Introduction
On August 4, 2026, Reuters exclusively reported that the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is preparing to ban the import of new models of optical modules on the grounds that the relevant products endanger the data security and service continuity of artificial intelligence data centers. The report attracted significant market attention. It is worth noting that since December 2025, when drones and critical components were first included, on the basis of "foreign production," in the list of communications equipment or services posing an unacceptable risk to national security (hereinafter the "Covered List"), the FCC has this year successively added consumer-grade routers, inverters with networking capabilities, and advanced robotic devices to the list. It is also worth noting that on July 22, 2026, the FCC published the Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FCC 26-50); the purpose of the relevant rules is to distinguish between the entity list and the product list for regulatory purposes, and in particular to propose a number of measures to strengthen regulation of the product list. The draft rules were published in the U.S. Federal Register on August 7, and the public has 30 days to submit comments, providing affected entities with an important window to participate in shaping the rules.
This article will systematically sort out the deeper implications of this regulatory trend from four dimensions: the FCC's functional positioning, the legal logic of national security determinations, the legal consequences of the list system, and corporate compliance response paths, and will offer recommendations on participating in the comment process for the FCC 26-50 draft rules.
01. The FCC is the implementing agency of the Covered List
Under the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, the FCC has the statutory duty to establish and maintain the Covered List, but it is not itself the body that determines national security risks.
National security determinations are made by an interagency Executive Branch body. This body is composed of experts from national security authorities such as the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of War, and the Department of Commerce, and is responsible for making a "national security determination" as to whether specific equipment or services pose an "unacceptable national security risk." After receiving such a determination, the FCC is legally required to include the relevant equipment or services in the list. This institutional design means that, in the process of updating the list, the FCC plays more of a statutory executor role. If an enterprise raises objections to the content of the list, it must in essence challenge the procedure and substantive basis by which the national security determination was made.
02. The expansion logic of national security determinations: from communications security to supply chain security
A review of the FCC's announcement texts in recent years reveals a significant expansion of the meaning of "national security." The early lists mainly targeted specific communications equipment companies, and at least the literal core concern was the technical controllability of communications networks. However, the relevant router announcement of March 23, 2026, and the relevant inverter and robotics product announcements of July 28, 2026, present new features: the grounds for national security determinations have expanded from purely communications technology security to supply chain resilience and economic security. In the announcement on the relevant router products, the national security determination expressly cited two types of risk: first, supply chain vulnerabilities that could disrupt the U.S. economy, critical infrastructure, and the defense system; second, cybersecurity risks that could be exploited to severely damage critical infrastructure and directly endanger the safety of U.S. citizens. In the July 28 announcements on the relevant inverter and robotics products, the supply chain concentration risk caused by foreign production was emphasized first.
The FCC 26-50 draft rules attempt to push this logic to a deeper level. For example, the draft rules for the first time incorporate "place of design or development" into the definitional framework of "foreign production": equipment constitutes "foreign production" if it is not a "U.S. domestic end product" under 48 CFR § 25.101(a) of the Federal Acquisition Regulation, or if it is "designed or developed" abroad. If this definition is ultimately adopted, even if a product is manufactured in the United States and meets domestic content thresholds, it may still fall within the scope of the list as long as the R&D stage is located overseas. For enterprises with a global R&D footprint, the impact of this provision far exceeds the adjustment of a single factory location and will substantively reshape their global R&D layout decisions.
Therefore, the "national security" involved in the Covered List is no longer limited to communications network security as understood from a technical perspective, but is a generalized industrial chain security, and has become a tool in the U.S. industrial chain contest.
03. Legal consequences of inclusion in the list: new products barred from the U.S. market
The direct legal consequence of a product being included in the Covered List is that it cannot obtain new equipment certification, but products that have already obtained certification can still enter the U.S. market. Under Section 2.903(a) of the FCC's current rules, equipment included in the Covered List is prohibited from obtaining new equipment certification. Failure to obtain certification means the product cannot be sold in the U.S. market, which means that once a product is included, future new products will be unable to enter the U.S. market for sale. However, inclusion of a product in the Covered List does not affect products that have already been certified. Generally speaking, products under orders in execution have already obtained certification before mass shipment, so the inclusion of a product in the Covered List may have limited impact on the performance of orders on hand and the sale of existing mass-produced products. However, because technology continues to iterate and new products are affected by the Covered List, the actual impact of the Covered List will materialize in the future.
Of course, once a product is included in the Covered List or may be included, a targeted and specific analysis of product contracts and orders is also needed. For example, the performance of contracts for new product R&D may be affected, and it is necessary to check whether the contracts contain targeted clauses addressing risk, liability, and cost allocation under the corresponding circumstances.
04. Recommendations for response after inclusion in the list
1. Conduct a detailed comparison and analysis of whether products fall within the list
The Covered List targets new products that have not obtained certification. Enterprises can, by comparing the technical elements of the list definition item by item, argue that a specific product does not meet the constituent elements of being "covered." The relevant comparison must consider not only technical factors but also the interpretation standards in the FCC's enforcement practice.
In particular, it should be noted that when applying for product certification, enterprises must declare on their own that their products are not Covered List products. Under Section 2.911 of the FCC's current rules, all entities applying for certification must declare that their products are not within the scope of the Covered List. Making a declaration means the enterprise is responsible for the truthfulness of the declaration and voluntarily bears liability for false statements. Therefore, enterprises need to make the relevant declarations prudently, after sufficient technical and legal analysis, and to create and retain files of the analysis materials as evidence of the truthfulness and good faith of the declaration.
2. Assess the commercial and legal risks of contract performance
For products that do fall within the scope of the list, enterprises need to conduct a tiered impact assessment:
At the existing business level: already authorized models are not subject to retroactive effect, and performance of orders on hand can usually proceed normally, but attention should be paid to the chilling effect of control measures and to whether customers claim contract modification or termination due to anticipated risks; explanatory statements for customers, financing institutions, insurers, and others should be prepared;
At the incremental business level: plans for R&D, production, and market launch of new models need to be reassessed, with focus on alternative solutions after certification is blocked, such as applying for exemptions, evaluating market strategies, and adjusting sales plans, so as to reduce the impact on market competitiveness.
For enterprises that may be affected, it is recommended to add a dedicated negotiated modification mechanism to contracts, clarifying whether list updates trigger price adjustments, delivery extensions, or rights to terminate the contract.
3. Actively apply for conditional approval
The Covered List regime has a "Conditional Approval" mechanism that provides an exemption channel for specific products. Under the current rules:
Relevant router products: application may be made to the Department of War or the Department of Homeland Security (DHS);
Relevant inverter products: application may be made to the Department of War or the Department of Homeland Security;
Relevant robotic devices: application may be made only to the Department of War
Applications must submit three core categories of information:
Disclosure of corporate structure and control, including ultimate beneficial owners, nationalities of board members and senior executives, and foreign government affiliations;
Full disclosure of manufacturing and supply chain, including bills of materials, country of origin of each component, ownership of intellectual property, single-source dependencies, and contingency plans; and
U.S. domestic manufacturing plans, including timelines, capital expenditure commitments, existing domestic capacity, and a quarterly progress reporting mechanism.
For exemption applications, the approving authority applies a case-by-case review principle, the approval period varies by case, and an exemption is very likely not a one-time permanent arrangement.
05. Key points of the FCC 26-50 draft rules and related recommendations
The FCC 26-50 draft rules are currently in the public comment stage, with a deadline for comments of September 8, 2026, and a deadline for reply comments of September 21, 2026. This is a key window for affected enterprises to participate in shaping the rules and to seek regulatory space. The draft rules are highly complex technically and sensitive policy-wise, involving more than 20 measures to strengthen regulation, for example:
1. The reasonableness of "place of design or development" as a criterion for determining U.S. origin. This criterion will greatly increase compliance difficulty, and the globalization of R&D is the industrial norm; using place of design as a criterion for list inclusion lacks a direct connection to national security risks;
2. The HBOM/SBOM disclosure obligations. The draft rules estimate a maximum HBOM cost of USD 10,000 per piece of hardware and an SBOM cost of less than USD 5,000 per software set, but do not fully assess the actual burden on complex equipment;
3. The scope of application of mandatory certification for "covered list departments." Exemption categories should be established for products under existing security certification systems;
4. The match between import thresholds and testing needs. The draft rules sharply reduce the number of test units from 4,000 to 40, which is seriously insufficient for products requiring multi-site, long-cycle verification;
5. Transitional arrangements for the validity period of authorizations. The draft rules propose a ten-year validity period for equipment authorizations and a renewal procedure, changing the current arrangement of "once authorized, permanently valid," providing the FCC with a statutory entry point for periodic reassessment and increasing compliance uncertainty for enterprises.
Conclusion
The continued expansion of the FCC Covered List regime and the systematic strengthening of practical regulatory measures under the FCC 26-50 draft rules both demonstrate that the United States, in national security reviews related to communications security, has already placed "supply chain security" first and is carrying out institutionalized, full-lifecycle penetrating regulation at the regulatory enforcement level. For multinational companies, this trend requires building a more forward-looking compliance architecture: they need to accurately grasp the technical and legal boundaries of the Covered List definitions and embed compliance considerations at the product design stage; they also need to dynamically track the evolution of national security determinations and anticipate the direction in which the scope of regulatory coverage will expand; and they further need to incorporate geopolitical risk assessments into supply chain layout, paying attention to the different compliance requirements in the jurisdictions where their business is located; at the same time, they should actively use the public participation mechanisms at the rulemaking stage to seek reasonable regulatory expectations in the early stage of institutional formation.
*This article is for professional exchange only and does not constitute specific legal advice. If you need a compliance assessment for a specific product or transaction, or specific strategies for submitting comments on the FCC 26-50 draft rules, it is recommended that you consult a professional legal adviser.
Questions and answers
What is the legal effect of being included in the FCC Covered List?
Inclusion bars a product from obtaining new equipment certification under Section 2.903(a) of the FCC's current rules, so new models cannot be sold in the U.S. market. Products already certified are not affected and can still be sold, so the impact falls on future new products.
Who determines national security risks for the FCC Covered List?
An interagency Executive Branch body composed of experts from national security authorities such as the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of War, and the Department of Commerce makes the national security determination. The FCC is then legally required to include the relevant equipment or services in the Covered List.
What is the deadline for commenting on the FCC 26-50 draft rules?
The deadline for comments is September 8, 2026, and the deadline for reply comments is September 21, 2026. This is a key window for affected enterprises to participate in shaping the rules and to seek regulatory space.
How can companies apply for conditional approval under the Covered List regime?
Applications are made to the Department of War or the Department of Homeland Security for router and inverter products, and only to the Department of War for robotic devices. Applications must disclose corporate structure and control, manufacturing and supply chain details, and U.S. domestic manufacturing plans.
What does the FCC 26-50 draft rules propose on the place of design or development?
The draft rules would incorporate "place of design or development" into the definition of "foreign production." Equipment could be considered foreign production if it is not a U.S. domestic end product under 48 CFR § 25.101(a) or if it is designed or developed abroad, even if manufactured in the United States.
Laws and cases cited
Laws
- Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019
Regulations
- 48 CFR § 25.101(a) of the Federal Acquisition Regulation
- Section 2.903(a) of the FCC's current rules
- Section 2.911 of the FCC's current rules
Policy documents
- Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FCC 26-50)


