Introduction

For Chinese cross-border sellers deeply engaged in the US market, a CPSC (Consumer Product Safety Commission) recall investigation is like a sword hanging overhead—you never know when it will fall, still less how hard it will strike. Yet what is more troublesome than the recall itself is the fog of misunderstanding that surrounds this investigation process: what procedure does the investigation follow? When will the platform cut off the sales channel? For those seemingly professional intermediary agencies, are the "shortcuts" they promise a lifeline or a misleading trap? Based on several CPSC recall cases the author has handled in recent years, this article dismantles these confusions one by one.

In 2025, the US CPSC issued a total of 422 recall notices, up 38.4% year on year, of which 315 involved products from China, accounting for 74.6% of the CPSC's total recalls and involving an amount of approximately USD 11.32 billion. In the first quarter of 2026, the CPSC issued a total of 142 recall notices, up 40.6% year on year, of which 120 involved products from China, an increase of 73.9% year on year, accounting for 84.5% of the CPSC's total recalls.

At a time when recall storms are increasingly frequent, understanding the operating logic and practical traps of the CPSC recall regime is the precondition for controlling losses to the greatest extent and preserving commercial interests in the storm.

01. Legal characterisation of CPSC recall investigations: distinguishing the negotiated investigation procedure from the formal adjudication procedure

Most CPSC-initiated product recalls begin with a subject bearing a reporting obligation performing its statutory reporting obligation to the CPSC in respect of a product defect. Section 15 (b) of the CPSA (15 U.S.C. § 2064 (b)) provides that where a "reportable event" occurs with respect to a product in commerce, the subject bearing the reporting obligation shall report to the CPSC within 24 hours after obtaining the reportable information.

A "reportable event" means information obtained by an enterprise that reasonably supports the conclusion that the product contains a defect which could constitute a substantial product hazard, or creates an unreasonable risk of personal injury or death; it also includes circumstances where the product violates a CPSC mandatory safety standard.

Subjects bearing the reporting obligation include manufacturers, importers, distributors, retailers, brand owners and all other relevant subjects across the supply chain; each type of subject has a reporting obligation. CPSC official guidance further clarifies that an enterprise's internal investigation and assessment to determine whether a reportable event exists should in principle not exceed 10 working days; a longer investigation period is reasonable only where the enterprise can adduce evidence of special circumstances; 10 working days is the maximum reasonable period for internal investigation and assessment, not the statutory reporting period—the reporting obligation starts from the time the enterprise has obtained information sufficient to support a reportable event, and a report must be submitted within 24 hours after that starting point.

However, from the triggering of the reporting obligation to the making of the final recall decision, the investigation procedure in between deserves special attention as to its legal nature. The preliminary investigation stage of a CPSC recall investigation is highly flexible. The investigation procedure is mainly driven forward by a compliance investigator assigned by the CPSC; at this stage there are no strict written hearing-type time limits; the investigator sets the pace of the investigation according to the circumstances of the individual case, and the investigated enterprise must submit materials and conduct communications and negotiations within this framework.

This flexibility stems from the underlying logic of the CPSC recall regime: the CPSC itself has no power to directly compel an enterprise to carry out a recall; the CPSC only has the power, after completing the statutory formal adjudication procedure, to have the Commission issue a formal compulsory recall order (a 15 (c)/15 (d) order). The vast majority of recalls are voluntary corrective action plans (CAPs) reached by agreement between the enterprise and the CPSC, that is, what is called in practice a voluntary recall.

It should be made clear that the CPSC is an independent regulatory agency established by the US Congress, with jurisdiction over recalls of approximately 15,000 kinds of consumer daily-use products, but it does not handle civil product quality damages disputes between ordinary consumers and businesses. Although the CPSC has investigation powers, information requisition powers and civil penalty powers, the exercise of such powers revolves around product safety regulation, reporting obligations and compulsory adjudication, and does not intervene in private civil tort disputes.

(1) The flexibility of the investigation procedure and the legal effect of the Preliminary Determination (PD)

This difference in legal characterisation determines that a PD (Preliminary Determination) issued by the CPSC is not a formal administrative adjudication and is not an adjudicative document under 16 CFR Part 1025.

A PD is a document output externally by CPSC investigation department staff recording an internal investigation conclusion; it represents the judgment of the CPSC investigation team, that is, whether there is sufficient evidence to preliminarily determine that the product presents a substantial product hazard within the meaning of Section 15 of the CPSA. Before making a PD, CPSC staff must carry out a technical assessment of the product, and that assessment process may take several months.

Enterprises should not underestimate the practical effect of a PD. A PD itself does not create compulsory legal binding force and is not a formal administrative order that can be directly appealed, but the CPSC may, where the statutory conditions are met, initiate the formal adjudication procedure based on the facts corresponding to the PD. At the same time, the CPSC has the power, where the statutory preconditions of Section 6 (b) of the Consumer Product Safety Act are met, to publish public warning information about the product defect, which has a major impact on the enterprise's commercial reputation.

When a PD is served on an enterprise, it usually requires the enterprise to reply within 10 working days, stating whether the enterprise agrees to carry out a voluntary recall (CAP). The enterprise may accept the PD's conclusion and sign a voluntary corrective action plan, or may refuse to accept the PD's defect finding and recall plan.

There is a very noteworthy issue in practice: the 40-day automatic effectiveness rule in 16 CFR 1025.52 does not apply to a PD at the investigation stage; it applies to the Initial Decision made by the presiding officer in formal hearing proceedings. A PD is not a Part 1025 adjudication procedure document, and there is no statutory right to appeal to the Commission within 40 days after a PD is made. The 16 CFR 1025.52 rule is an internal adjudication procedure of the US Consumer Product Safety Commission: within 40 days after the presiding officer makes an Initial Decision, a party may appeal to the Commission. If no appeal is filed within that period and the Commission does not initiate review on its own motion, the Initial Decision automatically becomes the Commission's Final Decision and Order. A PD is only an investigation finding of the investigation department; an enterprise refusing a PD cannot directly "appeal the PD". The enterprise may choose: ① to continue negotiating with the investigator; or ② to apply to initiate the formal adversarial adjudication procedure under 16 CFR Part 1025 (a hearing presided over by an administrative law judge), whereupon the CPSC formally dockets the case and the complete evidence discovery, hearing and initial decision process begins.

(2) The difference between voluntary corrective action before a PD and the formal administrative adjudication procedure

The stage before a PD is a consultative, non-adversarial investigation communication stage. Through negotiation with the CPSC investigator, the enterprise reaches a voluntary corrective action plan (CAP/Consent Agreement), that is, what is called in practice a voluntary recall.

In practice, the vast majority of CPSC recalls are voluntary recalls reached by agreement between the enterprise and the CPSC, not the result of unilateral compulsion imposed by the CPSC. The CPSC has also established a "No PD Fast Track Recall Programme", that is, where a qualifying voluntary recall plan is reached within 20 working days after the enterprise performs its 15 (b) reporting obligation, the CPSC may skip the step of issuing a PD document and directly implement the recall; this is also the institutional background against which a large number of enterprises reach a recall before a PD is issued.

After receiving a PD preliminary determination letter, an enterprise will usually give priority to negotiating a voluntary recall; only if the enterprise refuses to accept the entire recall plan is the case likely to escalate into the formal adversarial adjudication procedure under 16 CFR Part 1025: the CPSC issues a formal administrative Complaint, a Presiding Officer (administrative law judge) presides over a public hearing, evidence is presented and cross-examined, and the administrative law judge then issues an Initial Decision.

It should be noted that refusing a PD does not mean directly entering Commission review. This is because, after the enterprise refuses the PD, it is the CPSC that decides whether to docket the case and issue a formal Complaint, which then starts the Part 1025 (internal to the US Consumer Product Safety Commission) formal adjudication hearing procedure, after which the administrative law judge issues an Initial Decision; if a party is dissatisfied with the Initial Decision and appeals, the full CPSC Commission conducts review, which is a stage akin to "administrative review". Strictly speaking, no statutory review procedure is provided for a PD.

(3) Remedies for dissatisfaction with a PD

As discussed above, a PD is only a preliminary decision of the investigation department; there is no statutory appeal period against the PD itself, and 16 CFR 1025.52 does not apply. The lawful remedies for an enterprise after receiving a PD are:

1. Within the 10-working-day reply period stated in the PD, submit written submissions, technical evidence and test reports to rebut the CPSC investigation department's finding of a "substantial product hazard", and continue negotiations;

2. In some cases, the enterprise may propose a revised corrective action plan (CAP) and continue consultations with the investigator;

3. If negotiations break down completely, the CPSC may choose whether to initiate the formal adjudication procedure and then issue a formal administrative Complaint, entering the 16 CFR Part 1025 hearing procedure;

4. In formal hearing proceedings, the administrative law judge issues an Initial Decision, and only at this point is the 40-day appeal period triggered, during which the party may appeal to the CPSC Commission. If no appeal is filed within the period and the Commission does not initiate review, the Initial Decision automatically becomes the Commission's final administrative order (Final Order);

5. With respect to a Final Order for mandatory recall formally issued by the CPSC Commission, the court with jurisdiction for judicial review is the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, not the federal district court (15 U.S.C. § 2076, Hobbs Act). Federal district courts generally only hear actions brought by the CPSC for enforcement, injunctions, and civil penalties; companies cannot sue in district court to challenge the CPSC's formal recall administrative order itself.

Please note that once the formal adversarial adjudication process is entered, the case file will be made public in accordance with law. When the statutory disclosure conditions of Section 6(b) of the Consumer Product Safety Act are met, the CPSC may publicly disclose information related to the product defect, which will cause irreversible damage to the company's reputation; this is also an important reason why, in practice, the vast majority of companies tend to negotiate a voluntary recall before the PD is issued. However, the CPSC cannot arbitrarily disclose defect information merely because a company contests the matter; Section 6(b) sets strict preconditions for disclosure, and raw report information at the investigation stage is in principle kept confidential.

02. Full Report notification and the timing of Amazon delisting — practical observations of changes

(1) The stepped correspondence between CPSC notification types and Amazon's platform measures

1. Inquiry / Consumer Complaint Notice: after receiving a consumer complaint, the CPSC issues a notice to the company complained about, requiring the company to respond to the complaint within 10 working days, mainly addressing whether the complaint is true and whether confidential treatment is requested. Receipt of such a notice does not equal the formal initiation of a defect determination investigation, and such notice will not immediately notify Amazon; therefore, such notice usually will not directly result in the delisting of the product link.

2. Full Report Request: when the CPSC preliminarily suspects that a product may have a relatively serious defect, it will issue a Full Report Request, requiring the company to submit complete materials, including production information, technical test reports, sales volume, sales regions, sales period, incident complaint records, etc. At this point the CPSC has not yet made a violation determination, nor issued a PD. The CPSC's Full Report Request itself has no legal effect of compelling the platform to delist.

3. Notice of Violation (NOV): an NOV is a formal enforcement document issued by the CPSC Office of Compliance, used to determine that a product violates a CPSC mandatory standard, and is not a PD document targeting a "substantial product hazard / design defect." An NOV states the violated regulation and testing evidence, and requires the company to rectify within a time limit, stop sales, and recall; when the CPSC issues an NOV to a company, it will simultaneously copy Amazon. Upon receiving a formal NOV copy, Amazon usually immediately delists the corresponding ASIN product link.

4. Preliminary Determination (PD): after reviewing the full report submitted by the company, if the CPSC determines that the product has a substantial safety defect requiring recall, it issues a PD to the company. The PD requires the company to confirm within 10 working days whether it agrees to a voluntary recall. The PD itself does not automatically trigger Amazon's official mandatory delisting, nor does the platform have a legal right to remove the product sales link upon receipt of the PD; the company still retains room for defense and negotiation.

(2) Changes in delisting timing and analysis of causes

As of 2026, Amazon has not published a public written policy providing that upon receipt of a CPSC Full Report Request it must delist the product. The following describes a practical phenomenon increasingly reported by sellers in cross-border practice; it is the platform's own risk-control conduct based on its own terms of service, not a legal requirement of the CPSC.

Based on the foregoing analysis, when a company receives a Full Report Request, Amazon generally will not proactively disconnect the sales link, and the company may continue selling, until the CPSC issues a formal recall press release, at which point the platform executes delisting.

Since 2026, an increasing number of Chinese sellers in cross-border practice have reported that, after the deadline for responding to the Full Report has expired and before a PD has been issued, there are more and more cases in which Amazon disconnects the product sales link on its own. The platform often does not clearly inform the seller that the delisting originates from the CPSC Full Report investigation, but instead requires the seller to submit sufficient evidence to prove that the product has no safety defect before sales may possibly be restored.

Based on the author's experience, there may be three practical driving factors behind this phenomenon:

1. Amazon's seller service agreement itself contains general product safety compliance authorization clauses; as a private commercial platform, Amazon has the right, based on its own risk judgment, to take risk-control measures such as temporary delisting and sales restriction, without waiting for a formal effective order from a regulator.

2. In 2024, the CPSC issued a formal decision and order against Amazon, determining that under the FBA model Amazon can, in specific circumstances, be deemed a "distributor" under the Consumer Product Safety Act and must bear product safety and recall-related legal liability. That ruling greatly increased Amazon's compliance risk and prompted the platform to adopt a more defensive risk-control strategy.

3. The number of CPSC recall cases has continued to surge in the past two years, and the platform, in order to reduce its own potential regulatory and class-action risks, has adopted front-loaded and relatively conservative product safety risk control.

(3) Which situations are likely to trigger Amazon's early delisting and account freezing

Before discussing this issue, it should be recognized that when the CPSC issues a Full Report Request notice, this does not mean it has no contact with Amazon. When determining whether a product has a safety defect, the CPSC maintains close communication with Amazon and has the right to require Amazon to provide necessary information such as after-sales product reviews and incident reports within a time limit. The two have an information-sharing mechanism at any time, which makes it possible for Amazon to disconnect the sales link in advance.

According to information obtained by the author, Amazon's senior management has an adjustable guidance manual; when a product under CPSC investigation falls within that manual, Amazon will delist in advance. At this point, Amazon mostly adopts a "presumption of guilt," that is, first disconnecting the link and then having the seller (the company under investigation) prove its innocence.

In summary, products falling within the early-delisting manual include but are not limited to power banks, children's toys, children's learning and development products, children's clothing, drinking water pipe fittings, high-pressure cleaning equipment, products that have caused socially prominent incidents, or products that would likely cause serious consequences once an incident occurs (such as power banks). In addition, Amazon's early delisting is also related to whether the harm of the product safety defect involved is certain to occur. If the harm is not certain to occur, the likelihood of early delisting and account freezing is relatively low; if the harm is certain to occur, the likelihood of early delisting and account freezing is relatively high.

By way of example, in recent years the CPSC has initiated recall investigations into faucet products of many Chinese sellers due to excessive lead or into power bank products; after the CPSC issued a Full Report Request, while the company was actively responding, Amazon suddenly disconnected the sales link and froze the account. After carefully analyzing and summarizing dozens of cases handled by the author, the author believes that the underlying reason Amazon disconnects sales links and freezes accounts is that consumers use faucets every day, and if the lead exceeds the standard, the harm is not contingent but certain to occur every day; once a power bank product catches fire or explodes, it will cause serious consequences; therefore Amazon first disconnects the sales link and freezes the account, leaving the company to prove its innocence.

It should be noted that even if the seller can prove to Amazon that the product has no safety risk and restore the link and frozen account, if the CPSC ultimately determines that the product has a safety risk and should be recalled, Amazon will still comply with the CPSC decision, cooperate with the recall, and disconnect the sales link again.

03. Amazon is the most uncontrollable variable in CPSC recalls

The fundamental reason Amazon constitutes the most uncontrollable factor in CPSC recalls is that Amazon is a private commercial platform, whose risk-control decision-making logic is not fully synchronized with the CPSC's statutory administrative investigation procedure, and Amazon's platform measures do not entirely depend on the CPSC's formal documents.

(1) Platform reaction at the Notice of Violation (NOV) stage

When a company receives an NOV, the CPSC usually simultaneously copies platforms such as Amazon; after receiving the formal NOV copy, the platform will immediately delist the corresponding product link. At this stage, platform measures and CPSC formal documents are highly synchronized, and predictability is relatively higher.

(2) Increased unpredictability at the Full Report stage

When a company receives a Full Report Request, that notice means the CPSC requires the company to cooperate in ascertaining whether the product has a safety defect; that is, the issuance of a Full Report Request does not characterize the product safety defect. In this situation, Amazon sales should continue and should not be affected. But since 2026, the situation has become more complex, and the timing of Amazon's delisting at the Full Report stage has become increasingly unpredictable. Companies cannot simply rely on the CPSC investigation procedure timetable to estimate when Amazon will take delisting action, because Amazon's risk control does not entirely use the CPSC's formal determination as the sole basis.

In addition, Amazon's handling of listings during a recall also gives rise to knock-on consequences such as inventory removal and frozen funds. Under Amazon's policy requirements, when a product has a safety issue, the seller should initiate an inventory removal order within 30 days; once the 30 days expire, Amazon has the right to destroy the remaining FBA inventory without compensating the seller. All handling fees, disposal fees and storage fees arising from product removal or destruction are borne by the seller. During peak season, Amazon charges extended storage fees at double or even triple rates. It can be seen that once these knock-on measures are triggered, the impact on a company's cash flow and inventory management often exceeds the direct cost of the recall itself.

It is important to note that the CPSC generally will not intervene in disputes between a company and the Amazon platform over storefronts, listings, inventory or funds. Companies cannot place too much hope on the CPSC stepping in to coordinate with Amazon to restore listings or unfreeze funds, unless they happen to encounter a CPSC investigator who is easy to communicate with. Platform-related issues must be handled by the company itself through communication with Amazon seller support and compliance teams, or by engaging a lawyer to send a letter to Amazon to negotiate; recall investigations and platform disputes are two independent legal relationships.

04. Sellers abandoning their stores and the conjecture of "joint pressure" by CPSC and Amazon

A practical phenomenon worth noting is that more and more Chinese cross-border sellers, when facing a CPSC investigation, Amazon listing takedowns and frozen inventory, choose simply to abandon their stores and no longer cooperate with the CPSC's subsequent recall investigation.

(1) Abandoning the store leads to "four losses"

Once a seller abandons its store, it leads to "four losses" in consequences, and these are only the surface-level harmful consequences.

1. For the seller, abandoning the store means giving up the frozen account funds, inventory products and the historical goodwill accumulated by the store, and it may face accountability from relevant parties;

2. For the CPSC, it will most likely end the investigation by issuing a product defect announcement; the seller's loss of contact prevents the investigation from going deeper, makes it difficult to identify the root cause of the product defect, leaves dangerous products in the market, and means public safety hazards cannot be eliminated, seriously damaging enforcement effectiveness and credibility;

3. For consumers, those who continue to hold defective products have nowhere to turn for help, defect accidents can occur at any time, and they cannot obtain timely and effective remedies.

4. For e-commerce platforms, the platform may face consumer claims and therefore bear delisting and refund obligations, and face order cancellations, investigation fallout and legal risks.

(2) Abandoning the store leads to deeper harmful consequences—"joint pressure" by CPSC and Amazon

The deeper harmful consequence of this phenomenon is that it objectively gives both regulators and e-commerce platforms stronger incentives to adopt stricter interim risk-control measures at an early stage of the investigation, forcing companies to face up to their recall responsibilities rather than simply abandoning their stores to evade them. But this is only a factual effect objectively formed at the practical level; it is not a formal written "joint pressure" mechanism between the CPSC and Amazon, and the two have different legal status and statutory duties.

05. Recall rates are predictable but not negotiable

The recall rate, i.e., the proportion of defective products successfully recovered and disposed of out of the total number of defective products that entered the market, is the core variable determining the total cost of a recall. Industry practice data shows that the recall rate for voluntary recalls generally falls in the 5%–25% range, and in some cases is even below 1%. For high-risk categories in which multiple injury accidents have already occurred, the recall rate will rise significantly.

Is the recall rate negotiable? The answer is no. Some Amazon service providers, in order to obtain business opportunities, advertise to companies under investigation that they can negotiate with the CPSC to lower the recall rate and thereby reduce the company's losses. Such advertising is entirely false boasting, erroneous and irresponsible.

The recall rate is essentially determined by a series of objective factors, such as product category, the severity level of the defect's danger, accident and injury history, sales volume, geographic sales scope, recall method, channels for publishing the recall notice, wording of the recall advertising copy, consumer risk perception, years of use, and the proportion of units remaining in consumers' hands.

The core yardstick by which CPSC staff evaluate a recall plan is consumer protection and public safety risk, not commercial-level cost bargaining with the company. The CPSC will not accept a company setting an artificially lowered recall rate target simply on the grounds of reducing costs. The CPSC will never "negotiate a fixed recall rate number" with a company. However, although the recall rate is not negotiable, it can be predicted. Companies can refer to historical recall cases in the same category published by the CPSC and make a reasonable estimate of the recall rate range at the recall plan formulation stage, and on that basis formulate a recall budget, logistics plan and consumer communication contingency plan. Practical experience shows that actively and professionally cooperating with the CPSC investigation at an early stage is the key path to controlling the overall cost of a recall. Passive resistance and deliberate concealment of information will instead trigger the CPSC to propose a more stringent corrective action plan.

Practical case (for empirical reference only; it does not represent a universal legal conclusion): a Hunan power bank company cooperated insufficiently in the early stage and, on the first occasion, cooperated with the recall, with the actually executed recall rate ultimately approaching 100%; later, after engaging a professional team, fully submitting technical evidence to mount a defense, and adjusting the corrective action plan, the recall rate in a second similar case dropped to about 5%.

06. Encountering a CPSC recall investigation during the IPO tutoring period: a framework for assessing the severity of recall consequences

For companies in the IPO tutoring period or before major financing, the comprehensive impact of a CPSC recall investigation is far greater than for ordinary trading companies. In such cases, many corporate management teams are at a loss and "hesitate" over what response measures to take, all because they cannot assess the magnitude of the recall incident's impact. In fact, based on the author's experience, the severity of a recall investigation should be assessed from the following dimensional framework.

(1) Multi-dimensional risk assessment

1. Severity of the product defect

Could the defect cause serious personal injury or death? Has a real injury accident already occurred? The severity level of the defect directly determines the CPSC's handling priority and the degree of public attention.

2. Number of affected products and scope of circulation

The cumulative sales volume of the affected products, the countries and regions of sale, and the time span of sales determine the scale of the recall and the number of potentially affected consumers, and also directly correspond to potential economic losses.

3. Complaints, litigation and administrative penalties

The number of consumer complaints related to the product, whether product liability civil litigation has already arisen, and whether there is a history of CPSC penalties. The above factors are both indicators by which the CPSC assesses risk and major risk signals closely watched by capital markets and securities regulators.

4. The company's historical recalls and compliance record

Whether the company has had a CPSC recall in the past, and how historical recalls were handled and what the rectification results were. Historical records directly affect the CPSC's judgment of the company's cooperativeness and credibility. Repeated safety problems with similar products will significantly amplify regulatory pressure.

Here I would particularly add a case the author once encountered: because the company under investigation did not cooperate with the CPSC investigation, the CPSC added a sentence when issuing the product defect announcement: "The Firm is not cooperating with the voluntary recall." Such a simple sentence caused fatal consequences, and Amazon shut down the store on that basis. Therefore, the information on the CPSC official website itself reveals extremely rich information, and companies should learn to interpret it correctly.

(2) Judgment by reference to CPSC cases and disclosure obligations

For IPO companies, the author recommends a practical assessment method: search the recall cases published on the CPSC official website and focus on comparing recall press releases in cases of the same risk level. From the text of the press releases, read the CPSC's characterization of the defect risk, the description of the risk and defect, its evaluation of the company, the recall measures and the number of products involved, so as to predict the direction of one's own case, avoid delayed decision-making and missing the negotiation window.

At the same time, companies should also make a comprehensive judgment in light of the disclosure rules in China's Securities Law and the listing rules of the exchanges: where information would have a major impact on investors' value judgments and investment decisions, the issuer has a corresponding disclosure obligation. When encountering a CPSC recall investigation during the IPO tutoring period, a company should promptly assess whether it needs to perform disclosure obligations to the securities regulator and the exchange, and simultaneously formulate crisis response and risk mitigation plans. For this, reference may be made to another article by the author entitled "When IPO Meets the US CPSC: Legal Implications of Product Recall Investigations and Compliance Responses", which will not be repeated here.

07. There is no such thing as a "non-public recall"

Some service providers advertise to companies under investigation that the CPSC has a special channel for "non-public recalls", i.e., the company completes the recall but the CPSC does not publicly issue a recall press release, thereby protecting the company's commercial reputation. This statement is seriously misleading and false advertising.

Under Section 6(b)(5) of the CPSA (15 U.S.C. § 2055(b)(5)), the CPSC and its employees have a statutory duty of confidentiality with respect to defect reports submitted by companies under Section 15(b). This confidentiality obligation covers only the reports and investigation file materials submitted by the company during the investigation stage; it does not mean the company can carry out a recall that is not made public.

Once the two sides reach a voluntary corrective action plan (signing a CAP / voluntary recall), and once the recall plan is formally implemented, the CPSC has a statutory public protection obligation: it must issue a recall press release to the public, enter all recall information into the recall database on the CPSC official website, and disclose the product, the risk and the remedy to the public. Legally, there is no such thing as a recall that is entirely not made public.

(2) Refutation of the "non-public recall" claim

In practice, a company can negotiate and consult with the CPSC on the wording of the recall press release and the timing window for publication, and can seek to optimize the risk description and product description in the press release to reduce the impact on commercial reputation. However, a company has no right to require the CPSC not to publish recall information at all. Any intermediary or service provider claiming that it can arrange a "non-public recall, internal recall, or recall not posted on the official website" either seriously misunderstands the CPSA regulations or is deliberately deceiving the company.

One point to add here: in a very small number of circumstances, the CPSC only requires the company to internally rectify future production batches and does not carry out a recall of products already on the market; this is "not initiating a recall", not a "non-public recall". Once it is determined that a recall will be implemented for products already in circulation, whether voluntary or mandatory, it must be made public.

08. Recall publication timing can be adjusted through negotiation under certain conditions

Given the legal characterization of PD as a consultative investigation communication procedure, the specific release date of a recall press release is not entirely inflexible. Where enterprises meet strict preconditions, they may negotiate with the CPSC investigation team to adjust the release timing window of the recall press release.

CPSC's voluntary recall (CAP) is an administrative agreement reached through negotiation between the parties. The law permits the parties, on the baseline of protecting consumer public safety, to consult on the detailed arrangements for implementing the recall, including the release timing of the press release. However, this right to negotiate does not mean an enterprise may indefinitely delay releasing the recall; public safety is always the first and foremost consideration.

(2) Preconditions for negotiation and practical strategies

Enterprises may, in light of their own commercial arrangements (IPO window, major financing milestones, major marketing campaign milestones, etc.), request the CPSC investigator to adjust the release timing of the recall press release.

However, this negotiation has insurmountable hard preconditions:

1. The defect risk level is not high, and no serious personal injury accidents are continuously occurring. If the product has already caused serious injury or death accidents and there is an urgent public safety risk, CPSC will almost never agree to delay the release of the recall press release.

2. The enterprise cooperates fully with the investigation throughout, submits all evidence and materials completely, and conceals no facts relating to accidents, sales, or testing;

3. The enterprise has substantively completed all preparatory work for the recall plan: the remedy plan, retailer/consumer notification texts, customer service channels, and logistics plan are all ready. Adjusting the timing is merely a minor commercial-level window adjustment; it cannot be used to delay risk handling, nor to postpone risk warnings to consumers;

If an enterprise attempts to respond to the investigation with delaying tactics and refuses to advance recall preparations purely for commercial interests, it will not only fail to obtain a release timing adjustment, but will instead be deemed by CPSC to be non-cooperative with the investigation, directly triggering procedural escalation, including issuing a PD, publishing a defect warning notice, initiating formal adjudication proceedings, and even imposing civil penalties.

09. Who Engages the Testing Institution — An Overlooked Hidden Risk

A lawful, valid, and authoritative test report is an important basis for CPSC to determine product safety compliance. The Amazon platform likewise requires that compliance test reports submitted by sellers must come from independent third-party laboratories, but these laboratories are not necessarily all recognized by CPSC. For prudence, whether for children's products requiring mandatory CPC certification or ordinary goods requiring only GCC (ordinary GCC), it is recommended that enterprises engage laboratories recognized in the CPSC Accepted list to issue test reports.

However, in practice, the source, qualifications, and allocation of rights and responsibilities of test reports are often overlooked by cross-border sellers, thereby planting major hidden risks.

(1) Risks of test reports not accepted by CPSC

The first common mistake is that, to save costs, an enterprise chooses a small laboratory that is not on the CPSC Accepted list. Even if the report data show the product is compliant, CPSC has the right not to accept that test report, and may require retesting, or may directly require a product recall without giving an opportunity for retesting, leaving the business under investigation caught off guard.

The second high-frequency risk is that Amazon sellers directly use test reports provided by upstream manufacturers, but the sellers have not verified whether the tested sample model and batch are completely consistent with the product involved in this matter, whether the laboratory has CPSC-accepted qualifications for the corresponding items, whether the report version is complete, and whether any key test items have been deleted. Once a recall occurs, CPSC will not recognize a defective test report, and the enterprise will lose important defense evidence.

A more common commercial dilemma is that, between the cross-border seller as brand owner or importer and the upstream manufacturing factory, the procurement contract does not clearly stipulate product safety responsibility, recall cooperation obligations, and test report delivery obligations. Once a CPSC recall is triggered, the manufacturer, to avoid its own liability, refuses to provide the importer or seller with complete technical materials, original test reports, production batch records, and other information, and may even require the seller to sign a document waiving recourse before cooperating. At this point, the seller has neither an independent test report usable for defense nor the ability to obtain technical support from the upstream factory, and falls into an extremely passive position in the CPSC investigation. Therefore, enterprises should carry out risk prevention and control in advance at the product export and procurement stages.

1. Ensure that product testing is carried out by a laboratory on the CPSC Accepted list, and retain the complete original test report, not just a one-page summary of conclusions. Verify that the tested sample, model, and batch match the actually shipped products.

2. In the procurement contract and quality agreement with the upstream manufacturer, clearly stipulate in writing that after a product safety defect arises, the manufacturer must unconditionally cooperate with the importer or brand owner in responding to a CPSC investigation and provide complete technical drawings, original test reports, batch production records, and other information. At the same time, clarify the responsibility allocation and compensation mechanism in the event of product defects.

3. After a recall occurs, if the enterprise and CPSC have a major dispute over whether the product has a substantive defect, the author recommends, where necessary, engaging an independent third-party technical expert to issue an expert technical opinion, strengthening the professionalism of the enterprise's defense.

(3) Making good use of supplier test reports

For situations involving the use of supplier test reports, the author shares a practical case from experience; the approach of the author's client in this case is worth learning from and promoting. In early August 2026, a cross-border seller selling Plumbing Fitting products on Amazon was subject to a CPSC recall investigation on the grounds of excessive lead. Fortunately, the seller held supplier test reports for three key indicators. What is worth learning by other cross-border e-commerce sellers is that the supplier's test reports recorded the list of all downstream customer companies, including the name of the author's client company. After CPSC verified the information in these test reports, it quickly decided to close the recall investigation.

10. Making Good Use of Consumer Complaints and Reviews to Save Recall Costs

(1) The role of daily customer complaint information is often underestimated

In CPSC recall investigations, consumer complaints, reviews, customer service tickets, and return records—information accumulated in daily sales—are often underestimated. They are not merely "noise" at the after-sales level, but important clues for determining the scope of the problem and identifying the problematic models and batches. Especially when CPSC and the enterprise each hold their own views on whether a defect exists and which products are involved, this information can often break the deadlock and compress the recall scope from "possibly everything must be recalled" to "the part that actually has problems."

(2) Case showing how customer complaint information narrows the recall scope

Take an example to illustrate. CPSC issued a Full Report Request to investigate three products of the client company on the grounds that the products overheated. The client believed that two of them did not have an overheating problem, and only one had the potential to cause overheating. Each side stuck to its own account, and the technical judgment reached a deadlock. At this point, if one focuses only on laboratory reports or engineering analysis, it is easy to fall into endless argument. A better approach is to retrieve consumer feedback from a past period and sort it by model, batch, sales channel, production date, and usage scenario. For example, for Model A, descriptions such as "it gets hot after a short use," "the socket area melts," and "smoke" repeatedly appeared in e-commerce reviews and customer service records; for Model B, there were only sporadic complaints of "heating," and most were related to improper use; for Model C, complaints were concentrated in a certain production batch and accompanied by more serious phenomena such as burnt smell and shell deformation. Then, combined with the sales volume of each model, calculate the complaint rate per ten thousand units, the proportion of injury complaints, and the concentration of fire or smoke complaints. With such a comparison, it will be much clearer which product is more likely to actually have an overheating defect. If the data point to Model A, the enterprise can communicate with CPSC on that basis, focus the investigation and recall on Model A, and at the same time provide a basis for excluding Models B and C from the recall scope; if the data instead support the enterprise's judgment, it can also be used to persuade CPSC to narrow the scope.

(3) Flexible use of customer complaint information

In other situations, consumer complaints and reviews can also help identify defective product batches. For example, for different batches of the same model, if a certain batch has concentrated occurrences of the same type of failure, and the date codes, serial numbers, or supplier part batches are highly consistent, the recall can be limited to that batch rather than recalling the entire model. But this requires specific analysis of specific issues; one cannot draw conclusions based on just a few negative reviews. Duplicate complaints, malicious negative reviews, improper use, unstable voltage, mismatched accessories, and other factors should be excluded, and it is best to cross-verify with internal testing, failure analysis, production line records, and supplier change records. Only in this way can consumer information be both persuasive and stand up to scrutiny.

Customer complaint information cannot replace engineering conclusions and legal judgments, but as an investigation clue and scope-definition tool, it is of great value. At critical moments, it may determine whether one model or three models are recalled, whether all batches or a specific batch of products are recalled, and may also affect CPSC's assessment of the enterprise's cooperative attitude.

11. Telephone Service Providers — Cheap Service Is No Good Service

CPSC's recall corrective action plan usually requires the enterprise to set up a toll-free consumer inquiry hotline (800/888/877/866 US toll-free numbers) to facilitate consumers' inquiries about the recall and submission of return/exchange/repair requests. CPSC staff will review all telephone response scripts before the recall is officially announced. The enterprise also needs to provide an email address and a dedicated recall page on its official website as consumer response channels.

This step appears simple, but it often becomes a hidden risk of runaway recall costs and additional corrective requirements imposed by CPSC on the recall. Some enterprises, to save costs, purchase low-priced third-party telephone customer service on e-commerce platforms; the service provider's seat capacity and business experience are insufficient to handle the concentrated surge of consumer inquiries after the recall is announced. After the recall starts, consumer inquiry volume is large in the first two weeks; when the service provider's capacity does not match, a large number of consumers cannot get through by phone, or customer service personnel cannot accurately answer recall questions, which will trigger a large number of consumer complaints.

The major risk is that CPSC has the right to continuously supervise the implementation of the recall plan and review the monthly recall implementation reports submitted by the enterprise. If CPSC finds that a large number of consumers report that the recall hotline cannot be reached, that customer service answers are wrong, or that there are continuous delays, it has the right to require the enterprise to immediately change the recall implementation plan, or even escalate the corrective action requirements, which will directly cause a substantial increase in recall costs.

Therefore, at the recall preparation stage, choosing a professional telephone service provider with practical experience in recall projects and the ability to handle sudden peaks in call volume is a necessary investment for controlling the overall recall risk, not a non-essential expenditure that can be arbitrarily cut.

12. The "Half-Knowledgeable" Amazon Service Provider

Around CPSC recalls, there are a large number of Amazon operations service providers in the cross-border market. These service providers often lack professional knowledge and practical experience in US consumer product safety law. To win business, they offer sellers a large number of plausible-sounding "shortcut solutions," among which three types of fallacies are the most widely circulated and the most harmful.

Fallacy One: "The recall rate can be negotiated"

As discussed in Part IV, the recall rate is jointly determined by factors such as the severity of the defect, the recall method, the risk level, the objective conditions of the product, and consumer response. CPSC evaluates recall plans with consumer safety protection as the core benchmark, and will not accept an enterprise artificially negotiating and setting a target recall rate purely for the purpose of reducing commercial costs. Claiming to be able to help an enterprise negotiate down the recall rate is a misunderstanding, or even deception, regarding how CPSC works.

What an enterprise can genuinely do is, through sufficient technical evidence and risk argumentation, negotiate adjustments to the recall's remedy model (repair, replacement parts, full refund, software upgrade, etc.) and the recall scope (time, batch, model).

Take a case to illustrate: a cross-border e-commerce company in Hubei, when its first product encountered a CPSC recall investigation, selected a service provider to provide services, which failed to achieve the expected goal. When the company's second product encountered a CPSC recall investigation, it found the author to act as agent. During the agency contract negotiations, the company's representative raised a point that surprised the author: they had learned from the previous service provider that the recall rate could be negotiated down and controlled below a relatively small percentage. Obviously, this client had been seriously misled by the service provider!

Fallacy Two: "CPSC has non-public recalls"

As already discussed in detail above, the CPSA only protects the confidentiality of report information during the investigation stage. Once it is determined that a recall will be implemented for products that have already entered the market, the law mandatorily requires public disclosure of the recall information; there is no recall channel that is "not disclosed to the public and not posted on the official website." Such claims of "non-public recalls" constitute serious legal misdirection.

Enterprises should clearly recognize that a CPSC recall is a product safety regulatory event and a systemic legal compliance matter, and by no means an ordinary Amazon operations issue. Entrusting the entire recall to e-commerce operations service providers without legal practice qualifications and experience, and handling an administrative regulatory legal event with e-commerce operations thinking, is highly prone to problems and further amplifies losses.

Fallacy Three: "Control the recall rate by product batch"

We know that one way to reduce the product recall rate is to limit the batches of recalled products, that is, to lock the recall scope to one or several batches of products and exclude other batches from the recall. But this does not mean the recall rate can be "controlled by product batch." This statement misleads the enterprise under investigation, because in practice some products simply cannot be distinguished by batch, and even if products can be distinguished by batch, the final recall rate is determined by the severity of the product defect, consumer responsiveness, and the duration of the recall; product batch cannot determine the recall rate.

When encountering a CPSC recall investigation, the recall rate is one of the issues the enterprise under investigation pays closest attention to, and some service providers, well aware that the recall rate is one of the pain points, have ulterior motives.

13. Advantages and Disadvantages of Engaging US Lawyers to Handle CPSC Recalls

(1) The protective advantage of attorney-client privilege

The greatest value of engaging a US lawyer with practical experience in CPSC cases to handle a recall investigation lies in attorney-client privilege, that is, communications, legal analyses, and internal risk assessment documents between the enterprise and a US-licensed lawyer can be protected by confidentiality privilege under the law, whereas if the enterprise communicates directly with CPSC, none of the related correspondence documents are protected by attorney-client privilege. Without such privilege protection, should litigation disputes later arise from the product involved, the opposing party in the litigation proceedings would have the right, under the Discovery Rules, to require the enterprise to provide evidence that may be unfavorable to it.

(2) In which circumstances to engage a US lawyer as agent

Based on the analysis in the first point, in short, when the product under investigation has already given rise to multiple dispute cases or may give rise to a class action, engaging a US lawyer to handle the recall investigation is most advantageous. Because once litigation or a class action begins, the risk of evidence discovery rises significantly, and the recall statements, internal risk assessments, emails, etc. formed through direct communication between the enterprise and CPSC may be obtained by the opposing party and used as unfavorable evidence. With a US lawyer experienced in CPSC acting as agent, legal analyses, risk assessments, and necessary communications can be brought within attorney-client privilege, reducing disclosure risk and responding to the investigation more reliably. Therefore, in the case of multiple disputes or potential class actions, a US lawyer should be engaged to intervene as early as possible.

(3) Costs, time difference, and constraints of practice rules

Engaging a US lawyer also has practical shortcomings, specifically reflected in the following aspects:

1. High costs

Most US lawyers use hourly billing, CPSC recall investigations often last several months, and in complex cases the legal fees will significantly exceed the enterprise's prior estimates.

2. Time difference and communication efficiency issues

The time difference between China and the US, combined with CPSC often giving tight response deadlines of 10 working days. If the early communication mechanism is not set up properly, the time difference will compress the enterprise's internal decision-making time and affect the quality of the response.

3. Strict ethical constraints on US lawyers

US lawyers are bound by the practice rules of state bar associations and cannot provide clients with "workaround, shortcut" solutions. The "flexible operations" some Chinese enterprises expect cannot lawfully be implemented by US-licensed lawyers, which may cause a psychological gap for the enterprise.

Conclusion

A CPSC recall is by no means a simple Amazon product delisting incident. From the legal characterization of the administrative investigation and the distinction between PD and formal adjudication procedures, to the unpredictable risk-control reactions of e-commerce platforms; from the objective laws of the recall rate to the cognitive misconceptions of service providers on the market; from strategic assessment during the IPO window period to the selection of testing institutions and the upfront risk prevention of supply chain contracts, a CPSC recall is a comprehensive test integrating legal compliance, platform gaming, cost accounting, and crisis public relations.

Only by establishing a systematic and complete cognitive framework, identifying practical pitfalls, adopting proactive and professional response strategies at an early stage of the investigation, and relying on professional forces with the corresponding experience, can an enterprise maximize loss control in a recall investigation and protect its commercial interests.

Questions and answers

What is a Preliminary Determination (PD) in a CPSC recall investigation and can it be appealed?

A PD is an internal investigation conclusion by CPSC staff, not a formal adjudication under 16 CFR Part 1025. It has no statutory appeal period; the 40-day rule in 16 CFR 1025.52 applies only to an Initial Decision after a formal hearing. An enterprise may negotiate, submit evidence, or, if negotiations fail, the CPSC may initiate formal adjudication.

When does Amazon typically delist products during a CPSC recall investigation?

Amazon usually delists immediately upon receiving a Notice of Violation. For a Full Report Request, Amazon generally does not delist, but since 2026 it increasingly disconnects links before a PD is issued, especially for high-risk products like power banks and children's toys, based on its own risk control rather than a CPSC legal requirement.

Can the recall rate be negotiated with the CPSC?

No. The recall rate is determined by objective factors such as defect severity, sales volume, and consumer response. CPSC evaluates recall plans based on consumer safety, not commercial cost bargaining. Claims that service providers can negotiate a lower recall rate are false. However, the recall rate can be predicted from historical cases, and early professional cooperation helps control overall costs.

Is there such a thing as a non-public CPSC recall?

No. Under Section 6(b)(5) of the CPSA, confidentiality applies only to reports submitted during the investigation. Once a voluntary corrective action plan is implemented, the CPSC must issue a public recall press release and enter the information into its database. Any claim of a non-public recall is misleading; enterprises may negotiate the wording and timing of the press release but cannot prevent publication.

What are the advantages of engaging a US lawyer for a CPSC recall investigation?

A US lawyer provides attorney-client privilege, protecting communications and internal risk assessments from discovery in later litigation. This is especially advantageous when multiple disputes or class actions are likely. However, US lawyers have high costs, time difference challenges, and strict ethical constraints that prevent shortcut solutions.

Laws and cases cited

Laws

  • 15 U.S.C. § 2076, Hobbs Act
  • Section 6(b)(5) of the CPSA (15 U.S.C. § 2055(b)(5))
  • China's Securities Law

Regulations

  • 16 CFR Part 1025
  • 16 CFR 1025.52