Introduction
On 14 July 2026, the European Commission (hereinafter the "Commission") published the first enforcement review report and related documents under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (hereinafter "FSR"). This review was conducted pursuant to the statutory requirement in Article 52(2) of the FSR[1], namely that the Commission must review the implementation and enforcement practice of the FSR every three years and submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council. On the basis of sorting through the content of this publication, and in combination with the enforcement data, this article reviews and analyses the core conclusions of the report and looks ahead to the subsequent direction of the FSR regime.
01. Background to the report's issuance
(1) The introduction and enforcement history of the FSR
The FSR was adopted by the European Parliament and the Council on 14 December 2022, with the aim of addressing distortions in the EU internal market caused by third-country subsidies. The Regulation became formally applicable on 12 July 2023, with the ex ante notification obligations for concentrations and public procurement taking effect from 12 October 2023[2]. By the time of the publication of this evaluation report, the FSR had been in operation for approximately three years, and this report covers precisely the initial three-year period of the FSR's implementation and enforcement.
The FSR was introduced to supplement the traditional trade defence instruments that apply only to trade in goods, and the State aid instruments that apply only to subsidies granted by EU Member States; its investigation and enforcement now cover a broader range of economic activity scenarios, including M&A investment, public procurement and greenfield investment.
(2) The public consultation phase of the review
This review went through a process of multi-source evidence gathering and public participation. The sources of information for the review included: (1) a targeted public consultation questionnaire (Public Consultation), soliciting views on specific aspects of the FSR's implementation and enforcement[3]; (2) a Call for Evidence, inviting stakeholders to provide general feedback[4]; (3) targeted interviews and meetings with stakeholders and Member States; (4) an FSR evaluation study carried out by an external contractor (FSR Review Study); and (5) the Commission's internal review of its own enforcement practice.
The above public consultation received a total of 54 public consultation questionnaire responses and 49 call-for-evidence responses. On this basis, the Commission simultaneously published five documents on 14 July 2026, formally announcing the review conclusions.
02. Content of this publication
(1) The five documents
The five documents published this time are:
1. Press release: the review finds the FSR fit for purpose, and the Commission is considering targeted adjustments
2. Commission report: report to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation and enforcement of the FSR
3. Staff working document: staff working document accompanying the report
4. Q&A: questions and answers on the findings of the first FSR evaluation
5. Third-party study: final report of the FSR simplification and evaluation study
(2) Summary of the enforcement situation
Drawing together the information disclosed in the above documents, the enforcement practice since the FSR came into effect displays the following features:
Figure 1: Distribution of outcomes of concentration reviews
(Data as of 31 May 2026, 272 formal notifications in total)
Figure 2: Distribution of types of FSR submissions in public procurement
(Data as of 31 May 2026, 863 public procurement procedures)
Figure 3: Overview of ex officio investigations
The above data are compiled as of 31 May 2026 and cover the nearly three-year period since the FSR became applicable in July 2023.
On this basis, the Commission considers that the FSR effectively identifies and corrects distortive foreign subsidies, taking intervention measures and accepting commitments from undertakings where necessary, thereby safeguarding a level playing field in the internal market.
03. Commentary and observations
The core conclusion of this review is that the FSR is "fit for purpose", with only procedural fine-tuning (targeted adjustments) proposed, involving no amendment of substantive provisions and no adjustment proposals whatsoever for the ex officio investigation chapter.
However, examining all the published documents, as well as the experience from the Commission's enforcement practice, this evaluation remains open to question on several key dimensions, as follows:
(1) No substantive response to the core difficulties in investigation practice
Section 2.1.2 of the Review Report does indeed record stakeholders' feedback on a number of substantive issues, including:
the overly broad definition of financial contribution, which makes it difficult for undertakings to collect information across multiple jurisdictions;
the lack of predictability in the distortion assessment criteria in individual cases;
the uncertainty in identifying "directly enabling the concentration" and "unduly advantageous tender" in relation to "foreign subsidies most likely to distort the internal market" (Article 5);
the lack of support from practical cases for the balancing test (Article 6), among others.
However, the adjustment proposals put forward by the Commission involve only procedural simplification and fine-tuning of thresholds, and make no substantive response whatsoever to the above substantive issues. In addition, in undertakings' defence practice, the scope of the entities under investigation—that is, which entities within a group structure should be regarded as "undertakings" under the FSR and bear notification and disclosure obligations—is also a major difficulty faced by undertakings in their defence practice, and the report makes no response whatsoever to this.
Taking the definition of financial contribution as an example, the Commission brings commercial loans by state-owned banks at market interest rates, export credit insurance by policy insurers, and equity investment by industrial funds on commercial terms all within the presumed scope of "foreign financial contributions", conflating normal market conduct with subsidies. The solutions proposed in the Review Report are merely "simplifying the notification forms" and "moderately raising the reporting thresholds", which provide no substantive relief from undertakings' substantive compliance costs.
(2) The "97% initial-review closure rate" is misleading
The Commission uses the fact that 97% of concentration notifications did not proceed to an in-depth investigation to argue that "the procedure is efficient and the burden on undertakings is controllable"[5]. However, this data does not take into account transactions abandoned before notification, nor the number of transactions restructured due to FSR uncertainty. A large number of potential China-related M&A transactions are very likely to be voluntarily abandoned or restructured before formal notification precisely because of FSR uncertainty.
From the perspective of objectively evaluating the FSR's enforcement impact, the Commission, as the enforcement authority, should be in possession of comprehensive data and should accurately assess the administrative burden the FSR imposes on foreign undertakings operating in Europe. The current research methodology of selective non-disclosure undermines, at the level of the data basis, the narrative that "the FSR's administrative burden is controllable", and objectively avoids an assessment of the "chilling effect" brought about by enforcement.
(3) Using pending cases as institutional endorsement
In the report, the Commission uses the Nuctech and Goldwind cases, which are still under in-depth investigation, as evidence that the ex officio investigation tool is "working well".
To give institutional endorsement before the investigation has been concluded and before the parties' procedural rights have been exhausted is a de facto prejudgment of the Chinese undertakings concerned and violates the principle of procedural neutrality. This move in substance sets a "precedent template" for subsequent ex officio enforcement, to the detriment of the Chinese undertakings currently mounting their defence.
(4) The "independence" of the external study is unverifiable
This enforcement review is based on an independent study by an external research institution, but the Commission has not previously publicly disclosed how that research institution was selected, nor has it published the list of interviewees for the study, nor whether there were findings contrary to the Commission's conclusions. In the absence of such key information, the "independence" of the research report is doubtful.
(5) "Simplification" is in substance "targeted burden reduction"
The simplification advocated by the Commission is concentrated on "front-end" stages such as notification forms and threshold adjustments, and mainly reduces the compliance costs of European undertakings and routine notifying parties. The real enforcement pressure—namely the information disclosure requirements, the scope of evidence and the intensity of remedial measures once an in-depth investigation is entered—is not relaxed at all; on the contrary, it will become more concentrated as a result of "precision enforcement".
(6) The FSR and traditional countervailing instruments will form a "combined punch"
The FSR and the traditional countervailing regulation (Regulation 2016/1093) overlap heavily in the logic of subsidy identification. The subsidy information that undertakings are required to provide in FSR questionnaires overlaps heavily with the items required in traditional countervailing investigations, while being broader in type, and the Commission has already demonstrated its ability to use FSR investigations to provide factual support for traditional countervailing investigations. Chinese exporting enterprises may face both types of instruments and a double burden of proof at the same time.
(7) Brief summary
In summary, under the banner of "fit for purpose", the Commission is formally advancing the FSR from the "trial period of a new tool" to the "period of routine enforcement". Through high-profile endorsement of pending ex officio investigations, it sets a template for subsequent enforcement. Judging from the undertakings disclosed in the cases, this evaluation is in substance a pre-installed cloak of legitimacy for subsequent targeted enforcement against Chinese undertakings.
04. Subsequent direction
(1) Expected changes to the FSR regulation
The Commission has launched work on targeted adjustments to the FSR's procedural framework, to be implemented through delegated acts and implementing rules, but not involving amendment of the FSR's substantive provisions.
The proposed adjustments to the concentration chapter include:
(1) raising the turnover notification thresholds through a delegated act;
(2) introducing the possibility of simplified notification for specific cases or financial contributions;
(3) moderately raising the financial contribution reporting thresholds (single item and single third country);
(4) adding a category of reporting exemption for financial contributions with "low distortion risk".
The proposed adjustments to the public procurement chapter include:
(1) simplifying and clarifying the notification/declaration forms;
(2) revising the framework for undertakings to apply for exemption from disclosing information on specific financial contributions;
(3) clarifying and narrowing the reporting obligation for non-subsidy financial contributions;
(4) clarifying the rights and obligations of undertakings and contracting authorities in accessing the case file and the rules for handling confidential information.
The matters expressly not to be adjusted include:
(1) the public procurement notification threshold remains unchanged at EUR 250 million;
(2) the ex officio investigation chapter will not be adjusted at all;
(3) the FSR's substantive provisions will not be amended.
The Commission plans to publish the draft targeted adjustments in autumn 2026 and hold a public consultation, with formal adoption in 2027.
(2) The overall direction of the FSR
Judging from the Commission's competition policy review roadmap (2024-2029), FSR-related matters are essentially "closed out" on the timeline.[6]
Figure 4: FSR-related part of the Commission's competition policy review roadmap (2024-2029)
As shown in the figure above, the FSR Guidelines were issued in the first quarter of 2026, and the FSR Review Report was issued in the third quarter of 2026. In the above timeline, no new FSR-specific legislative plans are listed for 2027 to 2029.
In light of the information disclosed in the Q&A, the main milestones for the subsequent development of the FSR regime are: publication of the draft targeted adjustments in autumn 2026, public consultation, and formal adoption in 2027. Thereafter, the FSR will enter a phase of routine enforcement based on the existing framework.
The implications of this direction for Chinese undertakings are clear:
First, the Commission will not "voluntarily" narrow the scope of FSR enforcement; this evaluation expressly rules out any possibility of substantive adjustment to the FSR's substantive provisions. It is unrealistic to expect the Commission to relax enforcement against China through internal reflection.
Second, the public consultation window in autumn 2026 is a direct institutional channel. Once the targeted adjustment in 2027 formally takes effect, the new thresholds, exemptions and simplified rules will be essentially settled. If Chinese enterprises, as stakeholders, do not participate actively, the likely outcome is a targeted institutional arrangement in which "European enterprises benefit and Chinese enterprises come under pressure".
Third, given that seeking relief within the FSR framework has an extremely low success rate, extremely high costs and an extremely long cycle, consideration should be given to promoting rule coordination in China-EU economic and trade negotiations or at the multilateral level.
Conclusion
The publication of the first FSR enforcement assessment report marks the system's transition from its start-up phase to a phase of regular operation. For Chinese enterprises doing business in Europe, the public consultation window on the draft targeted adjustment in autumn 2026 is a key opportunity to participate in shaping the rules and to strive for institutional discourse power. At the same time, given the increasingly evident synergies between the FSR and traditional countervailing duty instruments, and the continued expansion of the boundaries of entity determination in ex officio investigations, enterprises should build a systematic compliance system covering subsidy data management, transaction structure design and investigation response as early as possible, so as to cope with the more complex pattern of parallel review under multiple instruments.
Enterprises must make simultaneous efforts in the two dimensions of rule contestation and compliance building in order to achieve effective risk prevention and control and safeguard their lawful rights and interests during the FSR's regular enforcement phase.
Appendix
Questions and answers
What did the European Commission conclude in its first Foreign Subsidies Regulation enforcement review?
The Commission concluded that the Foreign Subsidies Regulation is 'fit for purpose' and proposed only procedural fine-tuning through targeted adjustments, with no amendment of substantive provisions and no adjustment to the ex officio investigation chapter.
What enforcement data did the Foreign Subsidies Regulation review disclose?
As of 31 May 2026, the Commission reported 272 formal concentration notifications and 863 public procurement procedures, and stated that 97% of concentration notifications did not proceed to an in-depth investigation.
What does the Foreign Subsidies Regulation review mean for Chinese undertakings?
The Commission will not voluntarily narrow FSR enforcement, so Chinese enterprises should participate in the autumn 2026 public consultation and build compliance systems covering subsidy data management, transaction structure design and investigation response.
Laws and cases cited
Regulations
- Foreign Subsidies Regulation
- Article 52(2) of the FSR
- Article 5
- Article 6
- Regulation 2016/1093
Cases
- Nuctech
- Goldwind
References
- Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market, Article 52(2), OJ L 415, 23.12.2022, p. 1.
- Regulation (EU) 2022/2560, Article 55(1) (fully applicable from 12 July 2023) and Article 56 (notification obligations for concentrations and public procurement applicable from 12 October 2023), OJ L 415, 23.12.2022.
- https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14760-Foreign-subsidies-review-report/public-consultation_en
- https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14760-Foreign-subsidies-review-report_en
- https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_26_1607
- European Commission Competition Policy Review Roadmap (2024-2029), https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/fb32c5d5-51ec-4344-a9c6-35ebebbb2bc3_en?filename=timeline_competition-policy_review_2024-2029.pdf

