Introduction

On April 27, 2026, Meta's acquisition of the Chinese AI company Manus was halted by the Office of the Working Mechanism for Foreign Investment Security Review of the National Development and Reform Commission; on June 1, the State Council published the Provisions of the State Council on Outbound Investment (State Council Order No. 837, effective July 1, hereinafter the "New Outbound Investment Rules"), formally writing "outbound investment security review" into administrative regulations. Many multinational corporate legal counsel and investors have recently been asking us: what signal do these developments send? Is China's attitude toward foreign investment changing? As a law firm long engaged in cross-border compliance, we use this article to explore the policy logic behind them, in the hope of helping readers form relatively clear expectations during a period of policy change.

01. The Particularity of the Manus Case: Why Was This Transaction Halted?

To understand this case, one must first return to the publicly verifiable timeline: in March 2025, Manus gained prominence for its general-purpose AI Agent capabilities, securing US$75 million in financing led by Benchmark at a valuation of US$500 million. In May, the U.S. Department of the Treasury opened an investigation into that investment under the Outbound Investment Security Program (OISP)1. In June–July, Manus's parent company Butterfly Effect moved its headquarters to Singapore, cut its team from 120 to about 40, shut down its domestic services and blocked Chinese IPs. In December, Meta announced the acquisition of Manus for US$2 billion.

From the public information, the regulator's concern was not "foreign capital buying equity in a Chinese company" as such, but the form of the transaction: a company whose core technology, R&D team and user base all originated in China completed a stripping of its identity under unilateral U.S. compliance pressure through "relocating its registration—laying off staff—severing its domestic business," and was ultimately sold to a U.S. tech giant in the name of a "non-Chinese entity."

This model is called "bath-style going global"—washing away Chinese attributes by changing the place of registration. Halting the case was not directed at Meta's foreign identity, but at this one-sided decoupling and exit path. If such operations became a template, in sensitive fields where the United States already restricts investment in China, more cases of transfer after "self-hollowing-out" could arise. The key to understanding the Manus case, therefore, is this: the regulator does not intend to erect new barriers, but to turn compliance pressure unilaterally imposed by the United States into a predictable bilateral balance.

02. The Triple Logic Behind China's Regulatory Policy

To understand why this particular transaction crossed the red line, the individual case must be observed within the current framework of Sino-U.S. technological and institutional rivalry. In our observation, the policy logic of the regulators can be understood at at least three levels:

(1) Technological sovereignty and the integrity of industrial chains. Artificial intelligence, semiconductors and quantum information have become focal points of great-power competition, and the United States explicitly restricts the flow of U.S. capital and expertise into these fields through the OISP and the COINS Act. If China did not guard against this, it would objectively create a one-way hemorrhage of "the United States won't invest, China will sell anything." Regulatory intervention is, to a certain extent, a response to this asymmetric situation.

(2) Technical concerns over data and information security. The companies concerned have accumulated large amounts of domestic user data and industry-sensitive information; when they seek to sever their legal ties with China through rapid relocation of registration, the actual ownership and security of data assets naturally come within the regulator's view.

(3) Turning unilateral passive decoupling into a two-way compliance balance. The starting point of this case is the United States' unilateral restrictions on investment in China. China's move appears not to be a proactive expansion of the scope of regulation, but a signal: when facing external unilateral restrictions, companies cannot take "cutting off China" as the only solution. The regulatory intent is more like making unilateral compliance pressure the starting point for companies to seek balance within bilateral rules, rather than simply closing a door.

These three strands of logic point jointly to this: the red line is drawn at "the passive transfer of core industrial assets under unilateral pressure," not at "foreign capital normally entering the Chinese market."

03. The Rule-of-Law Significance of the New Rules and Corporate Responses

The new rules take effect on July 1. Judging by the legislative timeline, the provisions were adopted at an executive meeting of the State Council as early as April 17, and were not a hasty reaction after the Manus case. But in the market's view, they objectively further transform the look-through review logic embodied in the Manus case into a long-term, stable institutional framework. For companies, the core significance lies in two points:

First, security review moves from individual cases to an institution. The new rules make clear that the state will improve the outbound investment security review system and review outbound investments and asset transfers that affect national security. This means similar transactions in the future will face more predictable statutory procedures rather than sporadic case-by-case handling. For foreign investors, this actually reduces uncertainty—at least "what needs review" is no longer entirely vague.

Second, the boundary of technology export is clearer. The new rules stress that technology, data and related services whose export is restricted by the state may not be transferred abroad without permission, which provides companies involving core technologies with clear compliance coordinates and helps them judge at an early stage of a transaction whether filing procedures need to be initiated.

Based on the above observations, the following directions deserve the attention of multinational companies:

(1) The channels for ordinary M&A and financial investment remain open. The Ministry of Commerce has consistently stressed that it "supports companies in carrying out transnational operations in accordance with laws and regulations." As long as no shell-style transfer of core control is involved and no "de-Sinicization" asset shuffling occurs in sensitive fields, the channel for foreign capital to enter the Chinese market remains open.

(2) The red-chip structure itself does not equal decoupling. What regulation targets is the use of offshore structures to deliberately strip core assets and evade legal obligations. If a company's technology sources, core data and main R&D activities remain substantively connected with China, and the necessary filing procedures are performed, an overseas listing itself will not automatically trigger security review.

(3) Look-through review requires substantive assessment of transaction structures at an early stage. Both the Measures for the Security Review of Foreign Investment and the new rules repeatedly stress that "substance prevails over form." Merely changing the place of registration to Singapore or the Cayman Islands may not automatically insulate a transaction from the application of Chinese law. When designing transaction structures, companies should assess the actual location of technology and data earlier.

(4) For transactions in sensitive fields, we recommend putting security review first. If a transaction involves sensitive fields such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors or quantum information and is accompanied by "decoupling-style" arrangements such as relocation of headquarters, disbanding of the core team or termination of domestic business, pre-communication with the competent authorities in advance may be more efficient than after-the-fact remediation.

Conclusion

The Manus case and the introduction of the new rules mark China's cross-border investment regulation entering a more refined and more systematic new stage. The core thrust of these changes is not to exclude foreign investment, but to hold the bottom line of industrial security against the backdrop of intensifying unilateralist pressure.

From a corporate perspective, rule-of-law-based rules are actually beneficial—once review standards are clarified through administrative regulations, companies can conduct compliance assessments at an early stage of a transaction instead of relying entirely on guesses about the "policy wind direction." Future cross-border investment will require finding balance in a more complex geopolitical environment. Understanding that what regulators truly worry about is not "who is buying" but "how core assets are lost under unilateral pressure" will help the market build more robust expectations for investment in China.

We look forward to continuing to discuss these boundaries with all parties in the context of specific transaction structures. If you are assessing a cross-border transaction involving core Chinese assets, you are welcome to get in touch with us.

Appendix

In the AI field, the covered activities include (1) prohibited transactions: covered foreign persons developing AI systems designed exclusively for, or intended for use in, military, government intelligence or mass-surveillance purposes; and developing AI systems trained using more than a specified amount of computing power, i.e., AI systems whose training compute exceeds 10²⁵ computational operations, or that are primarily trained on biological sequence data with training compute exceeding 10²⁴ computational operations. (2) Notifiable transactions: developing AI systems that do not meet the prohibition threshold but are designed for military, government intelligence or mass-surveillance purposes, or intended for use in cybersecurity, digital forensics, penetration testing, control of robotic systems, or whose training compute exceeds 10²³ computational operations.

"Covered foreign person" means: (i) a relevant person of a country of concern (including China, Russia, North Korea, etc.) engaging in covered activities; (ii) a person that is not a relevant person of a country of concern but, by holding a board seat, voting or equity interest in, or the power to direct the management or policies of, the foregoing persons, derives more than 50% of its revenue, net profit, capital expenditure or operating expenditure from them.

Questions and answers

Why did China halt Meta's acquisition of Manus?

The regulator's concern was the transaction form: a Chinese-origin AI company relocated its registration, laid off staff, and severed domestic business under unilateral U.S. pressure, then sold itself as a non-Chinese entity. The halt targeted this 'bath-style going global' decoupling path, not Meta's foreign identity.

What are the Provisions of the State Council on Outbound Investment?

They are State Council Order No. 837, effective July 1, 2026, which write outbound investment security review into administrative regulations. They require review of outbound investments and asset transfers affecting national security and stress that restricted technology and data may not be transferred abroad without permission.

How should companies assess red-chip structures under China's look-through review?

The red-chip structure itself does not equal decoupling. Regulation targets using offshore structures to strip core assets and evade legal obligations. Companies should substantively assess the actual location of technology and data early, because substance prevails over form and merely changing registration to Singapore or the Cayman Islands may not avoid Chinese law.

Laws and cases cited

Laws

  • COINS Act

Regulations

  • Provisions of the State Council on Outbound Investment
  • Measures for the Security Review of Foreign Investment

Policy documents

  • Outbound Investment Security Program (OISP)

References

  1. The U.S. Outbound Investment Security Program sets out prohibitions or notification requirements for U.S. persons' investments in specified "covered foreign persons" in specified AI system fields.