Introduction
At the risk disposal stage of the private fund industry, the root causes of the vast majority of disputes can be traced back to the fundraising stage, with typical scenarios including admission of unqualified investors, nominee holdings and pooled subscriptions, actual controllers and affiliated entities conducting promotion beyond their proper role, principal-guaranteed and return-guaranteed publicity, perfunctory risk disclosure, lax control of fundraising funds, and missing business records and archives.
In the past, judicial adjudication was mainly based on the Private Fund Regulations, the Interim Measures for the Supervision and Administration of Private Investment Funds (hereinafter the "Interim Private Fund Measures") and the Measures for the Administration of Securities and Futures Investor Suitability (hereinafter the "Suitability Administration Measures"), with reference to scattered provisions in the 2019 Minutes of the National Courts' Civil and Commercial Trial Work Conference (hereinafter the "Jiumin Minutes") of the Supreme People's Court and industry self-regulatory rules such as the Measures for the Administration of Private Investment Fund Fundraising Conduct (hereinafter the "Fundraising Conduct Measures"). Because there was a lack of specialized, detailed regulatory rules covering the entire fundraising process, practice frequently encountered the real dilemma that administrative regulators found violations, yet civil litigation faced difficulties in proof and vague standards for determining the boundaries of fault.
This Draft Fundraising Measures uniformly incorporates investor due diligence, supervision of fundraising settlement funds, and twenty-year retention of archives into the fundraising institutional system; at the same time, it expressly brings managers' shareholders, partners, actual controllers and affiliates within the entities regulated for fundraising conduct, promoting effective linkage between administrative regulatory rules and civil tort adjudication rules. The regulatory standards established by the draft will provide important guidance for judicial practice in determining whether both parties meet the standard of "sellers being diligent and buyers bearing their own risks".
01. The Ten Core Institutional Changes of the Draft Fundraising Measures (from a Dispute Resolution Perspective)
(1) Expanding the Entities Bound by Fundraising Conduct: Actual Controllers, Affiliates and Others Are No Longer "Outsiders" in Fundraising Supervision
Key provisions:
Limitations of the old regime: The original prohibited fundraising rules mainly bound private fund managers and fund sales institutions. In practice, it was widespread for actual controllers and group affiliates, outside the registered manager entity, to carry out roadshow promotion, oral principal guarantees, and matchmaking for nominee shareholdings; such entities are not licensed institutions, and there was often the real dilemma that administrative regulators found it difficult to punish them directly and civil litigation found it difficult to include them in the assessment of liability for fundraising fault.
Changes under the new rules: The Draft Fundraising Measures builds a complete regulatory closed loop: investigation power under Article 37 → regulatory measures under Article 38 → administrative penalties under Article 40. It establishes a conduct test of "engaging in or disguisedly engaging in" activities, without making whether the actor conducts activities in the manager's name a precondition for determination. Where actual controllers or personnel of affiliated groups conduct private roadshows, promote through WeChat groups, make principal guarantees, or matchmake nominee shareholdings, all fall within the scope of regulation, and administrative penalties do not require the manager's own violation as a precondition.
Impact on dispute practice
1. Improvement of the civil tort accountability path. When investors sue actual controllers, in addition to traditional grounds such as misappropriation of fund property and interference with investment decisions, there is now a new independent tort fact: "actual controller/affiliate's improper participation in fundraising". Combined with the joint tort rule in Article 1168 of the Civil Code, where an actual controller leads, participates in, or implements prohibited fundraising conduct such as promotion and principal-guaranteed publicity, it may be found to constitute joint tort, and investors may claim joint and several liability.
2. The difficulty of proof for investors is significantly reduced. Warning letters and administrative penalty decisions issued in respect of actual controllers' or affiliates' participation in illegal fundraising will become important public documentary evidence in civil litigation and arbitration proceedings to prove that the relevant entities were at fault in fundraising.
Issues to be observed: How to draw the boundary of an actual controller "disguisedly engaging in fundraising conduct", and how to distinguish mere group brand publicity from promotion of a specific private fund product; when an actual controller's remarks mix group introduction with fund promotion, to what degree does this constitute "disguisedly engaging in prohibited fundraising conduct"; the outer boundary of "affiliates", and whether "other affiliates" in Article 15, paragraph 2 applies the accounting standards for business enterprises or the expanded private fund regulatory scope, and whether small financial shareholders are included in the regulatory scope.
(2) Upgrading the Qualified Investor Regime: Differentiated Thresholds + Strengthened Look-Through Verification, and Systematization of Nominee Holding and Pooled Subscription Rules
Summary table of key provisions
Limitations of the old regime
Previously, the basic rules on qualified investors, look-through verification, and the prohibition of nominee holdings and pooled subscriptions came from the Interim Private Fund Measures, the Private Fund Regulations, the Several Provisions on Strengthening the Supervision of Private Investment Funds (CSRC Announcement [2020] No. 71), and self-regulatory documents of the Asset Management Association of China (hereinafter "AMAC"), which prohibited nominee holdings, pooled subscriptions and share splitting at the administrative regulatory and industry self-regulatory levels respectively. However, the original regime had four major shortcomings:
1. Lack of differentiated investor thresholds for high-risk products: real estate, single underlying assets, overseas assets and OTC derivatives relied only on window guidance, with no hard matching standards at the departmental rule level;
2. Loopholes in the look-through verification exemption for channel products: once an asset management product or private fund was filed, verification of underlying investors was completely exempted, with only self-regulatory inspections filling the gap;
3. Nominee holding and pooled subscription rules were fragmented, with no statutory standardized investor commitment letter; in judicial practice, distinguishing active matchmaking by managers from private nominee arrangements among investors placed a heavy burden of reasoning under the comparative negligence doctrine;
4. The qualified investor verification obligation was only an industry self-regulatory requirement, not elevated to a departmental rule, and no list of objective verification materials such as bank statements, tax records, social security records and audit reports was set out; a large number of managers only collected self-declared questionnaires, and judicial standards for "reasonable and prudent review" were not uniform.
Changes under the new rules
The Draft Fundraising Measures systematically integrates scattered regulatory rules: establishing differentiated investor access thresholds for high-risk underlying assets; reconstructing a two-tier look-through verification architecture of "exemption + identification of source of funds"; setting a statutory standardized investor commitment letter; and elevating the objective due diligence obligation for qualified investors from industry self-regulation to a departmental rule, which will have a profound impact on subsequent litigation proof, fault determination and comparative negligence.
1. Tiered and differentiated qualified investor standards
Basic standards: individual investors must have at least 2 years of investment experience, family financial assets of not less than RMB 5 million / financial net assets of not less than RMB 3 million, average annual income over the past three years of not less than RMB 500,000, and paid-in capital contribution to a single fund of not less than RMB 1 million;
Enhanced requirements for high-risk underlying assets: for private funds investing in equity of real estate project companies, single underlying assets, overseas assets or OTC derivatives, natural person investors must have at least 4 years of investment experience, family financial assets of not less than RMB 10 million, and financial net assets of not less than RMB 6 million; the trigger precondition is that the corresponding underlying assets account for not less than 80% of the fund's paid-in scale.
2. Strengthening the look-through verification obligation: where funds are pooled through multiple layers of nesting to invest in private funds, managers and sales institutions shall look through to verify whether the ultimate investors are qualified investors and calculate the number of investors on a consolidated basis; only licensed asset management products may be exempted from qualified investor look-through, but the actual source of funds shall still be identified.
3. Expressly prohibiting fundraising conduct related to nominee holdings: funds shall not be raised from investors who hold on behalf of others, and pooling funds to meet the qualified investor threshold is prohibited.
4. Statutory mandatory investor commitment letter: before signing the fund contract, investors must sign a standardized commitment letter undertaking that the funds are their own, that there is no nominee holding, and that there is no investment of loan funds, among other matters.
Impact on dispute practice
1. Fault determination standards are further objectified. In past judicial practice, adjudication standards on the boundaries of managers' qualified investor verification obligation were inconsistent. The new rules detail the list of objective materials managers should verify: bank statements, asset certificates, tax records, social security records and audit reports. In subsequent litigation, courts may directly refer to these rules to determine whether a manager has fulfilled its reasonable review obligation; relying solely on investors' self-completed questionnaires without verifying supporting objective materials will most likely be found to constitute failure to fully perform the qualified investor verification obligation.
2. The allocation of fault in nominee holding and pooled subscription cases becomes clearer in both directions. On the one hand, managers and sales institutions may not actively matchmake nominee holdings or pooled subscriptions; on the other hand, investors who sign false commitment letters are themselves at fault, and courts may apply the comparative negligence rule accordingly to reduce the manager's corresponding liability.
3. The suitability obligation for investors in high-risk products is significantly increased. For private funds mainly investing in single underlying assets, real estate, overseas assets or OTC derivatives, managers should review higher asset scale and investment experience conditions; selling products to natural person investors who do not meet the conditions constitutes a major fundraising fault and will become a high-incidence area of suitability disputes in the future.
4. The focus of proof in litigation over nested FOFs and channel products changes. Managers cannot completely exempt themselves from the look-through verification obligation merely on the ground that the upstream product is a filed product of a licensed institution; apart from statutory exempt entities, managers should prove that they have completed the identification of the source of funds.
Issues to be observed: The objective standard for "identifying actual investors and the ultimate source of funds by reasonable and necessary means", namely whether written inquiries by managers suffice or whether bank statements and lists of contributors must be obtained, and what circumstances trigger an escalation of the manager's verification obligation; the range of comparative negligence when investors sign false standardized commitment letters, and how judicial practice distinguishes the proportion of fault between the manager's verification negligence and the investor's own falsification.
(3) Strong Supervision of Fundraising Entity Channels: Disguised Entrustment of Fundraising to Unlicensed Entities Is Strictly Prohibited, and Constraints on Group Affiliate Distribution Are Tightened
Key provisions: Articles 12, 13, 32 and 34 of the Draft Fundraising Measures: Private funds may be raised by the manager itself or by entrusting institutions that have obtained fund sales business qualifications; where a manager entrusts a sales institution to raise funds, the manager's statutory duties are not exempted by the entrusted distribution, and the manager shall sign an entrustment contract with the sales institution; where an affiliated sales institution is entrusted to raise funds, an interest-conflict isolation mechanism shall be established and special risk disclosure shall be made to investors; unlicensed institutions or individuals shall not be entrusted in disguised form to conduct fundraising through intermediary contracts or other means; and fundraising documents shall not be provided to third parties with whom there is no entrustment relationship for their use.
Practical pain point: In a large number of risk-exposure projects, the manager does not directly carry out sales work; instead, unlicensed companies under the group, employees, external intermediaries and agencies carry out roadshow solicitation in disguised form. When disputes later arise, the manager often defends itself on the ground that "the intermediary's conduct is an individual act and does not constitute the manager's fundraising conduct," making it difficult for investors to adduce evidence.
Changes under the new rules
Establish a judgment standard that substance prevails over form: the naming of a contract does not determine its legal nature, and whether conduct constitutes fundraising business is judged by actual performance; make clear that entrusting sales on a commission basis does not transfer the manager's statutory responsibilities; impose dual mandatory obligations of interest-conflict isolation and special risk disclosure on affiliated sales institutions.
Impact on dispute practice
1. Disguised entrusted fundraising is brought within the statutory assessment of violations. Even if a "Brokerage Service Agreement" or "Financial Advisory Agreement" is signed, as long as the third party substantively carries out promotion, solicitation or fundraising inducement, it constitutes disguised entrustment of an unlicensed entity to raise funds; the name of such an agreement cannot serve as a shield exempting the manager from liability. The manager should adduce evidence proving that it fulfilled its control obligations over the brokerage counterparty and expressly prohibited the third party from carrying out fundraising promotion; where the manager cannot adduce such evidence, it should bear compensation liability corresponding to its fundraising fault.
Boundary note: Not all brokerage and financial advisory cooperation constitutes illegal fundraising. Merely providing leads on potential investors, without carrying out product promotion, risk explanation, investment solicitation or subscription negotiation, is lawful investment and financing brokerage; once roadshow presentations, introduction of returns and risks, inducement to contribute capital, or assistance with risk assessment are carried out, it falls within the core fundraising business, and the entity carrying it out should possess fund sales business qualifications. At trial, evidence of actual performance (chat records, roadshow PPTs, meeting minutes, recordings) is the core object of review, and is not constrained by the title of the contract.
2. Where a licensed distribution institution is entrusted, the manager's ultimate liability is not transferred. Under Article 12, paragraph 2 of the Draft Measures for Fundraising (Consultation Draft): "Where a private fund manager entrusts a private fund sales institution to raise funds on its behalf, the duties that the private fund manager should bear according to law are not exempted by reason of the entrustment." Even if the manager fully entrusts an external distribution institution with fund sales qualifications to carry out promotion and investor suitability matching, the ultimate responsibility for core fundraising obligations—such as the truthfulness of promotional materials, the completeness of risk disclosure, and substantive verification of qualified investors—remains with the private fund manager; the manager may not simply shift all fault to the distribution institution in litigation or arbitration.
3. Fundraising by affiliated sales institutions is subject to dual mandatory obligations, and failure to perform them constitutes an independent fundraising fault. Under Article 32, paragraph 2 of the Draft Measures for Fundraising (Consultation Draft), where a manager entrusts an affiliated licensed sales institution under the same actual control system to carry out fundraising, compliance cannot be directly presumed, and two obligations must be fulfilled simultaneously: first, establish a complete interest-conflict isolation mechanism; second, make special risk disclosure to investors regarding the affiliated distribution relationship between the parties. Where the manager fails to implement interest-conflict isolation or fails to complete the special disclosure, this constitutes an independent fundraising fault, on which investors may base corresponding compensation claims.
4. Expansion of evidence-collection approaches. In litigation and arbitration proceedings, investors may use brokerage agreements, financial advisory contracts, external promotional materials, WeChat group chat records, meeting minutes and presentation recordings as core evidence to prove that the manager engaged in disguised outsourcing of fundraising or illegally entrusted third parties to solicit subscriptions.
Issues to be observed: the boundary of the manager's "control obligation" over intermediaries; where the manager has expressly prohibited solicitation and promotion in a written brokerage agreement but the intermediary privately carries out fundraising in violation, how the degree of the manager's fault should be assessed.
(IV) Fundraising documents, risk disclosure and special risk disclosure: refining the checklist and changing the adjudicative inertia that "a formal signature means exemption"
Key points of the provisions: Articles 14, 20 to 22 and 26 of the Draft Measures for Fundraising (Consultation Draft): make clear that fundraising documents should include the prospectus, risk disclosure statement, investor commitment letter, fund contract and other documents; promotional materials should include general content such as basic information on the manager and the fund, key personnel, subscription arrangements, risks, returns and distribution, risk rating and standards, and a contract summary, and should be supplemented with investment strategies for securities-type funds, exit arrangements for equity/venture capital-type funds, and investment paths for fund-of-funds, among other specific matters; the risk disclosure statement should include: the risk of bearing investment losses oneself, suitability matching, the fact that past performance does not predict the future, liquidity risk, the effect of signature confirmation and other content; for eight major circumstances—single underlying target, related-party transactions, non-direct investment in the underlying target, main investment in overseas assets, main investment in OTC derivatives and liquidity-restricted assets, complex structures such as tiered leverage, the affiliated relationship between the manager and the sales institution, and major conflicts of interest in the fund—special risk disclosure must be made, investors must be reminded to read it, and investors must sign item by item to confirm; where promotional materials are inconsistent with the fund contract, the manager must point out each inconsistency and the investor must sign item by item to confirm.
Past judicial practice
In many cases, when managers claim they have completed all risk-disclosure obligations, they submit only the risk disclosure statement already signed by the investor, and some adjudications mechanically find that the manager fulfilled its seller's due diligence obligation based on "having signed," ignoring whether the risk disclosure statement actually warned of the product's specific major risks.
Impact on dispute practice
1. Risk disclosure is upgraded from "signing a generic template" to "item-by-item disclosure of product-specific risks": merely signing a generic-template risk disclosure statement, without special warning of the eight major categories of special risks and without item-by-item signatures, will in future make it difficult to be found to have discharged the burden of proof that "suitability obligations have been fulfilled." Even if the investor has signed, the manager's fault is not completely exempted.
2. The rule for handling conflicts between promotional materials and the fund contract is clarified: where there are major discrepancies between promotional PPTs, roadshow materials and the formal fund contract (for example, expected returns, exit arrangements, underlying targets), the manager bears the obligation to give item-by-item warnings and the investor to give item-by-item confirmation; where this procedure is not followed, false statements in roadshow promotion can be directly attributed to the manager.
3. The evidentiary value of promotional materials from actual controllers and related parties increases: where external roadshow materials of the actual-controller group constitute disguised fundraising conduct, such promotional materials can serve as core evidence proving false advertising and misleading statements.
(V) Clarifying the negative list of fundraising conduct: listing eight prohibited acts and adding three regulatory red lines
Key points of the provisions: Article 15 of the Draft Measures for Fundraising (Consultation Draft) establishes a negative list for the entire private fund fundraising process, specifying eight prohibited fundraising acts for managers, sales institutions and practitioners. Compared with the old rules, three major regulatory red lines are added: raising funds from investors for whom others hold on trust, promoting subscriptions in the name of the custodian, and establishing or disguisedly establishing subsidiaries or branches for fundraising purposes; at the same time, borderline expressions such as "expected rate of return" are expressly brought within the prohibition of principal and return guarantees.
Past judicial practice
Under the old rule system, fundraising prohibition rules were relatively scattered, mostly relying on principled self-regulatory constraints and lacking explicit enumeration at the level of departmental rules. For a long time in practice, many regulatory grey areas existed: institutions commonly used "expected return" expressions to engage in borderline principal-and-return-guarantee promotion; promotional materials borrowed the custodian's brand to imply investment safety; actual-controller groups set up shell companies outside the group specifically to solicit clients and raise funds and evade regulatory liability; managers acquiesced in or even actively raised funds from nominee and pooled-order investors. At the judicial level, adjudicative standards varied, and the cost for investors to adduce evidence and reasoning regarding borderline promotion, custodian endorsement and off-balance-sheet fundraising was extremely high.
Changes under the new rules
The Draft Measures for Fundraising (Consultation Draft) codifies and lists all high-frequency industry chaos, while adding several highly targeted circumstances to close past regulatory loopholes. First, it expressly prohibits raising funds from nominee investors, forming a two-way closed-loop constraint together with the investor's no-nominee commitment letter; second, it strictly prohibits using the custodian's name for promotional credit enhancement, stripping the custodian institution of its "implicit endorsement function"; third, it prohibits establishing shell entities for fundraising purposes, cutting off the group's off-balance-sheet grey fundraising channels. In addition, for the most frequently occurring red line in practice—"promising principal and return guarantees"—the enumeration of expressions such as "expected rate of return" is included, refining the determination of principal and return guarantees and closing the borderline space for return-type promotion.
Impact on dispute practice
1. Types of fundraising fault are clear, and the basis for pursuing liability is clear. The statutory negative list established by Article 15 will become the core normative basis for determining fundraising fault; many high-frequency industry chaos practices obtain a basis for claims at the level of departmental rules, facilitating evidence adduction by parties and filling in the reasoning support for joint tort in off-balance-sheet disguised fundraising. Of course, whether civil breach of contract or tort is ultimately constituted, and the specific form of liability and scope of compensation, still require determination by the court after strict review.
2. Reasoning in nominee and pooled-order disputes becomes clearer. The rules expressly prohibit raising funds from nominee investors, combined with the investor's no-nominee commitment letter. Where the manager actively arranges nominee holdings or pooled orders, this directly constitutes a violation of this article; if the nominee holding is merely private among investors and the manager has fulfilled its verification and warning obligations, contributory negligence may apply to reduce the manager's liability.
3. The standard for determining principal-and-return-guarantee promotion is further clarified. Expressions such as "expected rate of return" and "high returns" are brought within the scope of regulation, and roadshow PPTs, WeChat group records and promotional materials can be directly used as evidence; objectively reviewing historical performance does not of course constitute a return promise.
4. Using custody as a safety endorsement is directly regulated. Using the custodian institution's name in promotional materials or roadshows to convey principal safety or implicit guarantees can directly invoke Article 15 to find a violation; merely objectively disclosing the custodian institution's name without implying safety does not constitute a violation. The relevant promotional materials can serve as direct evidence of civil misleading statements.
5. Closing the path of using shell companies to evade liability for off-balance-sheet fundraising. Where an actual-controller group specifically establishes shell subsidiaries or branches for roadshow solicitation, even if the signing is completed by a registered manager, this falls within the regulation of this article. The shell entity's business registration materials, business documents and job responsibilities can be used to prove subjective fault in splitting fundraising functions and evading regulation; combined with paragraph 2, actual controllers and affiliated shell companies can be brought within the assessment of joint tort. If a subsidiary simultaneously carries out diversified industrial and equity investment businesses, a violation cannot be found merely based on the entity's existence; a comprehensive judgment based on the substance of the business is required.
6. Reinforcing the basis for joint tort claims regarding off-balance-sheet fundraising by actual controllers and related parties (as already explained in the preceding content of this subsection, no further elaboration).
Issues to be observed: the boundary for determining principal-and-return-guarantee promotion—the dividing line between objective display of historical performance, performance attribution and internal institutional performance estimates, on the one hand, and prohibited promotion such as "expected rate of return," on the other; the boundary of custodian-related promotional wording—how to distinguish "objectively disclosing the custodian entity's information" from "using the custodian's name to imply principal safety and risk guarantees"; the standard for judging the purpose of establishing a shell entity—whether a subsidiary or branch is "established specifically for fundraising purposes" is judged by the subjective purpose at the time of establishment or by a comprehensive piercing judgment based on subsequent actual operations, personnel and revenue, and how to assess situations of business transformation after establishment.
(VI) Statutory timing of fundraising: prohibiting collection of subscription funds before signing
Key points of the provision: Article 26 of the Draft Measures for Public Solicitation (《募集办法征求意见稿》) establishes the order of the statutory solicitation process: complete the investor suitability assessment and qualified investor confirmation → carry out general and special risk disclosure → sign the fund contract → only then may investment funds be collected; it is strictly prohibited to collect subscription funds from investors before the fund contract is signed. Violation of this article constitutes a procedural violation under Article 41 and may independently give rise to administrative penalties.
Past judicial practice
Previously, only the self-regulatory rules of the Asset Management Association of China (中基协) set advisory requirements for the solicitation process, and these had not been elevated to the level of departmental rules. In practice, the operation of "paying in first, then subsequently supplementing the fund contract, backdating the risk disclosure statement, and retroactively conducting the risk assessment" often occurred. Judicial adjudication standards diverged: some judgments held that where the full set of documents was subsequently supplemented, the defect was merely a procedural issue and did not support the investor's claim for compensation on that basis; other judgments held that because risk disclosure and suitability assessment occurred after payment, the investor was not fully informed before making the investment decision, and on that basis found that the manager was at fault on suitability. Under the old rule framework, such conduct could only result in association self-regulatory sanctions, lacked an independent basis for punishment at the departmental rule level, and in civil litigation could only serve as auxiliary fact, making it difficult to use alone as the normative basis for finding a major violation.
Changes under the new rules
Article 26 elevates the timing of solicitation to a mandatory obligation under departmental rules, expressly requiring compliance with the complete sequence of "assessment and due diligence—risk disclosure—signing the fund contract—collecting subscription funds," and prohibiting the collection of investment funds before signing; violation of this article is classified as a procedural violation under Article 41, and the regulatory authority may independently impose warnings and fines, rather than merely self-regulatory constraints.
Impact on disputed practice
1. Collecting funds first and supplementing the contract later is no longer merely a self-regulatory defect; it is a statutory procedural violation; in litigation and arbitration, the fact that payment occurred earlier than the signing of the fund contract may serve as important evidence for comprehensively determining that the manager's solicitation process had major defects.
2. Even if the full set of materials—dual recording, asset verification, and risk disclosure—is subsequently completed, the inverted solicitation sequence itself still constitutes procedural fault. Of course, procedural illegality does not directly equal tort compensation; the court must comprehensively determine fault and exercise discretion over the proportion of liability in light of the degree of match between the investor's risk profile, the investor's subjective understanding, and the causal relationship with the loss.
3. The burden of proof shifts toward the manager. The manager should prove that the solicitation process complied with the statutory sequence; if payment occurred earlier than signing and the manager cannot provide a reasonable explanation for the process, it will bear an adverse presumption of fact.
Issue to be observed: where the manager has procedural violations such as collecting funds first and supplementing the contract later, but subsequently completes all solicitation procedures in full, how the weight of fault of such procedural defects should be determined in civil cases.
(7) Implementation of the dedicated fundraising settlement account system, closed-loop supervision of funds, and its profound impact on disputes involving misappropriation of funds
Key points of the provision: Articles 27 and 28 of the Draft Measures for Public Solicitation (《募集办法征求意见稿》) provide that a dedicated fundraising settlement account shall be opened for solicitation, and the account name shall reflect the product and the words "dedicated fundraising settlement account"; the collection of fundraising funds, transfer of shares, distribution of returns, redemption, and liquidation distribution shall all be completed through that dedicated account; funds in the dedicated account are independent of the inherent property of the manager and the sales institution; the funds in the dedicated account shall be supervised by licensed banks and securities companies as fundraising settlement fund supervision institutions, and a reconciliation mechanism shall be established.
Clarification of boundaries: a fundraising settlement fund supervision institution (licensed bank or securities firm) is not equivalent to a fund custodian. The statutory scope of supervision of the supervision institution is limited to reconciliation supervision of funds in the fundraising settlement dedicated account during the stages of subscription collection, redemption, distribution, and liquidation; it does not cover outward investment after the completion of fundraising or the use of post-investment funds, and it does not bear supervision obligations for the safety of underlying investment funds. Therefore, even if the supervision institution is defective in performing its duties, the scope of its civil liability is in principle limited to the fundraising collection stage and cannot be indefinitely expanded to all investment losses. This boundary will be a key issue of dispute in future judicial cases.
Past judicial practice
Previously, the AMAC's Measures for the Administration of Fundraising Conduct (《募集行为管理办法》) already set requirements for dedicated fundraising settlement fund accounts, but those rules were only industry self-regulatory rules, not departmental rules, and their level of authority was limited. In practice, a large number of partnership-type and group-channel private funds circumvented the dedicated account requirement on the ground that "partnership capital increase is not fundraising"; the old rules lacked direct administrative penalties and lacked mandatory detailed requirements for account naming and full-process closed-loop transfers. In many risk cases, fundraising funds went directly into the manager's general corporate account or the account of an affiliated enterprise controlled by the actual controller, and commingling and misappropriation of funds occurred frequently; in subsequent investor litigation, evidence of fund flows was scattered, making it difficult to distinguish fundraising funds from the manager's own funds, and the cost of proving commingling and misappropriation was extremely high.
Impact on disputed practice
1. Elevating the dedicated account obligation from self-regulation to departmental rules helps to ascertain and find commingling and misappropriation of funds. Under the logic of the new rules, funds at the fundraising stage should circulate in a closed loop through the dedicated fundraising settlement account; if funds do not enter the statutory dedicated fundraising settlement account and are directly transferred to ordinary accounts or accounts of affiliated parties controlled by the actual controller, this may serve as preliminary evidence of fund violations by the manager and the actual controller, reducing the investor's burden of proof.
2. Expansion of channels for obtaining evidence. Fundraising settlement fund supervision institutions (banks and securities firms) have obligations to reconcile accounts and retain transaction records; in subsequent disputes, investors may apply to the court for investigation orders to obtain the full set of account statements and reconciliation records of the dedicated account, thereby securing a complete evidence chain of fund transfers and misappropriation.
3. Strengthening the reasoning basis for adjudicating property independence. Property in the dedicated fundraising settlement account is legally independent of the manager's inherent property; if the manager or actual controller misappropriates dedicated account funds for group use, this can strengthen arguments in civil litigation for "commingling of property, piercing the limited liability, and joint and several liability of the actual controller."
4. Enhancing the effectiveness of enforcement. Funds in the dedicated account are themselves fund property and not the manager's inherent property; in enforcement proceedings, this helps distinguish fund property from the manager's own property and prevents ordinary creditors of the manager from erroneously freezing fund fundraising proceeds.
Issues to be observed: the retroactive effect and transitional boundary of the dedicated fundraising settlement account rules; the draft in principle applies only to fundraising conduct newly occurring after the implementation of the new rules; for existing products whose fundraising was completed before implementation, whether a dedicated fundraising settlement account needs to be opened retroactively, and whether civil litigation will directly apply the new rules' fault evaluation standards to fund transfer conduct during the transition period; the boundary of civil liability of fundraising settlement fund supervision institutions (banks and securities firms)—whether a supervision institution that fails to perform its reconciliation supervision obligation bears supplementary compensation liability for investor losses, and how the scope of liability is defined; whether capital increases of partnership-type funds, transfer of shares, and continued fundraising of old funds are all brought within the scope of application of the dedicated fundraising settlement account.
(8) Substantial increase in record-keeping and archive preservation obligations: dual recording, follow-up visits, cooling-off period, 20-year archive retention, and clear rules for internet fundraising
Key points of the provision: Articles 29, 35, and 36 of the Draft Measures for Public Solicitation (《募集办法征求意见稿》): when raising funds from natural person investors, audio and video recording, follow-up confirmation, and an investment cooling-off period are in principle required; however, for specific natural person investors meeting the conditions of Article 7, after special risk disclosure and signed confirmation, the above arrangements may be exempted; fundraising through self-operated internet platforms requires whole-process recording, record-keeping, and full traceability; the full set of investor due diligence materials, investor identity materials, transaction records, and other relevant materials shall be retained for at least 20 years from the date of completion of fund liquidation.
Limitations of the old system
Dual recording, cooling-off periods, and follow-up confirmation were only self-regulatory rules of the AMAC and had not been elevated to departmental rules; the scope of exemption was limited to professional investment institutions, lacking differentiated exemption rules for high-net-worth natural person investors, and implementation standards varied in practice. The self-regulatory archive retention requirement was to retain records for no less than 10 years after fund liquidation, a period that was too short to match the characteristics of delayed exposure of private fund risks. Internet fundraising rules were vague, did not legally define "self-operated internet platform," the boundary between self-operated platforms and third-party traffic platforms was unclear, and online promotion and contracting lacked mandatory full-process traceable record-keeping requirements.
Past judicial practice
In judicial adjudication, dual recording, follow-up visits, and business archives are the core evidence for a manager to prove performance of suitability obligations. In many disputes, managers submitted only paper materials signed by investors, while audio and video recordings of dual recording and follow-up visits were missing or damaged, and adjudicating bodies could only infer facts from written documents, making the cost of proof and reasoning regarding substantive performance of risk disclosure relatively high. Loss of archives and audio-video recordings generally triggered only self-regulatory sanctions and lacked a basis for punishment at the rule level; adjudication standards diverged on how much fault should be presumed from missing archives.
Impact on disputed practice
1. The burden of proof further shifts toward the manager. In suitability disputes, where the manager claims to have performed risk disclosure and suitability matching obligations, it must submit complete dual recording, follow-up visit, questionnaire, and asset verification archives; if archives are missing, recordings lost, or follow-up records blank, the court will most likely directly find that the manager has failed to meet its burden of proof and should bear fault-based compensation liability.
2. Extending the retention period facilitates rights remedies. The 20-year archive retention period is significantly longer than under the old rules; even if the fund was liquidated many years ago, investors can still obtain the full set of fundraising materials from that year, providing an evidentiary basis for subsequent accountability.
3. Clearer evidence rules for internet online fundraising cases. Articles 18, 35, and 44 jointly clarify internet fundraising rules—a self-operated internet platform is a website, mobile internet application, mini-program, or self-media that the manager or sales institution can fully operate independently and over which it enjoys complete data authority; third-party traffic platforms, external official accounts, and external mini-programs are not "self-operated internet platforms" and may not be used to promote private funds to specific targets. Where a manager conducts promotion and contracting through its self-operated mini-program or official account, backend access, form-filling, and pop-up confirmation records are statutory record-keeping evidence; if the platform deletes or tampers with fundraising-related records without authorization, the court may make an adverse factual presumption against the manager.
(9) Fundraising compliance internal control, personnel assessment, and independence of compliance and risk control positions
Key points of the provision: Articles 30 and 31 of the Draft Measures for Public Solicitation (《募集办法征求意见稿》): the manager shall establish fundraising compliance risk control and financial management systems for investor due diligence, archive preservation, and fund transfers, and designate a dedicated senior manager to be responsible; the assessment mechanism for fundraising practitioners shall not use sales performance as the sole assessment and reward indicator, and investor complaints, misleading sales, and fundraising violations shall be incorporated into the assessment system; an independent compliance and risk control position shall be established to conduct compliance review of fundraising business, promotional materials, and fundraising documents, issue written review opinions, and keep them on file; compliance and risk control personnel may not concurrently serve as senior managers of fundraising business or fundraising sales personnel, so as to ensure the independence of risk control performance.
Essence of the system: the rules no longer only regulate "external fundraising conduct" but also internally reinforce the manager's internal governance obligations, preventing misleading sales and illegal fundraising from three sources: organizational structure, assessment incentives, and position separation.
Past judicial practice
1. In the past, courts and arbitration institutions reviewing managers' diligence and due care mostly focused on external fundraising conduct (risk disclosure, qualified investor verification) and rarely conducted deep penetrating review of internal governance elements such as the manager's internal assessment mechanism, risk control position setup, and written risk control records for fundraising documents.
2. In a small number of cases, where the manager submits incomplete risk-control review working papers that were prepared after the fact, the judicial authorities can only exercise discretion to determine fault in light of the facts of the whole case; because there is no clear standard at the level of departmental rules as to "what degree of internal-control deficiency can give rise to a presumption of offering fault", the adjudicative standards of different adjudicative bodies diverge.
3. Non-compliant offerings caused by internal-control failure have in the past mostly been handled by self-regulatory sanctions; there are relatively few cases in which directors, supervisors and senior management bear civil fault liability for deficiencies in performing their duties in respect of offering compliance and internal control, and the adjudicative standards for finding senior management negligent in performing their duties are relatively vague.
Practical impact of the dispute
1. An institution's internal-control system becomes important indirect evidence of diligence and due care. In private fund redemption dispute litigation and arbitration, the manager's offering compliance internal-control system, assessment and incentive mechanism, and documented risk-control review of offering documents are key indirect evidence by which the adjudicative body assesses whether the manager has fulfilled the obligations of "seller's due care and diligence".
2. Systemic internal-control deficiency can give rise to an inference of offering fault. If the manager makes fundraising scale the sole assessment criterion for sales personnel, the promotional materials lack documented written risk-control review, and the risk-control position is conflated with the sales business; even if the investor has signed a risk disclosure statement, the adjudicative body may still, on the basis of systemic defects in the internal-control mechanism, find that the manager was at fault in the offering stage and order it to bear compensation liability. Conversely, if the manager can submit complete institutional texts, assessment documents and risk-control review working papers, these can serve as defence evidence to prove that a fundraising risk prevention and control system has been established at the institutional level, reducing the degree of its own fault.
3. This transmits to the personal liability risk of senior management in core positions. Systemic failure of the offering compliance system is no longer attributed only to the institution. Internal-control failure reflects defects in senior management's performance of duties; fund directors, supervisors and senior management will face civil fault liability for inadequate performance of duties, and at the same time face the risk of concurrent administrative regulatory liability.
Issues to be observed: the applicable conditions for civil fault liability of directors, supervisors and senior management where the internal-control system fails, how to distinguish negligence in performing duties of a position from overall institutional risk, and the evidentiary standard for senior management's defence of performance of duties.
(10) Legal liability system: connection between administrative liability and civil liability, with actual controllers and related parties directly included as targets of punishment
Key points of the provisions: Articles 37 (investigation power), 38 (administrative regulatory measures), 39 and 40 (referral to the penalty provisions of the Private Investment Regulations), 41 (new procedural penalty provisions created by these Measures), and 42 (market ban, referral to criminal authorities) of the Draft Measures for Public Comment on Fundraising.
Limitations of the old regime
1. Pursuing liability against actual controllers and related parties was subject to preconditions and could not achieve independent pursuit of liability. Under the old rules, offering violations by managers' shareholders, actual controllers and related parties were mostly scattered across the CSRC's Several Provisions on Strengthening the Supervision of Private Investment Funds (CSRC Announcement [2020] No. 71, a departmental normative document) and AMAC self-regulatory documents; although in principle they prohibited actual controllers and related parties from carrying out fundraising in disguised form, administrative penalties were generally premised on the existence of illegality on the part of the manager itself, making it difficult to impose administrative penalties directly on actual controllers and related parties, with mostly only self-regulatory measures available, so there was an institutional shortcoming in administrative accountability.
2. There was a lack of dedicated, independent administrative penalty provisions for procedural offering violations. Previously, a large number of procedural defects in offerings, such as collecting payment before signing contracts, loss of archives, and failure to open a dedicated fundraising settlement account, were mainly governed by the self-regulatory rules of the Asset Management Association of China; at the level of administrative regulations and departmental rules, no independent penalty provisions specifically targeting procedural violations in the offering stage were established. In practice, the administrative cost of procedural violations was relatively low. Substantive offering violations mainly invoked the general penalty provisions of the Regulations on the Supervision and Administration of Private Investment Funds, without distinguishing the special constituent elements of the offering scenario, so the penalty provisions were insufficiently tailored.
3. The scope of administrative investigation powers did not match the scope of subjects held accountable. The original regulatory investigation powers were mainly directed at registered private fund managers and sales institutions; for unregistered actual-controller-related entities without licensed qualifications, there was no clear regulatory basis for directly carrying out supervisory investigations and requiring the submission of materials, which made it difficult to obtain evidence on off-balance-sheet fundraising leads; many violations could only be dealt with after the fact, and process-based supervision was difficult to carry out.
Past judicial practice
Under the old rules, procedural defects in offerings fell within the scope of self-regulatory/administrative compliance, and no normative connection was established at the regulatory level between procedural violations and the assessment of the "seller's due care" obligation. The judiciary could only rely on academic doctrine and case-by-case reasoning, lacking targeted and specific laws and regulations as support for reasoning; adjudicative standards diverged as to whether, and to what extent, facts of procedural violations could prove civil fault on the part of the manager.
Changes under the new regime
1. The subjects to which regulatory investigation powers apply are broadened: Article 37 directly authorises regulatory authorities to carry out supervisory investigations of managers' shareholders, partners, actual controllers and related parties, and such subjects have a statutory obligation to cooperate with investigations and submit materials, resolving the pain point of difficulty in obtaining evidence from off-balance-sheet related entities.
2. Rules for independent accountability of actual controllers and related parties are established: Articles 38 to 42 of the Draft Measures for Public Comment on Fundraising set up a complete chain of legal liability: where a manager's shareholders, partners, actual controllers or related parties carry out prohibited fundraising acts, the regulatory authority may directly order correction, issue warning letters or conduct regulatory talks; where shareholders, partners or actual controllers violate Article 15, penalties are imposed by reference to Article 45 of the Private Investment Regulations pursuant to Article 40; where other related parties violate Article 15, they are dealt with pursuant to Article 41, paragraph 1; where circumstances are serious, responsible persons are subject to a market ban; where a crime is suspected, the matter is referred to the judicial authorities in accordance with law.
3. Dedicated procedural penalty provisions for the fundraising scenario are newly created (Article 41), bringing procedural offering violations such as loss of archives, failure to open a dedicated fundraising settlement account, and collecting payment before signing contracts within the scope of independent administrative penalties, so that they no longer rely solely on self-regulatory sanctions, raising the cost of procedural violations.
4. The chain of liability is fully connected: Articles 38 to 42 achieve a full closed loop of "investigation → regulatory measures → administrative penalty → market ban → referral to criminal authorities".
Practical impact of the dispute
1. Connection of civil and administrative evidence strengthens the parties' ability to adduce evidence. Administrative regulatory warning letters and administrative penalty decisions are both official documentary evidence, consistent with the spirit of State Council Office Letter No. 54 on strengthening the connection between administrative supervision and civil litigation, and can be used in civil litigation to corroborate the existence of fault in the offering stage. However, their probative force differs: a warning letter only reflects the existence of a violation, whereas an administrative penalty decision has gone through case filing and defence procedures and has higher probative force; of course, the aforementioned administrative documents can only prove facts of administrative violation and cannot directly give rise to a presumption of full civil compensation, as the elements of tort still require independent examination in civil proceedings.
2. Procedural violations give rise to dual civil and administrative accountability. After the new rules formally take effect, a large number of procedural defects (loss of archives, failure to open a dedicated fundraising settlement account, collecting payment before signing contracts) will not only face self-regulatory sanctions but will also trigger independent administrative penalties; at the same time, the facts of such procedural violations can become important evidence in civil cases proving defects in the manager's "seller's due care". Overall, the facts of procedural offering violations will serve as the normative basis for assessing whether the manager has fulfilled "seller's due care", building an institutional bridge from administrative compliance obligations to the assessment of civil fault and unifying the basis for adjudicative reasoning.
3. Investor rights-protection paths are diversified. Investors may combine three paths: "civil litigation/arbitration + administrative complaint and investigation for evidence + criminal report where criminal conditions are met"; for managers and actual-controller groups, compliance risks in the offering stage are superimposed with multiple consequences of civil compensation, administrative fines and confiscation, market bans and criminal accountability.
02. Five major trends in future adjudication of private fund fundraising disputes
Based on recent private fund dispute precedents and regulatory penalty cases from courts in Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen and other places, and the institutional orientation of the Draft Measures for Public Comment on Fundraising, future litigation and arbitration relating to private fund fundraising may show five major adjudicative trends:
Trend 1: The subjects held accountable will further expand, from "manager + distribution institution" to actual controllers, related groups, unlicensed intermediary promoters, etc.
In past cases, defendants were mainly limited to managers and contracting distribution institutions; after the new rules take effect, if actual-controller groups, affiliated companies or unlicensed intermediaries substantively carry out promotion, principal-guarantee commitments or matchmaking for nominee holdings, investors may on that basis list them together as defendants in tort actions.
Reference precedent: (2021) Hu 74 Min Zhong No. 375 (Jupai case) | One of the Top Ten Typical Cases of Financial and Commercial Adjudication of Shanghai Courts in 2021.
Facts: The nominal manager of the private fund at issue was Juzhou Asset Management, and the Jupai Group was the actual controller of Juzhou Asset Management. All core fundraising work for the fund's products, including roadshows, investor negotiations and meetings, and issuance of confirmation letters of funds received, was carried out by the Jupai Group; Juzhou Asset Management was only responsible for procedural matters such as signing fund contracts and handling AMAC filing, and did not substantively carry out fundraising work. The underlying assets were subsequently misappropriated, and the investors suffered major principal losses and sued Juzhou Asset Management and the Jupai Group.
Adjudication gist: The actual-controller group substantively undertook core fundraising obligations of the private fund manager, such as fundraising promotion and fund confirmation, and constituted joint tortfeasors and substantive co-trustees with the nominal manager; the actual controller was ordered to bear full joint and several liability for all of the investors' principal and loss of funds occupation.
Implication: The Draft Measures for Public Comment on Fundraising elevate this type of judicial practice experience into clear rules at the level of departmental rules, and subsequent adjudicative reasoning in similar cases will be more fully developed.
Trend 2: An investor's "signature" is no longer a universal ground for exempting the manager from liability; individualised risk disclosure and item-by-item confirmation of special risks become the core criterion for judging suitability obligations
Adjudicative bodies will distinguish two types of documents: general template risk disclosure statements and special risk disclosures targeting major risks specific to the product. If only a general template is signed, but no special disclosure is made of major risks such as a single underlying asset, related-party transactions, high leverage or overseas investment, the manager will still be found to have failed its suitability obligations.
Reference precedent: Case 5 of the White Paper on the Adjudication of Cases Involving Financial Institutions' Suitability Obligations by the People's Court of Chaoyang District, Beijing (2021–2025)
Facts: The manager provided a standard-form risk disclosure statement listing only the general risks common to private funds, but the underlying asset of the product was non-standard debt highly dependent on repayment by a single debtor, and the manager did not make special disclosure of this specific concentrated-repayment risk; after the investor signed, the underlying debtor defaulted and the principal was lost.
Adjudication gist: Standard-form, general template risk disclosure cannot replace the obligation to specifically explain major risks specific to the product at issue; where the manager cannot prove that it separately disclosed the exclusive major risks, it should bear compensation liability corresponding to the defect in its suitability obligations; the investor's signature only indicates that the general terms were read and cannot give rise to a presumption of full understanding of the product's unique major risks.
Implication: Articles 21 to 22 of the Draft Measures for Public Comment on Fundraising elevate special risk disclosure of eight major categories of major special risks and item-by-item signature confirmation by investors into mandatory statutory obligations, further narrowing the room for managers to defend on the basis of general template signatures alone.
Trend 3: The defensive effect of disguised intermediation and outsourced fundraising is substantially weakened; fundraising qualification obligations cannot be circumvented through financial advisory or intermediation agreements
Substantively carrying out solicitation and client recruitment, regardless of whether the contract is named an intermediation or financial advisory agreement, will be deemed fundraising activity; the manager cannot be fully exempted on the ground that "a third-party individual/intermediary publicized on its own," as the manager bears a control obligation over external fundraising publicity.
Reference case: Hengqin Juncheng Private Fund Management Co., Ltd. | AMAC Disciplinary Decision [2025] No. 365
Facts: Hengqin Juncheng signed a nominal "Financial Advisory Service Agreement" with Hangzhou Hanbang Consulting Co. In actual performance, although Hengqin Juncheng provided some investor suitability materials, Hangzhou Hanbang participated in front-end fundraising work such as fund promotion and sales. Hengqin Juncheng argued that the cooperation at issue was merely financial advisory services, and that promotion, suitability management and other fundraising work were all completed independently by itself.
Gist of the sanction: Institutions or individuals such as Hangzhou Hanbang actually participated in fund sales work; the violation fact was established that the manager entrusted institutions or individuals without fund sales qualifications to engage in fundraising activities, and the Association imposed on it the disciplinary sanction of suspending acceptance of private fund product filings for twelve months.
Implication: Managers often use financial advisory and intermediation agreements as tools to isolate liability. The Draft Measures for Fundraising explicitly prohibit disguised entrustment of unqualified entities to carry out fundraising, and managers bear a control obligation over external promotion and publicity; the effectiveness of defending solely by relying on the name of an agreement is substantially weakened.
Trend 4: Determination of fund flows is further objectified; fund transfers that do not enter the dedicated fundraising settlement account become important prima facie evidence for inferring misappropriation and commingling of assets
Investors need not fully prove the final destination of every single fund transfer; as long as they prove that the raised funds did not enter the statutory dedicated fundraising settlement account and flowed directly into the manager's general account or the accounts of actually controlled affiliated enterprises, they have completed their prima facie burden of proof, and the burden shifts to the manager and actual controller to prove that the fund flows have a lawful contractual basis.
Reference precedent: Cao Mouhong and other investors v. Fund Company A and Fund Company B, financial entrusted wealth management contract dispute | Guangdong High People's Court 2024 Typical Case No. 9 on Capital Market Investor Protection
Facts: Investors purchased a private investment fund; the nominal manager of the fund was Fund Company A, and the actual controller was Fund Company B. The fund contract stipulated that the fund's investment scope was to subscribe for partnership shares of a certain partnership enterprise, ultimately for use in a certain expressway northern section construction project. Fund Company A and Fund Company B breached the contract and misappropriated fund money, causing losses to investors. Cao Mouhong and others sued in court, requesting an order that Fund Company A and Fund Company B pay each investor the investment principal and returns. Upon investigation and evidence collection by the people's court, the fund money at issue was transferred through the account of a certain partnership enterprise into affiliated enterprises of Fund Company A and Fund Company B, and was not used for the agreed investment project.
Gist of the judgment: Private fund investors do not participate in fund operations and face inherent evidentiary obstacles regarding the destination of funds; the actual controller used its controlled nominal manager to isolate legal liability and conceal the fact of transferring funds to affiliated companies. The second-instance court, in light of suspicious equity changes, ex officio obtained bank statements to reinforce the investors' evidentiary capacity, ascertained that the raised funds were not invested in the agreed target but were misappropriated to affiliated companies, and that both the nominal manager and the actual controller obtained benefits, and held that such conduct simultaneously violated the contract and the manager's statutory duty of loyalty.
Implication: This case, under the old rules, relied on the court's ex officio obtaining of bank statements to achieve factual ascertainment. The Draft Measures for Fundraising elevates the dedicated fundraising settlement account to a statutory obligation expressly set out in departmental rules. After formal implementation, once investors make a prima facie showing that funds did not enter the dedicated fundraising settlement account, they may be deemed to have completed their prima facie burden of proof, and the burden shifts to the manager and actual controller, further alleviating investors' practical difficulties of information asymmetry and difficult evidence collection. Of course, failure to enter the dedicated fundraising settlement account is only prima facie evidence; it is not directly equivalent to misappropriation of funds, nor does it necessarily lead to a judgment of full compensation. Managers may rebut it by submitting complete underlying transaction materials, investment decision documents and payment vouchers.
Trend 5: The two-way linkage mechanism between fundraising supervision and civil litigation becomes normalized. Investor rights protection will increasingly adopt the combined strategy of "regulators fixing the facts + civil litigation for claims"
With respect to illegal promotion, nominee holding matchmaking and principal-guarantee publicity by actual controllers and related parties, investors may first submit complete leads to the local securities regulatory bureau, apply for a regulatory investigation, and obtain warning letters, investigation transcripts and penalty decisions as core official documentary evidence for subsequent civil litigation.
Reference case: 5·15 National Investor Protection Publicity Day | CIETAC: Typical Fund Arbitration Cases (VII) [1]
Facts: A private fund invested in by investors defaulted; the investors first submitted a full set of evidentiary leads to the local securities regulatory bureau; the regulator conducted an on-site inspection and issued an administrative regulatory warning letter, ascertaining that the manager and actual controller had multiple fundraising violations: the actual controller substantively participated in product promotion, risk disclosure was insufficient, and there were defects in qualified investor verification. The investors subsequently commenced arbitration and submitted the warning letter and regulatory investigation transcripts as core evidence.
Gist of the award: The arbitral tribunal ascertained facts such as the fundraising time point, underlying assets and actual manager of the fund at issue, which were highly correlated with and mutually corroborated the violations of the respondent stated in the regulatory documents. Although the regulatory documents did not directly evaluate the fund in this case, combined with the claimant's other evidence, they reached a high degree of probability that the manager breached the duties of loyalty and diligence; the respondent failed to prove that the violations ascertained by the regulator were unrelated to this case.
Implication: In judicial practice, administrative documents of financial regulators often become key evidence in adjudication and have a significant impact on outcomes. Administrative Regulatory Measure Decisions and Administrative Penalty Decisions of financial regulators are increasingly used by parties as evidence to prove that financial institutions have committed violations and are at fault, and thereby to assert contractual liability (culpa in contrahendo, breach of contract or invalidity of contract) or tort liability.
03. Risk prevention and dispute response implications for various entities involved in the fundraising stage
(1) Investor perspective: updating evidence collection and litigation strategy in fundraising disputes
1. Evidence collection: key evidence is no longer limited to the fund contract
Focus on collecting: roadshow PPTs, WeChat group chat records, audio recordings of presentations by actual controllers/group personnel, intermediation and financial advisory agreements, promotional posts; focus on identifying whether actual controllers or affiliated group personnel substantively participated in promotion and principal guarantees;
Obtain: risk disclosure statements, investor commitment letters, asset proof materials, dual-recording videos, follow-up visit records; focus on checking whether special risk disclosure and item-by-item signatures were made for the eight major categories of special risks;
Fund evidence: focus on checking whether subscription funds entered the dedicated fundraising settlement account; if they were remitted directly into ordinary accounts or affiliated enterprise accounts, treat this as a key lead of illegal fund flows, and subsequently apply to the court for an investigation order to obtain dedicated account statements and the reconciliation records of the supervising institution.
2. Litigation parties: not only sue the manager, but also assess adding the actual controller, related parties and intermediary promotion entities
If the actual controlling group or affiliated companies carried out prohibited fundraising acts such as illegal participation in promotion or principal-guarantee publicity, one may, pursuant to Article 1168 of the Civil Code on joint tort and other provisions, bring a tort action in court, and assess the feasibility of bypassing the arbitration clause in the fund contract.
3. Rights protection path: make good use of administrative complaints to fix the facts of violations in the fundraising stage
Leads include but are not limited to illegal participation in promotion by actual controllers and other entities, nominee holding and pooling of orders, disguised entrustment of unqualified intermediaries for fundraising, absence of risk disclosure, and funds not entering the dedicated fundraising account; one may proactively complain and report to the regulatory authorities, apply for investigation, and obtain regulatory documents as evidence in civil litigation.
4. Focus on differentiated qualified investor rules: if a product invests in a single target, real estate or derivatives, a higher investor threshold should apply; check whether the manager has implemented higher-standard investor due diligence.
(2) Manager and sales institution perspective: compliance rectification + dispute risk prevention
1. Compliance self-inspection of fundraising entities: comprehensively review intermediation and financial advisory agreements, and prohibit substantively outsourcing solicitation and promotion to unqualified third parties; where an affiliated sales institution is entrusted with fundraising, conflict-of-interest isolation must be implemented and special risk disclosure must be made to investors.
2. Upgrading qualified investor due diligence: do not rely solely on questionnaires filled out by investors themselves; verify supporting materials such as asset proofs, bank statements, tax and social security records in accordance with the new rules; for high-risk products investing in a single target, real estate, overseas assets, etc., apply higher investment experience and asset thresholds; for nested products, the look-through verification obligation must be implemented.
3. Reconstruction of risk disclosure documents: distinguish general risk disclosure statements from the "special risk disclosure" module; separately list the eight major categories of statutory special risks, prompt investors to read them, and set up item-by-item signature confirmation; where there are material differences between promotional materials and the fund contract, they must be prompted item by item and confirmed by investors item by item; it is prohibited to make safety publicity in the name of the custodian.
4. Rectification of fundraising settlement accounts: open dedicated fundraising settlement accounts in accordance with the new rules, and strive to have fundraising, redemption and distribution of funds flow through dedicated accounts in a closed loop; sign complete supervision agreements with fundraising settlement fund supervising institutions (banks, securities firms) and implement reconciliation mechanisms; it is strictly prohibited for raised funds to enter general accounts or affiliated enterprise accounts directly.
5. Full-process record-keeping and archive management: improve dual-recording, follow-up visit and cooling-off period mechanisms for natural person investors; implement full-process traceable technical records for fundraising on internet self-operated platforms; relevant materials such as due diligence, investor identity materials and transaction records shall be kept for no less than twenty years from the date of completion of liquidation of the private fund.
6. Advance risk prevention: record-keeping in the fundraising stage is both a regulatory compliance requirement and core defense evidence in future disputes; loss of archives or absence of dual recordings will directly create a risk of losing due to failure of proof in civil litigation. In the face of regulatory inquiries, full attention should be paid, and professional assistance should be used to handle them prudently, so as to avoid adverse regulatory conclusions due to neglect or improper response, which would lead to being found liable for excessive damages in later dispute resolution.
(3) Actual controller and group company perspective: from "hiding behind the scenes" to explicit liability in the fundraising stage
One of the biggest changes in the Draft Measures for Fundraising: actual controllers, shareholders and affiliated entities are no longer outsiders to fundraising supervision.
1. Group actual controllers and senior executives should avoid illegally participating privately in product roadshows or WeChat group promotion, and should not readily make oral or WeChat commitments to investors regarding principal, repurchase or returns; the above acts are statutory prohibited fundraising acts, administratively punishable and civilly liable to be found as joint tort with joint and several liability.
2. Establish isolation walls within the group: unqualified industrial companies and consulting companies under the actual controlling group must not engage in disguised private fund solicitation or client recruitment; group entities must not be turned into substantive fundraising channels through intermediation or financial advisory contracts.
3. Full-process control of group promotional materials: group official accounts, senior executives' external statements and offline activities should avoid illegal publicity and promotion of private fund products.
4. Communication during the risk disposal stage must be prudent: after a default, when the actual controlling group steps forward to negotiate and communicate with investors, it should be cautious about issuing new principal-protection or repayment commitments, so as to prevent easily adding new independent debt joinder or joint and several liability.
Conclusion
The Draft Measures for Public Comment on Fundraising is China's first draft departmental rule specifically regulating the fundraising stage of private funds. Once formally adopted, it will not only fill the gap in specialized departmental rules for fundraising compliance supervision, but also provide more operational adjudicative coordinates for dispute resolution at the fundraising stage.
As a draft for public comment, although the application boundaries of some provisions are not yet clear and await final determination in the formal version, and also need to be fully tested in judicial practice with answers gradually provided, looking at the ten institutional reforms summarized throughout the full text, the institutional direction established by the Draft Measures for Public Comment on Fundraising is clear: compliance obligations at the fundraising stage are being comprehensively tightened, and this trend will profoundly affect the adjudicative logic of fault determination, allocation of burden of proof, and definition of responsible entities in future private fund disputes.
Fundraising has rules, and disputes have standards. The draft for public comment is an important indicator of the future formal measures. Only by studying in advance, fully understanding, and responding beforehand can one calmly respond when the rules formally take effect and resolve dispute risks before the rules are implemented.
⚠️Special note: This article is written based on the text of the draft for public comment, and the provisions may be adjusted after formal release and implementation; this article is for reference only for dispute resolution and compliance research, and does not constitute legal advice for any individual case.
Article Appendix
Questions and answers
How does the Draft Fundraising Measures expand liability for fundraising conduct to actual controllers and affiliates?
The draft brings managers' shareholders, partners, actual controllers and affiliates within regulated fundraising entities. It establishes investigation power, regulatory measures and administrative penalties without requiring the manager's own violation as a precondition. Investors may use joint tort rules to claim joint and several liability against actual controllers who lead or participate in prohibited fundraising conduct.
What are the qualified investor thresholds under the Draft Fundraising Measures for high-risk private funds?
For private funds investing in real estate project company equity, single underlying assets, overseas assets or OTC derivatives, natural person investors must have at least 4 years of investment experience, family financial assets of not less than RMB 10 million, and financial net assets of not less than RMB 6 million. The trigger precondition is that the corresponding underlying assets account for not less than 80% of the fund's paid-in scale.
What does the Draft Fundraising Measures prohibit regarding nominee holdings and pooled subscriptions?
The draft expressly prohibits raising funds from investors who hold on behalf of others and prohibits pooling funds to meet the qualified investor threshold. Before signing the fund contract, investors must sign a standardized commitment letter undertaking that funds are their own, there is no nominee holding, and no loan funds are invested. Violations may constitute fundraising fault.
What is the dedicated fundraising settlement account requirement in the Draft Fundraising Measures?
A dedicated fundraising settlement account must be opened, with the account name reflecting the product and the words 'dedicated fundraising settlement account'. Collection, transfer, distribution, redemption and liquidation must flow through that account. Funds are independent of the manager's and sales institution's inherent property and are supervised by licensed banks or securities firms through a reconciliation mechanism.
How does the Draft Fundraising Measures affect civil litigation evidence in private fund disputes?
Warning letters and administrative penalty decisions become important public documentary evidence to prove fault in fundraising. Failure to use a dedicated fundraising settlement account may serve as preliminary evidence of misappropriation, shifting the burden of proof to the manager and actual controller. Missing dual-recording or archives may lead courts to find the manager failed its burden of proof.
Laws and cases cited
Laws
- Civil Code
Regulations
- Private Fund Regulations
- Interim Measures for the Supervision and Administration of Private Investment Funds
- Measures for the Administration of Securities and Futures Investor Suitability
- Measures for the Administration of Private Investment Fund Fundraising Conduct
- Several Provisions on Strengthening the Supervision of Private Investment Funds (CSRC Announcement [2020] No. 71)
- Draft Measures for Fundraising (Consultation Draft)
- Private Investment Regulations
Judicial interpretations
- 2019 Minutes of the National Courts' Civil and Commercial Trial Work Conference
Policy documents
- State Council Office Letter No. 54
Cases
- (2021) Hu 74 Min Zhong No. 375 (Jupai case)
- Case 5 of the White Paper on the Adjudication of Cases Involving Financial Institutions' Suitability Obligations by the People's Court of Chaoyang District, Beijing (2021–2025)
- Hengqin Juncheng Private Fund Management Co., Ltd. | AMAC Disciplinary Decision [2025] No. 365
- Cao Mouhong and other investors v. Fund Company A and Fund Company B, financial entrusted wealth management contract dispute | Guangdong High People's Court 2024 Typical Case No. 9 on Capital Market Investor Protection
- 5·15 National Investor Protection Publicity Day | CIETAC: Typical Fund Arbitration Cases (VII)
References
- See the AMAC official website https://investor.amac.org.cn//community/tzzhdzthd/ylj/202207/t20220704_13904.html