[Abstract] On February 20, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 607 U.S. ___ (2026) that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize the President to impose tariffs, which immediately triggered large-scale refund proceedings. At the same time, consumer class actions have spread across the United States, with plaintiffs alleging that importers, after passing tariff costs on to consumers through price increases, then applied to the government for refunds, constituting unjust enrichment. This article, in light of that judgment and the Nintendo, Amazon and other cases, analyzes the legal structure of such litigation and risk prevention plans.
Background: The Legal Finding That IEEPA Tariffs Are Invalid
In February 2025, Trump, citing drug inflows and trade deficits as grounds, declared a national emergency under IEEPA, imposed a 25% tariff on Canadian and Mexican goods, imposed tariffs ranging from 10% to 145% on Chinese goods, and imposed a "reciprocal tariff" of at least 10% on global trading partners. The related lawsuits were consolidated as the Learning Resources case, and on February 20, 2026 the Supreme Court ruled that IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs. Chief Justice Roberts pointed out that tariffs essentially fall within the taxing power that the Constitution confers on Congress, that "regulate...importation" in IEEPA is insufficient to support tariff imposition without time limits or amount limits, and that the case applies the "major questions doctrine," under which major economic decisions require explicit congressional authorization.1
After the judgment, on March 4, 2026, the U.S. Court of International Trade in the Atmus Filtration case ordered U.S. Customs (CBP) to stop liquidating IEEPA tariffs and to reliquidate already-liquidated entries, and this relief applies to all importers that paid the tariffs. According to a CBP statement, this refund involves more than 330,000 importers and 53 million records, with approximately US$166 billion in tariffs collected and approximately US$175 billion including interest, making it the largest refund in U.S. customs history.23
I. Reasons for the Consumer Class Actions and Their Bases of Claim
The judgment resolved the dispute between the government and importers over the legality of the tariffs, but it gave rise to a new dispute between importers and consumers: under U.S. customs law, the right to claim a refund belongs exclusively to the importer, and consumers have no right to apply directly to CBP for a refund. This creates a serious misalignment of rights and burdens—consumers are the actual bearers of the tariffs but do not enjoy the right to claim refunds; importers have the right to apply for refunds but have already passed the costs on to consumers through price increases. This misalignment is the root of this round of litigation.
Within months after the judgment, dozens of consumer class actions have emerged in federal courts across the United States, covering retail, consumer electronics, apparel, home goods, food and other industries. Although the defendants differ, the plaintiffs' logic is highly consistent, with the core being the "double recovery" claim: the defendants passed costs on to consumers through price increases during the tariff period, and after the tariffs were invalidated they applied to the government for refunds; retaining both parts of the benefit at the same time constitutes unjust enrichment.
Judging from the publicly available complaints, the plaintiffs' evidence usually unfolds around three elements: proving that the defendant is an importer and that its products fall within the scope of the tariffs; proving through price data, public statements and the like that the tariff costs were passed on to consumers through price increases; and proving that the defendant has applied for or is eligible to apply for a refund and has not returned it to consumers. The bases of claim mainly include three categories: unjust enrichment, money had and received, and state consumer protection laws.
It is worth noting that the scope of the plaintiffs' claims is continuing to expand: early cases targeted only "the defendant's failure to return refunds after receiving them," while recent cases have brought "the defendant's having the right to apply for a refund but choosing not to apply" within the scope of attack. In the Amazon case, the plaintiffs argue that an enterprise's waiver of a refund for commercial or political considerations cannot leave consumers who actually bore the costs to bear the adverse consequences.4
II. Typical Cases
(1) The Nintendo Case
Hoffert et al. v. Nintendo of America Inc., W.D. Wash., Case No. 2:26-cv-01360 (filed April 21, 2026) is a representative case in this round of litigation.
The plaintiffs argue that, in terms of supply chain, almost all of Nintendo's hardware is produced in China, Vietnam and Cambodia, all of which fall within the scope of the IEEPA tariffs; in terms of price, in April 2025 Nintendo postponed Switch 2 pre-orders on the grounds of "assessing the impact of tariffs," then raised accessory prices (the Pro Controller rose from $79.99 to $84.99, etc.), and in August raised console prices again; crucially, President Shuntaro Furukawa publicly stated at the May 2025 earnings briefing that "tariffs are regarded as part of costs and incorporated into prices"; after the judgment, Nintendo filed a refund lawsuit on March 6, 2026.56
The plaintiffs contend that Nintendo, while making consumers bear the tariff costs through price increases, applied to the government for a refund of the same tariffs, constituting typical unjust enrichment. The class period in this case is from February 1, 2025 to February 24, 2026, covering consumers across the United States who purchased Nintendo products whose prices had been raised, with a scale estimated in the millions.
(2) The Amazon Case
In Markland et al. v. Amazon.com, Inc., W.D. Wash., Case No. 2:26-cv-01670-TL (filed May 15, 2026), Amazon publicly stated that it would not apply for IEEPA refunds. But the plaintiffs did not withdraw the case; instead, they advanced a more expansive theory: through price tracking data (such as the Bissell vacuum rising from $41 to $45, etc.) they proved that Amazon had passed tariff costs on to consumers; they cited reports that Amazon had considered listing tariff amounts on the checkout page but abandoned the idea due to political pressure, proving that it could identify the tariff component in prices; and ultimately they argued that Amazon's waiver of refunds was to exchange for political and commercial benefits and cannot harm consumers' rights, and that regardless of whether it applied for a refund, it is obliged to return the overpaid amounts.7
The warning of the Amazon case is that enterprises cannot evade class action risk by "not applying for refunds." As long as the plaintiffs can complete the proof of "cost pass-through," even if the enterprise does not apply for a refund, it may still be held liable for restitution.
III. Which Enterprises Are More Likely to Be Targeted
As of June 2026, at least 30-plus class actions against well-known enterprises have been filed, covering fields such as athletic footwear and apparel, gaming hardware, consumer electronics, food, home retail and e-commerce platforms. Nike, Sony, Del Monte, IKEA, Mondelez, Amazon, Temu, Nintendo and others have all been involved. Looking at the law firms handling them, leading consumer class action firms such as Emery Reddy, Hagens Berman and Milberg have all entered this field, indicating that this is organized, template-based, batch case development.
Based on the complaints and samples, the following enterprises are more likely to attract attention: 1. Those that sell their own brands directly to consumers in the United States (online DTC, Amazon first-party, offline retail); 2. Those highly dependent on overseas supply chains that adjusted U.S. retail prices, platform prices or import fees during the tariff period; 3. Those that separately list tariff surcharge, import fee, duty, etc. in orders, invoices, checkout pages or customer service explanations; 4. Those that have stated in announcements, financial reports or media interviews that "tariffs led to price increases" or "tariffs are incorporated into costs/prices"; 5. Those that have applied for or are eligible to apply for IEEPA refunds but have not yet established a consumer restitution mechanism.
It should be emphasized that plaintiffs do not necessarily require enterprises to separately list tariff surcharges. As long as a public trace of "price increases due to tariffs" is left, or the price curve highly coincides with the tariff timeline, it may be asserted as evidence of pass-through. For Chinese clients going global, the focus of risk management should expand from "whether tariffs were actually passed on to consumers" to "whether external materials may be adopted by plaintiffs/consumers and give rise to litigation."
IV. Risk Prevention Recommendations
(1) Immediately Conduct an Evidence Chain Review
It is recommended that going-global enterprises immediately review: first, clean up single-attribution statements such as "tariffs led to price increases" in external materials (official websites, press releases, social media, customer service scripts, financial report transcripts); second, preserve the basis for pricing decisions during the tariff period, including multiple cost factors such as exchange rates, logistics, raw materials and competitive conditions, to break the plaintiffs' single narrative that "tariffs = price increases"; third, review the fee listings on checkout pages and assess the legal nature and refundability of "tariff surcharges," "import fees" and the like.
(2) Make Good Use of Arbitration Clauses to Block Class Actions
For such small-amount, dispersed consumer class actions, the most effective procedural defense is to design a well-developed arbitration clause in consumer contracts that expressly excludes class proceedings. The United States does not completely reject class arbitration, but the Supreme Court has made clear that an arbitral tribunal has no power to order class arbitration without the parties' explicit consent. As long as the contract provides for "individual arbitration only," the court must enforce it. A single consumer's tariff price-difference loss is usually only a few dollars to a few dozen dollars, and without a class procedure almost no one has the incentive to arbitrate individually, so the economic foundation of such litigation would be fundamentally dismantled.
(3) Handle Refunds and External Communications Prudently
For enterprises intending to apply for or having already applied for IEEPA refunds, it is recommended to formulate a plan for handling refund benefits in advance: for businesses that directly collected tariff surcharges, consider establishing a restitution mechanism (such as shopping credits, consumption offsets, etc.); in external communications, avoid absolute statements on the refund issue and do not proactively link refunds to price adjustments; at the same time, establish monitoring of related cases in state courts and engage in advance a legal team familiar with consumer class actions and international trade.
Conclusion
The consumer class actions triggered by IEEPA tariff refunds are a new wave of litigation that emerged after the judgment; in essence, plaintiffs' lawyers exploit the misalignment of rights and obligations in the tariff system to transform "invalid tariffs" into "enterprise unjust enrichment" and bring pressure on importers. Such risk is not uncontrollable: in the short term, an evidence chain review should be conducted and refunds and consumer communications handled prudently; in the medium and long term, well-developed arbitration clauses should be embedded in user agreements to block class actions procedurally and resolve batch litigation risk at its root.
It should be noted that all consumer cases are currently at the filing or early procedural stage, and many of the plaintiffs' legal theories have not yet been substantively tested by the courts. However, given the inherent deterrent effect of the U.S. class action system, enterprises should still put prevention first and complete the construction of a compliance system before the risk fully erupts.
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Questions and answers
What did the U.S. Supreme Court hold in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump regarding IEEPA tariffs?
The Supreme Court held that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize the President to impose tariffs. Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that tariffs fall within Congress's taxing power and that IEEPA's language does not support tariff imposition without limits, applying the major questions doctrine.
Why are consumers filing class actions against importers after the IEEPA tariff refunds?
Consumers allege unjust enrichment because importers passed tariff costs on to consumers through price increases and then applied for refunds from the government. Under U.S. customs law, only importers have the right to claim refunds, leaving consumers without a direct refund remedy despite bearing the costs.
What claims are asserted in the Nintendo case regarding IEEPA tariff refunds?
The plaintiffs claim that Nintendo passed tariff costs to consumers through price increases and then applied for a refund of the same tariffs, constituting unjust enrichment. They rely on Nintendo's supply chain in tariffed countries, price increases, and public statements that tariffs are incorporated into prices.
Can an importer avoid consumer class actions by not applying for IEEPA tariff refunds?
No. In the Amazon case, despite Amazon's public statement that it would not apply for refunds, plaintiffs argued that Amazon's waiver was to exchange for political and commercial benefits and that it is still obliged to return overpaid amounts. As long as plaintiffs prove cost pass-through, liability may still attach.
Laws and cases cited
Laws
- International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)
Cases
- Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 607 U.S. ___ (2026)
- Atmus Filtration case
- Hoffert et al. v. Nintendo of America Inc., W.D. Wash., Case No. 2:26-cv-01360
- Markland et al. v. Amazon.com, Inc., W.D. Wash., Case No. 2:26-cv-01670-TL
References
- 1. Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 607 U.S. ___ (2026).
- 2. Atmus Filtration, Inc. v. United States, No. 26-01259 (Ct. Int'l Trade Mar. 4, 2026).
- 3 Declaration of CBP Official in Atmus Filtration, March 12, 2026; see also Skadden, Tariff Refund Mechanism Takes Shape After Supreme Court's IEEPA Ruling (April 8, 2026). CBP officially estimates that approximately USD 166 billion in tariffs have been collected, and the Penn Wharton Budget Model estimates a total scale of approximately USD 175 billion including interest.
- 4 Markland et al. v. Amazon.com, Inc., W.D. Wash., Case No. 2:26-cv-01670-TL, Complaint ¶¶ 1-15.
- 5 Hoffert et al. v. Nintendo of America Inc., W.D. Wash., Case No. 2:26-cv-01360, Complaint ¶¶ 40-46.
- 6 Nintendo Financial Results Briefing for Fiscal Year Ended March 2025 (May 8, 2025) at 3, 5.
- 7 See note ④ above.
- 8 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
- 9 American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. 228 (2013).
