Introduction

When many private fund practitioners saw the penalty notice of nearly RMB 60 million against Jiuying Asset, their first reaction was to see only the huge figure, and they rarely analyzed in depth the layered enforcement logic behind the regulation. Violators believed that by splitting equity, building a dual-license structure, and conducting counterparty transactions in the capacity of "unrelated entities," they could bypass regulation. But under penetrating review, this carefully designed arrangement was ultimately identified and found to be a tool used by the actual controller to illegally transfer tens of millions in fund returns.

Taking this logic one step further: even if the related-party relationship were not concealed and the transaction approval procedures were followed, the legal characterization would still be clearly distinct. Procedural defects are compliance-level negligence, while malicious tunneling is a fundamental breach of fiduciary duty—the two differ essentially in the nature of the violation, the harmful consequences, and the severity of punishment, and are two red lines that absolutely cannot be conflated.

This case raises a core question of great industry thinking value: given that complex networks of related entities are common in the private fund industry today, how should institutions clearly distinguish lawful operations from violations when conducting related-party business? How can mere procedural defects be distinguished from substantive, malicious violations? If an enterprise deliberately conceals related-party relationships and packages cross-entity arbitrage as normal transactions with independent third parties, how will regulators penetrate the surface form of the transaction to accurately distinguish and identify it?

01. Complete Case Review: Hidden Benefit Tunneling Under a Related-Party Structure

(1) A Hundred-Billion Private Fund's Hidden Gray Structure: Two Sets of Licenses, Solely to Bypass Fair Pricing Regulation

At its peak, Jiuying Asset's assets under management exceeded RMB 10 billion, while Tengchuang Investment was merely a small registered private fund. The two institutions had no overlap in their publicly registered industrial and commercial equity, appearing unrelated and completely independent.

But after a penetrating review, the truth was plain: actual controller Bao Jiaoyan fully controlled all investment and financial decisions of both institutions, and their office space and staff were commingled. Nominally two companies, they were in substance one team.

This practice of splitting multiple licenses and failing to truthfully disclose the actual control relationship in the AMBERS system has long been a common gray structure in group-style private fund circles. The institution's intent was clear: to create the illusion of no relationship through separation at the industrial and commercial registration level, thereby evading cross-product transaction review, related-party investment decision procedures, and fair pricing verification. According to the Guiding Opinions on Strengthening Regulation, Preventing Risks and Promoting the High-Quality Development of Private Investment Funds (Guoban Han [2026] No. 54, hereinafter "Guoban Document No. 54"), this kind of isolation structure deliberately designed to evade regulation is precisely the type of violation that regulators will focus on rectifying in the future.

(2) Closed-Loop Wash Trading Arbitrage: Transferring RMB 28.47 Million in Fund Returns Under the Name of "Transactions with Unrelated Counterparties"

Between 2022 and 2023, actual controller Bao Jiaoyan uniformly issued trading instructions and arranged for multiple funds under the two institutions to conduct closed-loop counterparty transactions in low-liquidity credit bonds. The method was as follows: funds under Jiuying bought the target bonds at prices substantially below fair market value, after which products under Tengchuang took them over at prices significantly above valuation, artificially creating a huge price spread. The two operations cumulatively transferred RMB 28.476 million in fund assets to the accounts of Jiuying Asset and related entities, and none of the arbitrage proceeds belonged to the fund holders.

To continuously conceal the benefit tunneling, the institution also carried out dual falsification: it concealed the common actual control relationship from regulators and the AMAC year after year; and during regulatory verification, it directly altered 144 bank transaction records, deliberately erasing traces of cross-institution fund flows to conceal the arbitrage.

(3) Full-Chain Maximum Accountability: Nearly RMB 60 Million in Penalties and Confiscation + Dual Market Bans, Violation Costs Hit the Ceiling

Ultimately, regulators imposed penetrating, full-chain penalties, with the institution, the actual controller, and front-line trading personnel all held accountable:

Institution level: the full RMB 28.476 million in illegal gains was confiscated, with a fine of the same amount, totaling more than RMB 58 million in penalties and confiscation for the two companies; the AMAC simultaneously deregistered both managers, permanently depriving them of the qualification to conduct private fund business.

Actual controller Bao Jiaoyan: found to have played a decisive role in the occurrence of the illegal acts of both institutions, fined RMB 900,000, plus dual qualification sanctions of a 5-year market ban + a 5-year prohibition on securities trading.

Business execution personnel: found to be directly responsible persons, each given a warning and a fine of RMB 90,000.

Administrative-criminal linkage: adhering to the principle of transferring all cases that should be transferred, criminal leads were transferred to public security authorities in accordance with laws and regulations.

02. Deep Reflection on Enforcement Logic: Why Was the Same Transaction, Which Also Had the Appearance of an Illegal Related-Party Transaction, Characterized Only as Benefit Tunneling?

Jiuying Asset and Tengchuang Investment are related entities, and the transactions at issue had the appearance of related-party transactions and clearly violated rules on procedure, pricing, and information disclosure. Yet regulators penalized them only for benefit tunneling and did not separately pursue liability for related-party transaction violations. Why?

(1) Overlapping Provisions, Choose the Heavier Penalty, Following the Principle of No Double Punishment for One Act

The same wash-trading act simultaneously violated two penalty provisions—related-party transaction violations and benefit tunneling—constituting a concurrence of legal provisions. Under Article 29 of the Administrative Penalty Law, where one illegal act violates multiple legal norms and a fine should be imposed, the penalty shall be imposed under the provision with the higher fine amount:

• Benefit tunneling: confiscation of illegal gains + fine of 1–5 times the illegal gains

In this case, the illegal gains reached RMB 28.47 million. If penalized only as a related-party transaction, the maximum fine of RMB 1 million would be severely disproportionate to the tens of millions in illegal gains, so regulators inevitably chose the heavier penalty.

The entire cross-institution wash trading had no reasonable investment purpose; all transaction arrangements served to transfer fund returns. In administrative enforcement assessment, the means of committing an illegal act is absorbed by the core substantive illegal result, and there is no need to split and evaluate it repeatedly. Related-party transactions were merely a disguise; the true illegal core was misappropriation of investor assets, so it was characterized only as benefit tunneling.

(3) The Two Types of Acts Differ in Level of Illegality

Illegal related-party transactions: violate procedural compliance requirements, with no subjective malice to misappropriate assets;

Benefit tunneling: violates the trustee's duty of loyalty and fiduciary duty, is a substantive red-line act expressly prohibited by law, and directly erodes fund assets and harms investors' core rights and interests.

The two differ essentially in the viciousness of the violation and the harmful consequences. In practice, the scenarios in which illegal related-party transactions are penalized separately are usually limited to cases where pricing is fair and there is no intent to arbitrage. In this case, the transaction prices deviated substantially from fair market valuation, the subjective intent to profit was clear, and large illegal gains were generated; characterizing the conduct as benefit tunneling is an accurate assessment of the full picture of the acts.

The institution's concealment of the actual control relationship and alteration of transaction records to hide traces of the relationship were not grouped into the trading arbitrage conduct, but were separately characterized as systematic information disclosure falsification and penalized cumulatively on a separate basis. Trading arbitrage was grouped under benefit tunneling, and concealment of the related-party relationship under information disclosure violations; the two types of acts were evaluated separately and punished in both directions, with no penalty omitted.

In practice, related-party transactions do not necessarily lead to benefit tunneling, but benefit tunneling is often carried out through related-party transactions as a vehicle. Therefore, many private fund practitioners are unclear about the boundary between the two, and may even hold a misconception—believing that related-party transactions are equivalent to benefit tunneling and that any related-party business will inevitably be penalized. However, the two are entirely different in characterization and penalty mechanisms.

Related-party transactions are merely neutral commercial conduct. The Regulations on the Supervision and Administration of Private Investment Funds (hereinafter the "Private Fund Regulations") only require related-party transactions to be regulated; they never impose a blanket prohibition. The existence of a related-party relationship between the parties is not itself illegal, and where the three mandatory requirements of decision-making recusal, fair pricing, and full-process disclosure are met, it is usually a compliant operation recognized by regulators.

Benefit tunneling, by contrast, is a statutory substantive violation. Article 30 of the Private Fund Regulations expressly prohibits using fund assets to seek profits for entities other than investors. There are two core elements: subjectively, an intent to misappropriate returns; objectively, the creation of price spreads and interception of funds to generate large illegal gains.

In short: compliant related-party transactions are normal business dealings; benefit tunneling is the misappropriation of investor property using related-party transactions and other arrangements as a vehicle or tool.

(2) Comparison of Transaction Conduct Under Three Types of Related-Party Structures

In practice, three types of transaction conduct under related-party structures are clearly distinguished in characterization and legal consequences:

- Compliant related-party transactions: fair pricing, compliant decision-making, complete information disclosure, usually no penalty.

- Related-party transactions with mere procedural violations: fair pricing, with problems only in decision approval and information disclosure; institutional fine of RMB 100,000–1,000,000, responsible persons fined RMB 30,000–300,000, generally no market ban or criminal liability.

- Benefit tunneling through related-party transactions: deliberate unfair pricing and transfer of huge returns; all illegal gains confiscated plus a fine of 1–5 times; the actual controller may be subject to a market ban, responsible persons fined RMB 30,000–300,000, and leads transferred to public security authorities.

Key point: where only approval and disclosure have procedural defects, regulators impose an appropriate fine; but once artificial price spreads and transfer of fund returns are added, the conduct escalates to benefit tunneling subject to maximum penalties. The two are completely different in nature and must never be conflated.

(3) Dual Warning: The Two Types of Compliance Red Lines Are Independent and Must Not Be Crossed

Procedural violations in related-party dealings and benefit tunneling are two independent sets of regulatory red lines, and either one, if verified, can be penalized separately. The fact that this case did not separately penalize the related-party transactions does not mean that related-party disclosure can be omitted or approval procedures bypassed; for mere procedural defects without arbitrage, regulators may also open a separate case and impose penalties under Articles 28 and 54 of the Private Fund Regulations. Likewise, even if benefit tunneling is verified, routine related-party transaction controls cannot be relaxed; risk control must run on two parallel lines: simultaneously building a procedural compliance defense line for related-party transactions + a cross-product arbitrage interception defense line, with separate routine self-inspection mechanisms to prevent and control both types of risk simultaneously.

04. Compliance Recommendations: Implementation Plan for Risk Control of Group-Style Multi-License Private Funds

(1) Clean Up Illegal Isolation Structures and Truthfully Disclose All Related-Party Relationships

Conduct a comprehensive penetrating review of the actual controller, their relatives, and all entities under them, and update the related-party ledger quarterly; excess private fund licenses without substantively differentiated business should be gradually deregistered; the premises, finance, trading, and risk control personnel of each manager should be physically separated, and the actual controller should be prohibited from uniformly directing all product funds.

(2) Distinguish Transaction Types and Set Tiered Risk Control Standards

1. Routine related-party investments: strictly implement related-party recusal, fair pricing, and special disclosure procedures; may proceed normally if compliance requirements are met;

2. Cross-product counterparty transactions: add dual risk control review, set price-spread alerts in the system, and prohibit two-way wash trading without a reasonable liquidity need; where transactions are truly necessary, issue a special explanation to all LPs and fully retain third-party valuation materials;

3. Clarify internal red lines: it is strictly prohibited to use multi-license related-party structures to artificially adjust the profits and losses of different products; such conduct will be directly characterized as benefit tunneling and trigger maximum penalties.

(3) Shift from Formal Risk Control to Substantive Penetration, with Full-Process Record-Keeping for Exemption

Establish a dynamic list of related entities, focusing on screening for "invisible related parties";

Prohibit the actual controller from directly issuing trading instructions bypassing investment decisions and risk control;

Build a four-tier checks-and-balances mechanism of "decision—approval—execution—review";

The risk control officer has substantive review authority and a written veto right over major related-party transactions, and written opinions are included in the annual compliance file;

Trading personnel who receive suspected non-compliant instructions must report them in writing to compliance, and may not be exempted from liability merely on the ground of "executing instructions";

Related-party transactions in low-liquidity bonds require the investment decision committee to issue a written record of reasonableness, with the custodian concurrently reviewing pricing; failure to report anomalies entails corresponding liability;

Trading procedures and documents must be traceable throughout the process, with both paper and electronic archives retained for no less than 20 years.

(4) Regular two-dimensional self-inspection to resolve risks in advance

Each quarter, two types of risk are examined separately: first, whether the disclosure, decision-making and approval procedures for related-party transactions are complete; second, whether abnormal price spreads exist in cross-product bond and non-standard transactions. Problems found should be rectified as early as possible, to avoid minor procedural defects escalating into cases of massive benefit tunneling.

Conclusion

Jiuying Asset's huge fine of RMB 60 million clearly demonstrates the enforcement logic of the era of penetrating supervision after the implementation of State Council Office Document No. 54 — regulators have moved beyond surface-level business registration and now substantively determine related-party relationships from multiple dimensions such as funds, transactions, personnel and premises. The three-tier boundary of conduct is clear and definite: compliant related-party transactions may be carried out normally, mere procedural defects receive light penalties and rectification, and transferring profits through related-party structures receives the maximum penalty. Liability is pursued across the entire chain of actual controllers, senior executives and frontline personnel, with administrative penalties, qualification sanctions, industry clearing and criminal referrals imposed simultaneously.

For group-based, multi-license private fund managers, this case has strong warning significance. Institutions need to comprehensively review their related-party structures, restructure tiered transaction approval mechanisms, build a penetrating substantive risk control system and fully retain compliance archives, strictly distinguish normal investment from arbitrage-style wash trades, block at the source the path of benefit tunneling through related-party transactions, and firmly secure the bottom line of compliant operation in an environment of strong penetrating supervision.

Questions and answers

What are the three mandatory requirements for compliant related-party transactions under the Private Fund Regulations?

The Private Fund Regulations require decision-making recusal, fair pricing, and full-process disclosure for related-party transactions. Where these three requirements are met, related-party transactions are usually recognized as compliant operations and are not prohibited outright.

How does benefit tunneling differ from a mere procedural violation in related-party transactions?

A mere procedural violation involves fair pricing but defects in decision approval or information disclosure, typically resulting in an institutional fine of RMB 100,000–1,000,000 and responsible persons fined RMB 30,000–300,000, generally without market ban or criminal liability. Benefit tunneling involves deliberate unfair pricing and transfer of huge returns, leading to confiscation of all illegal gains plus a fine of 1–5 times, possible market ban, and criminal referrals.

What penalties did Bao Jiaoyan and business execution personnel receive in the Jiuying Asset case?

Actual controller Bao Jiaoyan was fined RMB 900,000 and received a 5-year market ban plus a 5-year prohibition on securities trading. Business execution personnel found directly responsible were each given a warning and a fine of RMB 90,000. Criminal leads were transferred to public security authorities.

What compliance measures should group-style multi-license private fund managers adopt after the Jiuying Asset penalty?

Managers should clean up illegal isolation structures, truthfully disclose all related-party relationships, distinguish transaction types with tiered risk controls, shift from formal to substantive penetration risk control with full-process record-keeping, and conduct regular two-dimensional self-inspections covering both related-party procedures and abnormal price spreads in cross-product transactions.

Laws and cases cited

Laws

  • Administrative Penalty Law

Regulations

  • Regulations on the Supervision and Administration of Private Investment Funds
  • Article 30 of the Private Fund Regulations
  • Articles 28 and 54 of the Private Fund Regulations

Policy documents

  • Guiding Opinions on Strengthening Regulation, Preventing Risks and Promoting the High-Quality Development of Private Investment Funds (Guoban Han [2026] No. 54)