(5) Ordinary employees
Ordinary finance, business or data personnel may participate in preparing spreadsheets, modifying systems or making supplementary entries of documents. Their liability needs to be assessed in light of factors such as whether they understood the purpose of the fraud, whether they had room to choose, whether they participated continuously, whether they profited, and whether they helped conceal it. In Guiding Case No. 220, the judicial organs classified and handled the listed company's chairman, senior managers, department heads and ordinary employees; two employees of a multiplication branch were not prosecuted because of factors such as their lighter degree of participation and smaller role. The case reflects tiered attribution of liability and control of criminal punishability in securities crimes.[16]
04. Liability of intermediaries
Intermediaries are called the "gatekeepers" of the capital market, but criminal liability still requires distinguishing subjective state and level of conduct. The existence of falsehood in a project does not mean that the sponsor, accountant, lawyer or appraiser is necessarily guilty. The real watershed is: whether the necessary procedures were completed, whether red flags were identified and addressed, whether documents were issued while knowing they were false, and whether they further participated in designing, implementing or concealing the fraud.
Table 4 Four-tier liability ladder for intermediary personnel
Article 229 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China simultaneously provides for two forms of crime: intentionally providing false supporting documents and serious irresponsibility causing major inaccuracy. The 55th batch of guiding cases of the Supreme People's Procuratorate and the typical cases of financial fraud by intermediary organizations further emphasize that, in accordance with the principle of consistency between subjective and objective elements, a precise distinction should be made among accomplice in fraudulent issuance, the crime of providing false supporting documents and the crime of issuing supporting documents with major inaccuracy.[17]
(1) How should responsibility be tiered among the project team, quality control, internal review and compliance?
The sponsor project team and sponsor representatives are closest to the issuer and the underlying materials, and usually are responsible for verifying customers and suppliers, business-finance reconciliation, fund flows, related-party relationships and responses to inquiries. The quality control department focuses on whether major risks are identified, whether additional procedures are sufficient, and whether conclusions are supported by evidence; the internal review and compliance levels decide whether the project can proceed. The three lines of defense have different duties, and criminal attribution should also separately prove the anomalies they encountered, the measures they could take and their actual decisions.
The Administrative Measures for Sponsor Business of Securities Issuance and Listing permit reference to the professional opinions of other securities service institutions within the scope of professional division of labor, while requiring sponsors to maintain professional skepticism; where there are major anomalies, major contradictions, or major differences between professional opinions and their own investigation conclusions, additional investigation and review should be conducted. Reasonable reliance must be based on actually implemented procedures and complete working papers.[18]
(2) The Sierxin sponsorship case
In the Sierxin IPO project, the CSRC imposed administrative penalties on CICC and two sponsor representatives. The main problems identified by the regulator included: the actual production time of hardware did not match the year of revenue recognition; occasional pure software sales contributed 60.09% of the year's profit, and the software was mainly compatible with its own hardware, yet customers did not purchase the hardware; customer visits used preset questionnaires and did not ask follow-up questions about anomalies such as handwritten contract numbers, reversed approval timing and contradictory delivery methods; and the verification of fund flows failed to identify that the issuer's prepayments were converted through third parties into false sales receipts.[19]
This case is also instructive for criminal defense. A regulatory finding of "failure to perform duties diligently" does not automatically prove joint crime; to elevate it to accomplice in the crime of fraudulent issuance of securities, it is still necessary to prove that the intermediary personnel knew of the issuer's fraud and had a meeting of minds with it or provided substantial assistance. Conversely, if the project team can prove that it identified red flags, conducted additional verification, formed dissenting opinions and was deceived by false materials, this will significantly affect the assessment of subjective intent and degree of negligence.
(3) The Jingmou Culture auditors case
In the case of Zhu Moujun and Liu Moujun providing false supporting documents, the two signing certified public accountants had already discovered during the audit that the film and television project had not obtained a broadcasting license and that the relevant revenue could not be recognized in 2018. Thereafter, the two proposed replacing the original broadcasting contract with an investment share contract and backdating the date, helped review the false contract, modified the audit working papers, and ultimately issued a standard unqualified audit report, causing the listed company to inflate operating revenue by 358 million yuan and inflate profit by 145 million yuan. The court sentenced them to one year and five months and eleven months in prison respectively, and imposed fines.[20]
The underlying logic of the case is very clear: failure to discover an anomaly may fall within professional negligence; after discovering an anomaly, rashly accepting an explanation requires examination of whether there was serious irresponsibility; after discovering the problem, actively helping to change the form of the contract, backdate the date and adjust the working papers to create an audit basis already constitutes strong evidence of intentionally providing false supporting documents. The professional knowledge background of the professionals is not a mitigating factor here; on the contrary, it strengthens their awareness of the conditions for revenue recognition and the falsity of the evidence.
(4) Guiding Case No. 219
The case of Jia Leather Co., Ltd., Zhou Moumou and others committing fraudulent issuance of bonds, and Ma Mou issuing supporting documents with major inaccuracy (Guiding Case No. 219) makes clear that SME private placement bonds fall within the scope of "corporate or enterprise bonds" under Article 160 of the Criminal Law. For intermediary personnel, a separate assessment should be made of accomplice in fraudulent issuance, the crime of providing false supporting documents, or the crime of issuing supporting documents with major inaccuracy, according to whether they conspired with the issuer, whether they knew the materials were false, and whether they merely failed to discover the problems due to serious irresponsibility.[21]
Such cases especially require reconstructing the internal division of labour within the project. The signing partner, project manager, on-site personnel and quality-control reviewers may have come into contact with different materials; some directly accepted forged tax materials and assisted in preparing false working papers, while others merely carried out routine procedures based on tampered underlying materials. Criminal liability cannot be distributed evenly along the firm's organisational structure.
05. Investigative thinking in securities crime defence work
(1) The corporate fact chain — from the figures in the statements back to the underlying transactions
Financial fraud cases often present as "inflated revenue", "understated costs" or "overstated assets", and the criminal evidence needs to be traced further down. Every accounting figure should correspond to customers or suppliers, contracts, approvals, production, delivery, acceptance, invoices, funds, tax, inventory and system records. ERP (enterprise resource planning) systems, warehousing systems, logistics tracking, equipment logs, licence issuance records and third-party platform data are often closer to the real business than paper explanations created after the event.
In the Sierxin case, server logs, chats and emails, production inspection records and end-user delivery together broke through the paper contracts and acceptance materials; the CICC case further shows that a lack of reconciliation between financial and non-financial data deprives formalistic due diligence of probative value. Even where contracts, invoices, acceptance and payment collection are all present, there may still be early recognition, closed fund loops, nominal customers or a lack of commercial substance.[22]
(2) The individual intent chain — versions, timing and red flags matter more than the final signature
Individual intent is usually hidden in the version chain. The first internal draft report, audit adjustment schedules, drafts of responses to inquiries, email attachments, instant messages, meeting minutes, document metadata and approval records can show when the true information entered the individual's field of vision, who proposed deleting or downplaying the risk, who asked for additional transaction evidence, and who still held unresolved contradictions before the final signature.
A signature has significant probative value, but its meaning needs to be explained in light of timing and basis. A signature can prove participation in the confirmation process, and may together with job responsibilities, red flags and modification conduct prove knowledge; if contemporaneous materials show that the person only came into contact with materials confirmed by the professional department, raised questions and received substantiated answers, the signature may also admit of an explanation of reasonable reliance. Criminal adjudication requires a comparison of the evidence between the two explanations.
(3) The Zhangzidao case — how objective third-party data reconstructs the real business
In the case of Wu Moumou and others illegally disclosing important information (Guiding Case No. 220), the listed company's seabed aquaculture and harvesting data were missing or deleted, and the investigating authorities used Beidou navigation positioning information and the ship navigation tracks reconstructed from it and other external data to reconstruct the harvesting areas, then compared them with the book cost carry-forward and the annual reports. For the 2016 financial year, operating costs and non-operating expenses were understated, inflating profit by a total of more than RMB 130 million; subsequently the earlier distortion was dealt with by adjusting the harvesting area, impairment and write-offs.[23]
This case shows that the books are not the only "scene". Banks, tax authorities, customs, logistics, satellites, platforms and equipment systems may all leave objective traces that are difficult to alter in sync. However, third-party data can only answer where the ship went, when the goods moved and how the funds circulated; it cannot directly prove what each signing person knew. The corporate fact chain and the individual intent chain must be completed separately.
From a defence perspective, big-data analysis reports still require review of the completeness of the raw data, whether the equipment operated continuously, the algorithmic model, the behavioural inference rules, the margin of error and counter-explanations. A report labelled "satellite" or "big data" enjoys no inherent advantage; only where the analysis process is repeatable and the conclusions verifiable does it have stable probative value.[24]
(4) Conditions for the establishment of reasonable reliance
"I trusted the accountant", "the issuer deceived the project team" and "the business department said the transaction was real" all need to be converted into verifiable facts of performance of duties. Reasonable reliance usually requires five conditions: the matter genuinely falls within the scope of the professional division of labour; the person relied upon has the qualifications and competence; before relying, complete facts were provided and necessary review was carried out; at the time no major red flag appeared that was sufficient to overturn the professional opinion; and the reliance process is documented in emails, inquiries, working papers and approval records.
Once a red flag appears, the duty of reliance escalates accordingly. Revenue growing sharply while cash flow diverges, occasional transactions contributing the vast majority of profit, contracts and orders dated in reverse order, customers having no real need to use the product, payment funds originating from the issuer or related parties, and confirmation addresses and contacts controlled by the issuer — these circumstances usually require additional procedures. Mechanically accepting professional conclusions may be administratively assessed as a failure of diligence; where accompanied by knowledge, cooperation and concealment, criminal risk rises rapidly.
06. High-risk business practices that recur in public cases
So-called "industry hidden rules" should not be understood as the general state of an entire industry. What recurs in public cases is a number of high-risk practices that readily arise under performance pressure, issuance windows and responsibility-diffusion mechanisms. Identifying these patterns helps one hear criminal risk early in business language.
1. Set the target first, then find the accounting treatment. Listing, refinancing, performance commitments, avoiding delisting or equity incentive targets are determined first, and the business and finance sides then look for transactions, recognition timing or impairment policies to match the target. Legitimate accounting judgement should start from the real business; where the target conversely determines the facts, evidence of intentional manipulation readily forms.
2. Use "completing the chain" to repair an accomplished result. Signing supplementary contracts, redoing acceptance, re-confirming and adding meeting minutes after on-site inspections, annual audits or inquiries may appear to perfect the formalities, but if the materials are intended to create historical facts that did not exist, they become direct evidence of subjective intent and concealment. The case of the Jing Mou Culture auditors presented precisely this high risk of backdated contracts and altered working papers.[25]
3. Formal procedures replacing substantive verification. Visits, confirmations, interviews and sign-offs are all completed, yet the issue list is not designed around anomalies, no one pursues contradictory evidence, and the working papers can only prove that something was "done", not that it was "verified". The Sierxin sponsorship case provides a typical sample of this.
4. Third parties helping to form a closed transaction loop. Customers, suppliers, related parties or fund channels cooperate in signing contracts, moving funds, issuing acceptance and returning confirmations; the transaction looks complete, yet the commercial need, the flow of goods and the source of funds cannot be explained. The 2024 comprehensive punishment and prevention opinions have brought suppliers, customers, intermediaries and financial institutions that cooperate in fraud into whole-chain accountability.[26]
5. Major matters bypassing the disclosure chain. The actual controller or business head, on the grounds of confidentiality or that commercial negotiations are not yet settled, fails to report fully to the board secretary, finance or the board; once the matter is exposed, responsibility is then attributed to the disclosure department. Such cases should focus on when the information was formed, who controlled it, who had a reporting duty and who suppressed disclosure.
6. Company counsel or a unified account overriding individual differences. After risk arises, the company tends to form a unified explanation. Different positions hold different information and interests; a seemingly complete company account may crystallise admissions adverse to particular individuals, and may also conceal conflicts of interest that have already arisen among the actual controller, senior executives and intermediaries.
07. The substantive path of criminal defence
The common charging path in securities misrepresentation cases is: the company's data is distorted — the prosecution threshold is met — the actor held a key position and signed — it is presumed that he knew and participated. Effective defence requires dismantling each leap layer by layer. An overall denial may sometimes conflict with objective data and reduce credibility; a layered dispute more easily enters the adjudicator's assessment of the evidence.
Table 5 Prosecution's proof path and defence's review focus
(1) Disputing the corporate facts
For disputes over revenue recognition, review the transfer of control, performance obligations, returns and repurchases, nominal customers, end use, source of funds and abnormal gross margins; for disputes over asset impairment, review the valuation basis, forecast assumptions, consistency of methodology over time and management's purpose; for related-party relationships and fund occupation, penetrate the personnel, funds, seals, business and attribution of returns. The conclusions of a forensic accounting report cannot replace proof of the underlying facts.
(2) Disputing the criminal threshold
Defence counsel should obtain the complete calculation schedules, adjustment entries, sample lists and source vouchers, and where necessary introduce accounting experts to form supporting opinions. Focus on checking: whether the same matter is counted twice in revenue and profit as harm; how a loss-making year is handled where negative profit is used as the denominator; whether changes in the scope of consolidation have been ignored; whether cross-year projects are calculated on a consistent basis; and whether investors' direct losses have a causal relationship with the misrepresentation at issue.
(3) Disputing subjective intent
The intent defence cannot stop at "I didn't know". A persuasive counter-explanation should contain four elements: the boundary of the information held at the time, the materials on which the judgement was based, the inquiries and verification already carried out, and the measures taken when anomalies subsequently appeared. Contemporaneous emails, annotations, meeting minutes and working papers are usually superior to after-the-event statements.
For signing personnel, explain the object signed, the time of signing, the scope of review and the professional reliance; for intermediary personnel, explain that the procedures were genuinely implemented, how red flags were handled, dissenting views and the reporting chain; for ordinary employees, explain the content of instructions, their level of understanding, the room for choice and their actual role. If the prosecution cannot exclude explanations such as being concealed from, reasonable reliance, professional disagreement or marginal execution, a gap may appear in the proof of individual intent.
(4) Disputing role and level of responsibility
In the same case, the responsibility of planners, organisers, key executors, ordinary aiders and passive participants should be layered. Guiding Case No. 220 declined to prosecute ordinary staff, and Guiding Case No. 219 distinguished intent from negligence among intermediary personnel, both showing that accountability for securities crimes does not exclude relative non-prosecution, accessory status, suspended sentences and treatment of minor circumstances. Defence should convert the abstract "minor role" into comparable facts: whether the person participated in decision-making, whether he controlled the data, whether the conduct was replaceable, whether he participated continuously, whether he profited, and whether he voluntarily corrected.[27]
(5) Disputing the admissibility and probative value of evidence
For interview records formed in administrative investigations, check the maker, the contemporaneous record, the notification of rights, whether there was inducement and conflicts among multiple versions; for electronic data, check the original medium, the extraction record, hash verification, account attribution, integrity and the recovery process; for audit or data analysis reports, check the commissioned matter, the personnel's qualifications, the methodology, the underlying data and the boundaries of the conclusions.
The author has seen, in criminal and civil-criminal crossover matters involving listed companies, that the same piece of material performs different functions in administrative, civil and criminal proceedings. The presumption of responsibility in administrative proceedings, fault and causation in civil proceedings, and intent and proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal proceedings need to be argued separately. Explaining the procedural differences clearly is often more readily understood by adjudicators than a blanket denial of the regulatory conclusions.
(6) Remedying the harm and sentencing
Where the room for acquittal is limited, measures such as corrective disclosure, recovery of illegal gains, compensation, internal accountability, improving internal controls, voluntarily reporting intermediary problems and protecting investors should be assessed as soon as possible. Remedying the harm cannot be used to conceal facts, nor be conflated with collusion in testimony or fabricating materials. Genuine, timely and verifiable remedial conduct can support arguments for pleading guilty and accepting punishment, accessory status, voluntary surrender or meritorious service, discretionary leniency and suspended sentences.
The four departments' opinions on securities and futures illegal and criminal work require strict punishment of major cases in accordance with the law, while also emphasizing evidentiary standards, recovery of illicit gains and compensation for losses, and two-way linkage between administrative and criminal proceedings. For persons with relatively minor circumstances and limited roles, the defense should still put forward specific arguments centered on criminal necessity, level of responsibility, and social harm; for core planners, the focus should instead be on the boundaries of facts, the number of offenses, the basis for calculating amounts, the principle of applying the old law with the lighter punishment, and remediation of harm.[28]
08. Conclusion
Securities misrepresentation lies at the intersection of corporate governance, financial accounting, administrative regulation, civil compensation, and criminal proof. Understanding how the securities market operates is important, but more important is translating business language into criminal law questions: whether the transaction was real, when the information was formed, who had a duty to report, who had access to the true data, who altered the documents, who drove the disclosure, and whether the evidence can exclude explanations based on good faith and professional division of labor.
In the author's view, the unique value of criminal lawyers' involvement in such cases includes, for example: reconstructing the chain of evidence in reverse from an investigative perspective, separating the company from individuals through the principle of responsibility, and using crisis-management experience to preserve original evidence and control secondary risks. High regulatory pressure and strict proof do not conflict. Holding accountable in accordance with the law those who actually organize, plan, and carry out fraud, and preventing objective imputation based on position, signature, or industry identity, are equally part of the rule of law in the capital market.
*Disclaimer: This article is general research and practical exchange material and does not constitute legal advice on any specific case. Judgment in individual cases should take into account the time of the conduct, the applicable rules, the complete case file, and professional accounting opinions.
Article Appendix
Questions and answers
What criminal offenses correspond to securities misrepresentation under Chinese law?
The main offenses are fraudulent issuance of securities under Article 160 of the Criminal Law for issuance-stage misrepresentation, and irregular disclosure or non-disclosure of important information under Article 161 for continuous disclosure violations. Intermediaries may face charges under Article 229 for providing false supporting documents or issuing documents with major inaccuracies.
What evidence is needed to prove individual intent in securities misrepresentation cases?
Intent is inferred from objective facts such as access to true internal data, attendance at meetings on anomalies, receipt of audit adjustments, requests to delete risk statements, alteration of working papers, or continued signing after red flags. Direct admission is rare; the evidence chain must show knowledge and participation.
Can administrative penalty decisions be directly used as evidence in criminal proceedings for securities misrepresentation?
Objective materials lawfully collected by administrative organs may be used after examination in criminal proceedings, but evaluative conclusions and presumptions of liability in administrative penalty decisions require independent review by judicial organs. Defense should check the legality of acquisition, completeness of originals, and reproducibility of data analysis.
How does the Sierxin case illustrate the boundary between administrative violation and criminal fraud?
The CSRC found Sierxin inflated revenue and profit in its STAR Market IPO application, but because it withdrew before registration and actual issuance, criminal evaluation under Article 160 still requires analysis of issuance elements, commencement of actus reus, and attempt or discontinuation. Administrative characterization does not replace criminal law analysis.
What factors determine the criminal liability of intermediaries like sponsors and auditors in securities misrepresentation?
Liability depends on whether necessary procedures were completed, red flags identified and addressed, documents issued with knowledge of falsity, and further participation in designing or concealing fraud. The Sierxin sponsorship case and Jingmou Culture auditors case show that failure to discover anomalies may be negligence, but active concealment or backdating constitutes intentional false supporting documents.
Laws and cases cited
Laws
- Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China
- Securities Law of the People's Republic of China
- Amendment (XI) to the Criminal Law
Regulations
- Measures for the Administration of Information Disclosure by Listed Companies
- Regulatory Rules for Board Secretaries of Listed Companies
- Administrative Measures for Sponsor Business of Securities Issuance and Listing
Judicial interpretations
- Provisions of the Supreme People's Procuratorate and the Ministry of Public Security on the Standards for Filing and Prosecuting Criminal Cases under the Jurisdiction of Public Security Organs (II)
Cases
- Guiding Case No. 220
- Guiding Case No. 219
- SiErXin case
- Kangmei Pharmaceutical case
References
- See China Securities Regulatory Commission: "CSRC Holds Central-Local Coordination Work Promotion Meeting on the Comprehensive Punishment and Prevention System for Capital Market Financial Fraud," June 30, 2026. The notice states: a cumulative total of 247 financial fraud cases were investigated and handled, 156 administrative penalties were imposed, fines and confiscations exceeded 9.051 billion yuan, and 21 companies were forcibly delisted; 134 leads on suspected financial fraud crimes were transferred to public security organs, procuratorial organs initiated public prosecution against 267 persons involved in 95 cases, and more than 1,500 leads on third parties assisting fraud were transferred cumulatively.
- See the General Office of the State Council forwarding the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Finance, the People's Bank of China, the National Financial Regulatory Administration, and the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council: "Opinions on Further Improving the Comprehensive Punishment and Prevention of Financial Fraud in the Capital Market" (Guobanfa [2024] No. 34), June 29, 2024.
- See Articles 160, 161, and 229 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China; Articles 8, 9, and 25 of the Amendment (XI) to the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China.
- See Articles 78, 80, and 82 of the Securities Law of the People's Republic of China; Articles 3, 4, 26, and 30, among others, of the Measures for the Administration of Information Disclosure by Listed Companies (China Securities Regulatory Commission Order No. 226).
- See Articles 15, 160, and 161 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China. Paragraph 2 of Article 15 provides: "Criminal responsibility for a negligent crime shall be borne only where the law so provides." Neither Article 160 nor Article 161 contains a provision criminalizing negligence.
- See Articles 180 and 182 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China; Supreme People's Procuratorate: "Jiang Moumou Insider Trading Case (Guijian No. 221)" and "Zhao Moumou and Others Market Manipulation Case (Guijian No. 222)," in Guiding Cases of the Supreme People's Procuratorate (Fifty-Fifth Batch), February 21, 2025.
- See China Securities Regulatory Commission: "Administrative Penalty Decision of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (Si'erxin) [2023] No. 152," December 18, 2023; China Securities Regulatory Commission: "CSRC Imposes Administrative Penalties on Shanghai Si'erxin Technology for Fraudulent Issuance Violations," February 9, 2024.
- See Supreme People's Procuratorate and Ministry of Public Security: "Provisions on the Standards for Filing and Prosecuting Criminal Cases Under the Jurisdiction of Public Security Organs (II)," issued April 6, 2022, Articles 5 and 6. The different circumstances constitute parallel prosecution paths; in specific cases, the text applicable at the time of the conduct and the calculation basis should also be verified.
- See the Economic Crime Procuratorial Department of the Supreme People's Procuratorate: "Answers to Questions Concerning the Handling of Financial Fraud Criminal Cases," August 16, 2024. The document sets out case-handling opinions on issues including cross-period recognition, reverse adjustments after prior-period fraud, continuous conduct, liability of intermediary personnel, and categorized handling of personnel.
- See Supreme People's Court: "Top Ten Commercial Cases of Courts Nationwide in 2021—Special Representative Action in the Securities Misrepresentation Liability Dispute Brought by Gu Huajun, Liu Shujun, and 11 Other Investors Against Kangmei Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.," January 29, 2022.
- See Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, and China Securities Regulatory Commission: "Opinions on Several Issues Concerning the Handling of Securities and Futures Illegal and Criminal Cases," May 17, 2024; Article 54 of the Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China.
- See Paragraph 2 of Article 160 and Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 161 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China. Amendment (XI) to the Criminal Law strengthened criminal accountability for controlling shareholders and actual controllers who organize or instigate the relevant conduct.
- See Articles 3 through 7 of the Regulatory Rules for Board Secretaries of Listed Companies (China Securities Regulatory Commission Announcement [2026] No. 8), effective May 24, 2026.
- See China Securities Regulatory Commission: "Administrative Penalty Decision of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (Si'erxin) [2023] No. 152," December 18, 2023. The penalty decision found that the then board secretary, Xiong Shikun, participated in the negotiation and signing of contracts for fictitious sales business between the company and relevant customers.
- See the Measures for the Administration of Independent Directors of Listed Companies (China Securities Regulatory Commission Order No. 220, amended according to China Securities Regulatory Commission Order No. 227); the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies (China Securities Regulatory Commission Announcement [2025] No. 18), effective January 1, 2026.
- See Supreme People's Procuratorate: "Wu Moumou and Others Case of Disclosing Important Information in Violation of Regulations (Guijian No. 220)," in Guiding Cases of the Supreme People's Procuratorate (Fifty-Fifth Batch), February 21, 2025. The case states that Yu Moumou and Zhao Mou, who participated to a lesser extent and played lesser roles, were lawfully handled by non-prosecution.
- See Article 229 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China; Supreme People's Procuratorate: "Jia Leather Industry Co., Ltd., Zhou Moumou and Others Case of Fraudulent Bond Issuance and Ma Mou Case of Issuing Certifying Documents with Major Misrepresentation (Guijian No. 219)," in Guiding Cases of the Supreme People's Procuratorate (Fifty-Fifth Batch), February 21, 2025; Supreme People's Procuratorate: "Typical Cases of Strictly Punishing Crimes Related to Financial Fraud by Intermediary Organizations in Accordance with the Law," January 3, 2025.
- See Articles 17 and 23, among others, of the Measures for the Administration of Sponsorship Business for Securities Issuance and Listing (China Securities Regulatory Commission Order No. 207, amended according to China Securities Regulatory Commission Order No. 227) concerning due diligence, independent verification, and reliance on professional opinions.
- See China Securities Regulatory Commission: "Administrative Penalty Decision of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (China International Capital Corporation Limited, Zhao Shanjun, Chen Liren) [2024] No. 152," December 20, 2024.
- See Supreme People's Procuratorate: "Zhu Moujun and Liu Moujun Case of Providing False Certifying Documents," in Typical Cases of Strictly Punishing Crimes Related to Financial Fraud by Intermediary Organizations in Accordance with the Law, January 3, 2025.
- See Supreme People's Procuratorate: "Jia Leather Industry Co., Ltd., Zhou Moumou and Others Case of Fraudulent Bond Issuance and Ma Mou Case of Issuing Certifying Documents with Major Misrepresentation (Guijian No. 219)," in Guiding Cases of the Supreme People's Procuratorate (Fifty-Fifth Batch), February 21, 2025.
- See China Securities Regulatory Commission: "Administrative Penalty Decision of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (Si'erxin) [2023] No. 152," December 18, 2023; "Administrative Penalty Decision of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (China International Capital Corporation Limited, Zhao Shanjun, Chen Liren) [2024] No. 152," December 20, 2024.
- See Supreme People's Procuratorate: "Wu Moumou and Others Case of Disclosing Important Information in Violation of Regulations (Guijian No. 220)," in Guiding Cases of the Supreme People's Procuratorate (Fifty-Fifth Batch), February 21, 2025.
- See Supreme People's Procuratorate: "Discussing Law Through Cases | Evidentiary Treatment of Fund Data Analysis Reports Meets Realistic Judicial Needs," March 22, 2025; Supreme People's Procuratorate: "Wu Moumou and Others Case of Disclosing Important Information in Violation of Regulations (Guijian No. 220)," February 21, 2025.
- See Supreme People's Procuratorate: "Zhu Moujun and Liu Moujun Case of Providing False Certifying Documents," in Typical Cases of Strictly Punishing Crimes Related to Financial Fraud by Intermediary Organizations in Accordance with the Law, January 3, 2025.
- See the General Office of the State Council forwarding the China Securities Regulatory Commission and five other departments: "Opinions on Further Improving the Comprehensive Punishment and Prevention of Financial Fraud in the Capital Market" (Guobanfa [2024] No. 34), items (2), (4), and (9).
- See Supreme People's Procuratorate: "Wu Moumou and Others Case of Disclosing Important Information in Violation of Regulations (Guijian No. 220)" and "Jia Leather Industry Co., Ltd., Zhou Moumou and Others Case of Fraudulent Bond Issuance and Ma Mou Case of Issuing Certifying Documents with Major Misrepresentation (Guijian No. 219)," in Guiding Cases of the Supreme People's Procuratorate (Fifty-Fifth Batch), February 21, 2025.
- See Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, and China Securities Regulatory Commission: "Opinions on Several Issues Concerning the Handling of Securities and Futures Illegal and Criminal Cases," May 17, 2024.