Introduction: A new signal behind an "escalated" application
In July 2026, the European Commission (hereinafter the "Commission") announced the imposition of a definitive anti-dumping duty on passenger car and light truck tyres originating in China. The definitive duty rates are: 45.3% for non-cooperating companies and 24.4% for most cooperating companies.[1] The anti-subsidy investigation concerning the same product (Case AS743) is still ongoing.[2] If the Commission decides to impose anti-subsidy duties on the same product at the same time, how the two measures will interact and how to avoid double offsetting of the low-price effect caused by the same subsidy[3] has become an important dispute in the subsequent proceedings.
On 13 August 2026, the "Coalition Against Unfair Tyres Imports" (hereinafter the "applicant"), representing the EU tyre industry, submitted to the Commission a "Note on the cumulation of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures", arguing that no double-remedy deduction should be made for certain categories of subsidies and that anti-subsidy duties should be imposed on top of the existing anti-dumping duties.
This document appears to be merely a procedural application in an individual case, but in fact it represents a new trend in the field of EU trade remedies that all Chinese companies should closely follow: against the backdrop of increasingly frequent parallel anti-dumping and anti-subsidy (double remedy) investigations into Chinese exports to the EU, EU industry has begun to seek to break the Commission's established practice of avoiding "double remedies" in double remedy investigations, pursuing double pressure, attempting to directly stack the two types of duties on the same product, and arguing that they can be "fully stacked without offset".
This article takes this case as its starting point, reviews the legal basis for the prohibition of double remedies and the Commission's practice, analyses the main issues in this dispute, and discusses what Chinese companies and industry organisations can learn for responding to future EU trade remedy investigations.
01. What is a "double remedy": the same subsidy cannot be offset twice
Double remedies (double remedies) refers to the situation where anti-dumping duties and anti-subsidy duties are applied simultaneously to the same imported product, causing the low-price effect caused by the same subsidy to be to some extent double-counted in determining the double remedy measures; the key point of assessment is whether the actual effects of the two measures overlap.[4]
(1) What anti-dumping duties and anti-subsidy duties each remedy
Anti-dumping measures address the situation where a product is exported to another country at a price below its normal value and thereby causes injury to the industry of the importing party. The dumping margin is usually determined through a fair comparison between the normal value (generally the profitable domestic sales price) and the export price. Where the statutory conditions are met, the investigating authority may use alternative methods such as constructed normal value for the calculation.[5]
Anti-subsidy measures, by contrast, address actionable subsidies and the injury they cause. Whether measures such as government grants, preferential financing and tax reductions or exemptions constitute actionable subsidies must be determined on the basis of statutory elements such as whether they constitute a financial contribution, confer a benefit on the investigated enterprise and are specific.[6]
The two measures have different legal bases and conditions of application, but in specific calculations the same facts may be captured separately by the two investigations and included in the calculation of the level of the double remedy measures, resulting in the double counting and remedy effects discussed below. This is precisely why double remedy investigations need to address the issue of double remedies.
(2) Will these two duties be double-counted?
Where the normal value is constructed using third-country costs or prices, if a subsidy lowers the export price of the investigated enterprise while the normal value does not reflect the effect of that subsidy, the price reduction caused by the subsidy may constitute part or even all of the difference between the normal value and the export price. To that extent, the imposition of anti-dumping duties has already offset part or all of the effect of the subsidy. If anti-subsidy duties are then imposed on the same subsidy without corresponding adjustment, i.e. if the two are simply added together, double remedies arise.
Article VI:5 of GATT 1994[7] and Article 24(1) of the EU Basic Anti-Subsidy Regulation[8] provide that no anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties shall be levied simultaneously to offset the same situation caused by dumping or export subsidies. The reason why the relevant provisions prohibit double taxation only in respect of export subsidies, while domestic subsidies (otherwise understood as production-type subsidies) are not equally subject to the rule against double remedies, is that export subsidies affect only the export price and have no effect on the normal value. As a result, the price-suppressing effect of the subsidy is already incorporated into the comparison between normal value and export price, and the anti-dumping duty imposed on that basis has therefore already offset the negative effect of the export subsidy. Conversely, in the case of domestic subsidies, both domestically sold products and like exported products are affected by the subsidy to the same extent, and the dumping margin calculated from a symmetrical comparison of normal value and export price theoretically contains no price-suppressing effect caused by the subsidy, so the anti-dumping duty will not have the effect of remedying the impact of the subsidy.
The overlap between anti-subsidy duties calculated in respect of domestic subsidies and anti-dumping duties calculated using the non-market economy methodology is a special case. This is because the normal value obtained by applying the non-market economy methodology has already removed the effect of domestic subsidies on the normal value, and its practical effect is equivalent to converting domestic subsidies into export subsidies that affect only the export price. The DS379 case further confirmed, on the basis of Article 19.3 of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, that investigating authorities have an obligation to ensure that anti-subsidy duties are levied in the appropriate amounts and to avoid double offsetting of the same subsidy.[9]
In the EU's current anti-dumping practice against China, the method of constructing normal value on the basis of non-distorted costs because of serious distortions in prices and costs in the exporting country[10] is no different from the non-market economy methodology in producing an "asymmetrical comparison" (the export price contains the price-suppressing effect of the subsidy, while the normal value does not). This is the core reason why the risk of double remedies still exists in double remedy investigations where anti-dumping measures are applied under Article 2(6a) of the EU Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation.
(3) The key to the assessment is whether the subsidy margin is "hidden" in the dumping margin
Determining whether double remedies exist mainly involves two interrelated questions: first, whether and to what extent the subsidy lowered the export price and was thus included in the dumping margin; and second, whether the investigating authority made the necessary calculation adjustments to eliminate double offsetting. The DS379 case did not hold that double remedies necessarily arise whenever third-country prices or costs are used and both types of duties are imposed simultaneously; whether overlap exists and the extent of that overlap still need to be determined on the basis of the specific facts.[11] This also requires the investigating authority to fully ascertain the effect of the subsidy on the export price and whether the adjustment measures already taken are sufficient to avoid double offsetting, and to make findings on the basis of the empirical material in the case file.
Although both sides in this case actually agree that "double remedies need to be assessed case by case" — the applicant's wording in the Note is precisely "double remedies cannot be presumed" — there are two real points of disagreement: first, the dispute over methodology, since the Commission's overall full deduction is result-oriented while the applicant's item-by-item subsidy analysis is process-oriented; and second, the dispute over the burden of proof, since the applicant argues that the Commission is obliged to prove item by item that each subsidy has not been absorbed by the dumping margin, while our side argues that the applicant should prove by evidence in the case file that there are subsidies that have not been absorbed. This constitutes the real battleground in the assessment of this case.
02. The Commission's consistent practice: full deduction
In 2017 the EU introduced Article 2(6a) of the Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation, which allows normal value to be constructed on the basis of non-distorted prices or benchmarks where it is found that there is "significant distortion" in the exporting country's industry and that it is inappropriate to use domestic prices and costs in the exporting country to calculate the dumping margin. In its key feature of "replacing domestic prices and costs with external benchmarks", this method is functionally equivalent to the traditional "surrogate country" methodology addressed in the DS379 case, and this is the technical premise on which the DS379 rules can be extended to apply to this case.[12] In the definitive anti-dumping determination in this case, the Commission found that the price formation of all inputs of Chinese tyre companies — raw materials, energy, land, financing, labour and so on — was subject to "significant government intervention", and therefore comprehensively used non-distorted benchmark data from a representative third country to construct normal value.[13]
The risk of double remedies arises precisely from this: the normal value uses non-distorted external benchmarks, while the export price remains the actual price of the Chinese companies. The dumping margin obtained by comparing normal value and export price already fully incorporates the price-suppressing effect of the subsidies. On this premise, the anti-dumping duty determined on the basis of the dumping margin has already offset the effect of the subsidies. If anti-subsidy duties are then imposed on the basis of the calculated subsidy margin without corresponding adjustment, the same subsidy may be offset twice.
Therefore, the Commission's consistent past practice has been to deduct the full subsidy margin from the dumping margin and then impose anti-dumping duties on the remainder, capped by the injury margin, thereby ensuring that no double remedies occur. This practice is fully reflected in the following cases.
Glass Fibre Fabrics case (GFF, Regulation (EU) 2020/776): the Commission first imposed anti-subsidy duties at the established subsidy margin, then deducted the entire subsidy margin from the dumping margin, determined the residual anti-dumping duty on that basis, and confirmed that this method avoided double counting.[14]
Aluminium Converter Foil case (ACF, Regulation (EU) 2021/2287): the Commission adopted the same method and expressly described it as the "standard practice" in anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations concerning the same product.[15]
Optical Fibre Cables case (OFC, Regulation (EU) 2022/72): the Commission again applied the full deduction and confirmed that, after deducting the entire amount of subsidies, the relevant double counting problem no longer existed.[16]
Mobile Access Equipment case (MAE, Regulation (EU) 2025/796): faced with a similar argument by the industry that subsidies such as government grants, preferential financing and tax reductions or exemptions could be cumulated, the Commission did not accept it, maintained the full deduction, and confirmed that this treatment eliminated the risk of double counting.[17]
Truck and Bus Tyres case (TBR, Regulation (EU) 2018/1690): this is the precedent in the same industry and with the most similar procedural background to the present case. The Commission applied a two-step method to each company: first determining the level of anti-dumping duty needed to eliminate the injury, and then deducting the anti-subsidy duty in full from it. For the product concerned, Chinese tyres, the Commission has never permitted the full cumulation of the two types of duties.[18]
The above cases show that the Commission has developed a relatively settled approach in parallel anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations against China involving the application of Article 2(6a) of the Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation. The applicant in this case, by requesting that no deduction be made for certain categories of subsidies and that the duties be directly cumulated, is in substance asking the Commission to change this established practice.
03. The applicant's argument is in fact an attempt at an institutional breakthrough
In this case, the applicant further refined its claim regarding the cumulative imposition of duties on certain subsidies. Its core logic is that double counting exists only where a given subsidy can be matched to a "corresponding line item" in the financial data of representative third-country companies, and where the undistorted substitute price in the representative third country is higher than that in China, and the difference can be attributed to that subsidy. Otherwise, the subsidy has not been absorbed by the dumping margin and may be fully cumulated with the countervailing duty.
We consider that this claim suffers from the following core flaws in its reasoning:
First, the applicant's claim lacks a sufficient legal basis. WTO rules and EU regulations require investigating authorities to avoid offsetting the same subsidy twice and set out the result to be achieved, but they do not lay down detailed rules on the investigation or analysis methods the authority should adopt; instead, they deliberately leave a "blank space", reserving the decision to the investigating authority.[19] The judgment method and criteria proposed by the applicant substantially constrain the authority's analytical path and have no legal basis.
Second, the applicant's claim directly conflicts with the Commission's established practice. Among the cases listed above, the truck and bus tyre case in the same industry is particularly noteworthy: the Commission deducted the full amount of the countervailing duty from the anti-dumping duty for every company and never permitted cumulation. The applicant is in substance asking the Commission to abandon its own precedent on this product, Chinese tyres, in the present case.
Third, the applicant's claim is self-contradictory with the logical basis and grounds on which it relied in the anti-dumping case to request the application of Article 2(6a). In the anti-dumping investigation, the applicant relied on the same government subsidy measures to establish the alleged "significant distortions" in the Chinese tyre industry and to support the application of the normal value construction method under Article 2(6a). In the countervailing investigation, it now argues that, because the undistorted costs and prices in the representative third country do not achieve the remedial purpose of offsetting the "distortions", the duties may be cumulated. The Commission has already found in the anti-dumping final determination that the relevant distortions "pervade the whole of China and run through the supply chain" — if subsidies are passed down layer by layer through the supply chain, no individual subsidy can be "isolated" from the calculation of the dumping margin. The applicant's claim of "item-by-item cumulation" is incompatible with the claim it itself previously constructed in the anti-dumping case for the application of Article 2(6a).
Fourth, the applicant's claim lacks substantive evidence. Although it was clearly aware of the Commission's previous full-deduction methodology, the applicant has not produced any strong evidence showing why the government grants, preferential financing, tax reductions and exemptions and other alleged subsidy policies and content it lists were not covered by the dumping margin calculated under the Article 2(6a) rules, or to what quantified extent they were not absorbed, such that all or part of the countervailing duty must be imposed cumulatively to offset the negative price effects of these subsidies. Likewise, given that WTO rules and EU regulations are oriented towards avoiding the result of double remedies, the applicant has not put forward convincing grounds to show that cumulative imposition of duties would not lead to a double remedy, even a small part of double taxation.
04. Lessons from this round of exchanges
The most important signal sent by this case is that the EU industry is not satisfied with the effect of the existing trade remedy measures and is seeking a breakthrough to keep escalating them. The combined use of anti-dumping and countervailing measures has already become the standard configuration in recent years. But in the eyes of the EU industry, even with the full deduction and cumulative imposition of the two measures, the restrictions and blocking of Chinese product imports into the EU are still not strong enough. Hence the current "escalation claims".
In addition, we consider that "retroactive imposition of duties" and "non-application of the lesser duty rule" are also among the paths through which the EU industry seeks institutional escalation and breakthrough. The latter two have become the standard configuration of claims by the EU industry in newly initiated double-remedy cases.
For the Chinese industry, fully exercising procedural rights, actively participating in every round of comments, and forming a unified and strong defence through industry organisations are the most direct and effective weapons for safeguarding the lawful rights and interests of enterprises and the industry.
Our team will continue to follow the progress of Case AS743 and share our analysis in a timely manner.
*Trainee Hao Jiaxuan also contributed to this article.
Appendix
Questions and answers
What are double remedies in EU anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations?
Double remedies occur when anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties are imposed on the same product, causing the price-suppressing effect of the same subsidy to be counted twice. The key is whether the two measures overlap in offsetting the same subsidy.
What is the European Commission's established practice on avoiding double remedies?
The Commission deducts the full subsidy margin from the dumping margin and imposes anti-dumping duties on the remainder, capped by the injury margin. This full-deduction practice has been applied in cases such as Glass Fibre Fabrics, Aluminium Converter Foil, Optical Fibre Cables, Mobile Access Equipment, and Truck and Bus Tyres.
Why does the applicant argue that anti-subsidy duties should be cumulated with anti-dumping duties?
The applicant claims that double counting exists only where a subsidy can be matched to a corresponding line item in third-country financial data and the price difference is attributable to that subsidy. Otherwise, it argues the subsidy has not been absorbed by the dumping margin and may be fully cumulated.
What are the flaws in the applicant's cumulation argument?
The argument lacks legal basis because WTO rules and EU regulations leave methodology to the authority; it conflicts with the Commission's established full-deduction practice, including in the same tyre industry; it is self-contradictory with the applicant's reliance on subsidies to justify Article 2(6a) in the anti-dumping case; and it lacks evidence that the subsidies were not absorbed by the dumping margin.
How should Chinese companies respond to EU double remedy investigations?
Chinese companies should fully exercise procedural rights, actively participate in every round of comments, and form a unified defence through industry organisations to safeguard their lawful rights and interests.
Laws and cases cited
Regulations
- EU Basic Anti-Subsidy Regulation
- EU Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation
- Regulation (EU) 2020/776
- Regulation (EU) 2021/2287
- Regulation (EU) 2022/72
- Regulation (EU) 2025/796
- Regulation (EU) 2018/1690
Treaties
- GATT 1994
- WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Cases
- DS379
References
- Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/1540, OJ L, 2026/1540, 7 July 2026.
- European Commission, "Case AS743 – Passenger car and light lorry tyres".
- Dumping is regarded as a form of price discrimination, meaning that exporters sell like products to other countries at prices below the normal domestic selling price. However, low-price sales may be purely price discrimination, or they may be the consequence of export sales supported by subsidies. Therefore, when anti-dumping measures are imposed, they may simultaneously remedy the unfair trade effects caused by price discrimination and by export subsidies. At this point, if countervailing measures are additionally imposed, the low-price effect caused by the same subsidy will be remedied twice. Appropriate adjustments to the duty measures are needed to avoid double taxation.
- Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, para. 541.
- Regulation (EU) 2016/1036, arts. 1–2
- Regulation (EU) 2016/1037, arts. 1, 3 and 4.
- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, art. VI:5
- Regulation (EU) 2016/1037, arts. 15(2) and 24(1)
- Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, art. 19.3; Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, paras. 568–569 and 583.
- The legal basis for this method is Article 2(6a) of the EU basic anti-dumping regulation.
- Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, paras. 599 and 601–602.
- Regulation (EU) 2016/1036, art. 2(6a), as inserted by Regulation (EU) 2017/2321, art. 1(1).
- Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/1540, recitals 112–134 and 206–208.
- Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/776, recitals 1117–1118 and 1135–1136.
- Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2287, recitals 792–793 and 804.
- Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/72, recitals 765–766
- Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/796, recitals 526, 528 and 530–531.
- Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1690, recitals 929–933 and 939–941
- Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, paras. 582 and 599–611; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/796, recitals 530–531.

