Introduction
In the practice of defending smuggling cases, cases where the object of smuggling is military goods are genuinely rare. Such cases not only lack publicly available precedents and settled adjudication rules, but also, because they involve internal military management regulations that are not publicly disclosed, present numerous special challenges to fact-finding and legal application.
In a case I handled, the client was suspected of exporting military goods, with the alleged amount exceeding one million US dollars. Faced with the predicament of a "vacuum of similar cases," I grounded my defence in the rules of evidence and legal interpretation, conducting a refined defence across dimensions such as subjective knowledge, the amount of the crime, and accessory status, and ultimately secured a suspended sentence for the client. This outcome is extremely difficult to achieve in comparable cases. I now set out the process below, in the hope that practitioners and enterprises will establish the awareness and systems that "only compliance self-inspection can exempt liability."
01. Case Overview
Yi, after being demobilised from the military, engaged in the parts trade. Company A is a foreign trade enterprise that purchased parts from Yi. The investigative authorities determined that Yi, while knowing the goods were military goods and that Company A had no qualification to export military goods, still supplied them to it, constituting a joint offender in the crime of smuggling goods prohibited by the state from import and export. The alleged export amount exceeded one million US dollars, the circumstances were serious, and the statutory penalty was fixed-term imprisonment of not less than five years together with a fine.
02. Defence Difficulties
The crime of smuggling goods prohibited by the state from import and export is itself not a common charge, and cases involving the export of military goods are even rarer. When searching for similar cases, I found that whether in the People's Court Case Database or professional legal databases, there are very few precedents on military goods smuggling, and there is a lack of referable sentencing standards. This was the first barrier faced in this case.
The second barrier lies in the closed nature of the rules. Core rules such as the definition of military goods, qualification management, and export approval are largely scattered across internal military normative documents, most of which are not disclosed to the public. It was difficult for me both to obtain the normative basis in full and to cite it directly as a ground of defence; I could only work backwards from publicly available laws and regulations, industry practice, and the client's statements to infer the industry ecosystem and the boundaries of knowledge at the time, which greatly increased the difficulty of factual argumentation and legal application.
The third barrier lies in the ambiguity of characterisation. From the perspective of the level of control, military goods exports are subject to a licensing management system and in essence fall within the category of "restricted export" goods. "Restrictive" and "prohibitive" goods are, in international trade, subject to different intensities of control, yet under the current judicial interpretation, importing or exporting goods restricted by the state from import or export without a licence may nonetheless be convicted and punished as the crime of smuggling goods prohibited by the state from import and export. In this case specifically, whether the general-purpose parts involved belonged to military goods absolutely prohibited from export or to military goods whose export is merely subject to approval and licensing had no clear, publicly available catalogue providing a one-to-one correspondence.
It is against this background of lack of reference and ambiguous rules that we chose to return to the basic principles of criminal law and the principle of adjudication by evidence, breaking through layer by layer across five dimensions—subjective, objective, amount, harmfulness, and procedure—to construct a complete defence system.
03. Core Defence Approach
(1) Subjective defence: the subjective culpability of indirect intent is significantly lower than that of typical conspiratorial smuggling
In this case, Yi did not participate in Company A's false declaration for export, nor did he subjectively and actively form a clear smuggling conspiracy with Company A. Drawing on the client's professional background and cognitive process, I argued that his conduct amounted only to indirect intent of acquiescing in smuggling, with relatively low subjective culpability.
First, Yi's understanding of military goods involved industry-specific misconceptions different from those of ordinary people. According to his work experience, his criteria for judging "military goods" remained at the internal factory level rather than the military goods regulatory level, and there were cognitive limitations: he mistakenly believed that products were divided into three categories—military goods, civilian goods, and foreign trade goods—with the distinguishing criteria being whether the sales contract bore a military representative's seal, the nature of the purchasing unit, and the level of quality control. Yi had never been exposed to the sales and export process for foreign trade goods, and without verifying the attributes of the products, mistakenly believed that the parts traded were foreign trade goods rather than military goods.
Second, Yi's understanding of Company A's qualifications involved mistaken trust and misjudgment. The case spanned a long period, and in earlier years there existed the phenomenon of private enterprises affiliating with or borrowing the qualifications of military enterprises. Company A had business dealings with a military factory and explicitly required the purchase of goods bearing markings; the above information was sufficient to give Yi a mistaken belief that "Company A was an affiliate or affiliated unit of a qualified enterprise." Although he had asked about qualifications, he did not request to see the certificates and received no clear answer; this amounted to a failure to diligently perform the duty of examination, rather than an active pursuit of the smuggling result.
Third, Yi's awareness that Company A would export the goods formed gradually—from initial ignorance to later awareness of partial exports, and only upon being brought to justice did he understand that all the goods had been exported. Subjectively, he did not actively pursue the result of smuggling for export, but rather held an attitude of acquiescence toward the possible unlawful consequences, which constitutes indirect intent; compared with direct intent involving active planning and implementation, the subjective culpability is clearly lower.
Finally, Yi had a good attitude of pleading guilty and accepting punishment, deeply regretted his ignorance and negligence, assisted the investigative authorities in securing evidence, not only cooperating with searches and seizures and truthfully confessing all facts of the crime, but also voluntarily submitting bank statements and actively disgorging his unlawful gains.
(2) Status defence: a helper who merely supplied goods should be punished more leniently than an ordinary accessory
After the procuratorate determined that Yi was an accessory, I further argued that Yi was a helper among accessories, whose status and role were significantly lighter than those of Company A's internal employees who participated in the acts of perpetration, and that sentencing should therefore be further lenient.
From the perspective of the criminal process, Company A's smuggling chain covered the complete stages of receiving orders overseas, preparing false documents, entrusting customs declaration, and receiving and settling foreign exchange; false declaration of the product name was the core act of perpetration for evading customs supervision. Yi was merely one of the company's domestic suppliers, participating only in the domestic supply stage, never touching core smuggling steps such as forging contracts and invoices, nor participating in the distribution of smuggling profits after export; his profit came only from the price difference in domestic trade.
Under Article 156 of the Criminal Law, whoever conspires with a smuggling offender and provides facilities for him is to be punished as a joint offender in the crime of smuggling. Yi's conduct was in essence providing goods facilities for the perpetrator, a typical helper rather than a perpetrator directly carrying out the smuggling act. Within Company A, even the employee responsible for procurement, because he knew the true and false product names, was a secondary perpetrator directly participating in the criminal process, and his role was still greater than that of an external supplier.
Therefore, I argued that sentencing for a helper should not mechanically apply the restriction of "the next sentencing range." Where multiple mitigating circumstances such as voluntary surrender and accessory status are present at the same time, a cross-range reduction, or even exemption from punishment, may be made in accordance with the principle that punishment fits the crime and the offender, so as to truly achieve "a punishment befitting the offence."
(3) Harmfulness defence: under special historical circumstances, the social harm was significantly lower than that of conventional military goods smuggling
We did not stop at arguments on the legal elements, but further combined the historical background and the attributes of the goods to demonstrate the special nature of the social harm in this case.
From the perspective of historical background, after the military system established several foreign trade groups in the 1980s, there existed in society the phenomenon of private enterprises affiliating with or borrowing military goods export qualifications; the other supplying units involved in this case sufficiently reflect the ecosystem of a particular historical period, and consideration of people's understanding at the time should be relaxed.
From the perspective of the attributes of the goods, the goods involved were mainly vulnerable parts with low technical content and strong general applicability, which could be widely used in civilian industrial equipment; the corresponding military equipment had mostly been retired, and the export destination was a friendly neighbouring country of our country, with little impact on national defence security. In addition, the transactions spanned more than ten years with a low average annual transaction amount, so the actual social harm was not comparable to typical smuggling of sophisticated military goods.
04. Case Outcome
After the trial, the court adopted several of our core defence arguments: on the one hand, it recognised that the defendant played a secondary, auxiliary role in the joint crime, lawfully determined him to be an accessory, and mitigated his punishment; on the other hand, it fully confirmed the defendant's repentant conduct after being brought to justice—consistently cooperating with the investigating authorities, truthfully confessing the crime, and voluntarily disgorging unlawful gains. Taking into account all the facts and circumstances of the case, the court ultimately pronounced a suspended sentence for Yi. In cases of smuggling goods prohibited from import and export involving military goods, suspended sentences are themselves uncommon. This outcome fully implemented, in the individual case, the criminal policy of balancing leniency and severity and the basic principle that punishment fits the crime and the offender, achieving good legal and social effects.
05. Practice Reflections
Looking back on this rare smuggling case, I have three practical reflections:
First, there remains defence space for further subdivision within the category of accessories. Most cases stop at determining accessory status, but for helpers who merely provide goods, technology, funds, or other auxiliary support, there is still an essential difference in status and role from secondary perpetrators who directly participate in perpetration. Refined distinction of the internal tiers of accessories is an effective path to achieving a further reduction in sentencing.
Second, since 2025, "failure to obtain a licence" has replaced "false declaration" as the primary type of violation in cases involving restricted and prohibited imports and exports, indicating that the front-end identification capacity of individuals and enterprises is seriously inadequate. "Ignorance of the law is no excuse"; investigating authorities may comprehensively infer what one "should have known," so compliance self-inspection is the precondition for exemption from liability. Before export, the identification of the attributes of goods must be completed, and one must not make a subjective judgment merely on the basis of "ordinary commodity" or "civilian use." It is recommended to keep firmly in mind "no order without a licence, no shipment without a licence, no operation without complete licensing" and to turn this into an ironclad system.
In professional fields where similar cases are scarce and rules are opaque, the core of the defence is precisely to return to the basic principles of criminal law and the basic rules of adjudication by evidence. No matter how rare the charge or how special the facts, legality of crime and punishment and the principle that punishment fits the crime and the offender remain the unchanging cornerstones of the defence.
Questions and answers
What challenges arise in defending a military goods smuggling case?
There are few publicly available precedents and no settled adjudication rules. Core rules on military goods are scattered across internal military normative documents not disclosed to the public, making it difficult to obtain the normative basis and cite it directly. The ambiguity between prohibited and restricted goods further complicates characterisation.
How was indirect intent argued in the military goods smuggling case?
The defence argued that the defendant did not participate in false declaration or form a smuggling conspiracy. His understanding of military goods was limited to factory-level criteria, he mistakenly believed the goods were foreign trade goods, and he mistakenly trusted Company A's qualifications. His awareness of export developed gradually, showing acquiescence rather than active pursuit, indicating indirect intent with lower culpability.
What is the significance of helper status within accessories in smuggling cases?
The defence argued that a helper who merely supplied goods should be punished more leniently than an ordinary accessory. The defendant participated only in domestic supply, not in core smuggling acts like false declaration or profit distribution. Refined distinction within accessories can lead to further sentencing reductions, and cross-range reduction may be possible with multiple mitigating circumstances.
How did historical circumstances affect the social harm assessment in this military goods smuggling case?
The defence showed that in the 1980s, private enterprises affiliating with military enterprises was common. The goods were low-tech, general-purpose parts usable in civilian equipment, the military equipment was mostly retired, and the destination was a friendly neighbouring country. The long transaction period with low annual amounts meant the social harm was lower than typical smuggling of sophisticated military goods.
What compliance measures are recommended for exporters of potentially military goods?
Before export, the attributes of goods must be identified; subjective judgments based on 'ordinary commodity' or 'civilian use' are insufficient. Companies should adopt the system of 'no order without a licence, no shipment without a licence, no operation without complete licensing' and conduct compliance self-inspection, as ignorance of the law is no excuse and authorities may infer what one should have known.
Laws and cases cited
Laws
- Criminal Law
