Introduction
On August 25, 2026, the Cross-Border Anti-Corruption Law of the PRC (Draft Version) (the "CBACL Draft") was submitted to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for deliberation for the first time. In recent years, as enterprises' cross-border business activities have continued to increase, a large number of corruption acts connected with China have taken on cross-border features—for example, the bribe giver and bribe recipient are located in different jurisdictions, bribery funds may flow through multiple countries and regions, and the persons and evidence involved in corruption cases fall under the jurisdiction of different legal systems. This confronts cross-border corruption cases with more complex practical problems in investigation and evidence collection, accountability, and law enforcement cooperation.
Before the CBACL Draft was proposed, China's legal system already contained various institutional arrangements for combating cross-border corruption, and China is a signatory to the United Nations Convention against Corruption. China's Criminal Law, Supervision Law, Anti-Unfair Competition Law, Data Security Law, International Criminal Judicial Assistance Law, Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law, and Regulations on Countering Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of Foreign Countries address issues related to cross-border corruption and its enforcement (including countermeasures against improper extraterritorial enforcement by foreign countries) from different angles. At the same time, integrity compliance in Chinese enterprises' overseas operations has received increasing attention—for example, in May 2025 the Ministry of Commerce issued the dedicated Guidelines for Integrity Compliance in Enterprises' Overseas Operations, and regulations and rules such as the Measures for the Administration of Outbound Investment (NDRC 2026 version), the Measures for the Administration of Overseas Investment (issued by the Ministry of Commerce), the Regulations on the Administration of Foreign Contracted Projects, and the Regulations on the Administration of Foreign Labor Cooperation set out a series of provisions on Chinese enterprises' compliant overseas operations. However, these rules were previously distributed mainly across different laws and regulatory regimes and were relatively fragmented, which was not conducive to unified enforcement against cross-border corruption. The proposal of the CBACL Draft reflects China's intention to integrate the existing fragmented anti-cross-border corruption rules through dedicated legislation and to establish a systematic legal regime covering the prevention, investigation, international cooperation, and corporate compliance dimensions of cross-border corruption.
Since the CBACL Draft was submitted for deliberation, the legal community has already produced many interpretive articles. The purpose of this article is not to simply repeat basic provision-by-provision explanations (which is not complicated work in the AI era), but rather, through in-depth analysis of the legislative background of the CBACL Draft's most core provisions and by using comprehensive simulated cases, to pragmatically analyze the possible impact of the CBACL Draft in the following case scenarios: (i) investigations of corruption-related conduct involving subsidiaries in China of foreign multinational corporations ("MNCs"); and (ii) investigations of corruption-related conduct involving Chinese enterprises' overseas investments. In particular, with respect to issues of U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") extraterritorial enforcement and investigations that are of great concern to MNC subsidiaries in China, we will conduct an in-depth analysis of the degree and scope of the CBACL Draft's impact (for example: whether data and materials formed domestically can be provided overseas; what procedures overseas headquarters or foreign lawyers should follow when conducting investigations in China; and whether and how enterprises should report to Chinese authorities after discovering suspected cross-border corruption). At the same time, we will focus on putting forward our suggestions regarding provisions of the CBACL Draft that remain doubtful, ambiguous, or in need of improvement.
It must be specially stated that the CBACL Draft is currently still at the legislative deliberation stage, and the analysis in this article is based on the existing draft text. These analyses will obviously need to be adjusted and revised in the future according to the final effective Cross-Border Anti-Corruption Law; at the current stage they serve only a discussion-and-illumination purpose. Readers must not treat them as legal advice in any form, nor understand them as official interpretation in any form, and we assume no legal consequences for the analysis, explanations, and suggestions in this article. In addition, although the two comprehensive simulated cases provided in this article draw to some extent on real cases, in order to be more typical we have added numerous fictitious elements to each case; readers should keep this firmly in mind and must not directly equate them with any real case.
Part One: In-Depth Analysis of the Core Provisions of the CBACL Draft
The CBACL Draft has six chapters and 47 articles in total. Due to space limitations and in order to highlight the key points, this article deliberately selects the provisions of the CBACL Draft that cross-border operating enterprises should particularly focus on, and, combining our practical observations and understanding from many years of compliance practice, conducts an in-depth analysis of the legislative background, wording, institutional relationships, and possible practical impact of these core provisions. Of course, these analyses are all subject to the special statement made in the introduction.
Article 3: For the purposes of this Law, "cross-border corruption" means the following acts:
(1) acts by domestic citizens and domestic enterprises, other organizations and their branches and subsidiaries of offering bribes to foreign public officials or officials of international public organizations, or acts by overseas persons and overseas enterprises, other organizations and their branches of offering bribes within the territory to foreign public officials or officials of international public organizations;
(2) acts by overseas persons and overseas enterprises, other organizations and their branches of offering bribes to domestic public officials and their specific related persons, or to state organs, state-owned enterprises, public institutions, or people's organizations, as well as the related bribery-taking acts;
(3) acts by domestic citizens and domestic enterprises, other organizations and their branches and subsidiaries outside the territory, other than those specified in the preceding two items, of embezzlement and bribery, abuse of power, dereliction of duty, rent-seeking, transfer of benefits, favoritism and irregularities, and waste of state assets, and other duty-related illegal or duty-related criminal acts;
(4) other corruption acts of the same nature as the acts specified in the preceding three items, where all or part of the act is carried out outside the territory and all or part of the result occurs within the territory;
(5) acts of persons suspected of corruption fleeing overseas or transferring corruption assets across borders.
Article 3 of the CBACL Draft further clarifies the scope of "cross-border corruption" by listing five categories of acts. Article 164, paragraph 2 of the Criminal Law already provides criminal liability for offering bribes to foreign public officials and officials of international public organizations. Article 3, item 2 of the CBACL Draft expressly brings into the scope of cross-border corruption situations such as overseas entities offering bribes to domestic public officials and their "specific related persons" and to relevant entities. Among these, the determination of "specific related persons" and the legal application where an entity is the object of bribery deserve attention.
Article 3, item 4 of the CBACL Draft uses "part of the act is carried out outside the territory" and "part of the result occurs within the territory" as connecting factors to bring other corruption acts of the same type that meet the requirements into the scope of regulation. This provision has a certain connection with the rule on territorial jurisdiction in Article 6 of the Criminal Law, but the CBACL Draft's definition of cross-border corruption is not equivalent to an expansion of criminal jurisdiction; whether a specific act constitutes a crime and whether criminal liability can be pursued still need to be determined in accordance with the Criminal Law and other relevant provisions.
Article 3, item 5 of the CBACL Draft brings into the scope of regulation persons suspected of corruption fleeing overseas and cross-border transfer of corruption assets, echoing Chapter VI of the Supervision Law on international cooperation against corruption and the provisions of the International Criminal Judicial Assistance Law on the confiscation and return of property involved in cases, thereby extending cross-border corruption governance to the pursuit of fugitives and recovery of assets.
In summary, readers should pay particular attention to the following: (i) the CBACL Draft provides all-around coverage without blind spots for the scope of cross-border corruption under its jurisdiction—as long as a cross-border corruption act has a connecting point with a Chinese citizen or with Chinese territory, it will almost certainly fall within the scope of jurisdiction; and (ii) other cross-border duty-related illegal or duty-related criminal acts similar to corruption also fall within the scope of jurisdiction covered by the CBACL Draft. This is clearly different from the U.S. FCPA, and in terms of textual content its scope of jurisdiction far exceeds that of the FCPA. Therefore, enterprises engaged in cross-border investment and operations, whether their headquarters are in China or abroad, are advised not to harbor any wishful thinking about the scope of jurisdiction of the CBACL Draft.
Article 6: Where a foreign state, in violation of international law and the basic norms of international relations, uses anti-corruption as a pretext or improperly applies its domestic laws extraterritorially to contain or suppress China, or takes discriminatory restrictive or other improper measures against Chinese citizens, enterprises, or other organizations, harming China's sovereignty, security, and development interests, China has the right to take countermeasures, blocking, and other corresponding measures in accordance with the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law of the People's Republic of China and other relevant state provisions.
Article 6 of the CBACL Draft continues the relevant provisions of Article 3 of the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law and Articles 3, 6, and 7 of the Regulations on Countering Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of Foreign Countries, and makes clear that countermeasures, blocking, and other measures may be taken in accordance with law against foreign states' acts of improper extraterritorial jurisdiction carried out under the pretext of anti-corruption. It should be noted, however, that this article is not directed at all overseas investigations, but at foreign states that, in violation of international law and the basic norms of international relations, use anti-corruption as a pretext or improperly apply their domestic laws extraterritorially to contain or suppress China, or take discriminatory restrictive or other improper measures against Chinese citizens, enterprises, or other organizations.
If a domestic Chinese enterprise encounters an anti-corruption investigation by a foreign government (for example, an FCPA investigation), the Chinese enterprise cannot simply assume that it may, in accordance with Article 6 above, apply to the Chinese government for countermeasures, blocking, and other measures against such foreign investigation; the evidentiary threshold here is very high. Although an MNC subsidiary in China is legally also a Chinese enterprise, based on our reasonable judgment, if an MNC subsidiary in China is subjected to an anti-corruption investigation by a foreign government (for example, an FCPA investigation), in reality it is almost unlikely to successfully apply to the Chinese government for countermeasures, blocking, and other measures against such foreign investigation.
Based on the author's understanding and years of practical observation, the purpose of the legislature's special establishment of Article 6, in addition to connecting with the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law and the Regulations on Countering Unlawful Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, is mainly to protect Chinese concept stock enterprises listed on the U.S. securities market. The jurisdiction of the U.S. FCPA in fact perfectly covers the overseas corrupt conduct of Chinese concept stock enterprises (including corrupt conduct committed by them in China). For example, if a Chinese concept stock enterprise bribes a Chinese official in China, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") have clear jurisdiction under the FCPA and may enforce the law against that Chinese concept stock enterprise, including arresting personnel and imposing huge fines. However, in practice to date, there have been very few anti-corruption enforcement cases by U.S. enforcement agencies against Chinese concept stock enterprises; their enforcement involving corrupt conduct in China has basically been carried out against the unlawful conduct of MNC subsidiaries in China. Therefore, to the extent known to the author, the Chinese government has almost no precedent of raising objections to U.S. FCPA enforcement, for two main reasons: first, there are very few FCPA enforcement cases by U.S. enforcement agencies against Chinese concept stocks, and there is no need to object to enforcement against MNC subsidiaries in China; second, corrupt conduct itself is a widespread crime that the Chinese government strongly dislikes, and the Chinese government has no need to oppose anti-corruption enforcement initiated by U.S. enforcement agencies without political bias, which also helps to shape the Chinese government's image of integrity. However, in the broader environment of intensifying China-U.S. political rivalry, China's legislature still specifically established Article 6 in the CBACL Draft, mainly to prevent the United States from using FCPA enforcement in the future as a tool of political suppression and discrimination against Chinese concept stocks (many of which are China's leading enterprises). Therefore, in the absence of political suppression and discrimination factors, Chinese concept stock enterprises should not expect too much that the Chinese government will take countermeasures or blocking measures against foreign governments' anti-corruption investigations; after all, the Chinese government also opposes corruption in the ordinary sense.
Relatedly, we note that Article 54 of the Measures for the Administration of Outbound Investment promulgated by the National Development and Reform Commission in October 2026 provides: where outbound investment listed in the annual report on outbound investment information submitted by Chinese investors is affected by discriminatory measures of foreign organizations or individuals, or is unreasonably deprived or restricted by foreign organizations or individuals, the National Development and Reform Commission may, at the investor's request, take corresponding countermeasures in light of the actual circumstances within the scope of its duties. We understand this to echo Article 6 of the CBACL Draft.
Article 18: In the course of handling cross-border corruption cases, supervisory organs, public security organs and other relevant organs have the power to learn about the situation from relevant organizations and individuals and to collect and obtain evidence in accordance with law. Relevant organizations and individuals shall actively cooperate and truthfully provide relevant evidentiary materials.
In the course of handling major cross-border corruption cases, supervisory organs, public security organs and other relevant organs may, in accordance with the principle of reciprocity, require foreign enterprises and other organizations to cooperate in accordance with law.
Article 44: Where relevant organizations and individuals violate the provisions of this Law by refusing to provide evidentiary materials, concealing, forging or destroying evidence, or refusing or obstructing cross-border corruption investigations, the unit to which they belong, the competent department, the superior organ, the supervisory organ or the public security organ shall order them to make corrections. Where the conduct constitutes a violation of public security administration, public security administration penalties shall be imposed in accordance with law; where the conduct constitutes a crime, criminal liability shall be pursued in accordance with law.
Paragraph 1 of Article 18 mainly applies to domestic enterprises (including foreign-invested enterprises), other organizations and individuals involved when relevant Chinese organs conduct investigations in accordance with law. Their cooperation obligation has the existing investigation and evidence collection system as its basis, and Article 44 also provides corresponding legal liability for conduct such as refusing to provide evidentiary materials and obstructing investigations, so it is highly enforceable against domestic enterprises, organizations and individuals.
By contrast, the enforceability in practice of the cooperation requirement in Paragraph 2 of Article 18 directed at foreign enterprises and other organizations (note that foreign individuals are not included) is disputed. On the one hand, there is a lack of clear criteria for determining a "major cross-border corruption case"; on the other hand, "may, in accordance with the principle of reciprocity, require" gives the relevant organs a certain discretion, meaning that this is not a mandatory provision. At the same time, Paragraph 2 of Article 18 and Article 44 do not clearly specify the punitive means and consequences for foreign enterprises and other organizations that refuse to cooperate with Chinese government anti-corruption investigations. We understand that Article 44, read literally, applies to domestic institutions and individuals, but is difficult to apply to foreign enterprises and organizations. For example, if the Chinese government initiates an anti-corruption investigation against an MNC's subsidiary in China and needs the MNC headquarters to cooperate in providing evidentiary materials located abroad, but the MNC headquarters refuses or passively cooperates, the punitive means the Chinese government can lawfully take against the MNC headquarters are very limited (of course, the Chinese government can indirectly achieve a certain punitive effect by dealing with its subsidiary in China, but this is after all not direct punishment). We suggest that the legislature consider adding punitive provisions directed at foreign enterprises and organizations themselves in the CBACL Draft, specifically with reference to the measures provided in Article 6 of the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law.
Article 26: Relevant organs shall, in accordance with Chinese law, international treaties and agreements concluded or acceded to by China, or in accordance with the principles of equality and mutual benefit and consensus through consultation, handle requests for cross-border corruption law enforcement and judicial cooperation and judicial assistance made by relevant foreign institutions.
Without the consent of the relevant Chinese organs, foreign institutions, organizations and individuals may not conduct anti-cross-border corruption investigations or other law enforcement activities within China by themselves or through others, and institutions, organizations and individuals within China may not provide evidentiary materials or other relevant assistance to foreign institutions, organizations and individuals. Where Chinese law is violated, corresponding measures such as blocking shall be taken in accordance with relevant state provisions, and legal liability shall be pursued in accordance with law.
Paragraph 1 of Article 26 is a relatively ordinary provision, but it should be noted that what the Chinese government handles are requests for cross-border corruption law enforcement and judicial cooperation and judicial assistance made by relevant foreign institutions, and the relevant institutions here obviously refer to foreign public functional departments (such as judicial organs) and generally do not include foreign enterprises and individuals.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 requires special attention from readers, as it is very easy to misread here. Paragraph 2 addresses the situation where "foreign institutions, organizations and individuals conduct anti-cross-border corruption investigations or other law enforcement activities within China by themselves or through others, which requires the consent of the relevant Chinese organs." There are several layers of meaning here: (i) what is addressed here is law enforcement activity, and according to general legal theory, law enforcement activity refers to the exercise of public power, meaning that the foreign institutions, organizations and individuals referred to in Paragraph 2 should be foreign law enforcement subjects exercising public power, and do not include ordinary foreign enterprises and their employees; (ii) compared with the "criminal proceedings" addressed in Article 4 of the International Criminal Judicial Assistance Law, the "law enforcement activities" referred to here literally cover anti-corruption administrative law enforcement investigations other than criminal proceedings, and therefore have a broader scope; (iii) the reference to "through others" in this paragraph is generally understood to mainly include foreign law firms (and their representative offices in China); therefore, many people naturally infer that it is unlawful for foreign law firms to conduct anti-corruption investigations (such as FCPA investigations) in mainland China. We believe that this view does not fully understand the provisions of Paragraph 2: the subject of "through others" here is foreign institutions, organizations and individuals engaged in public power law enforcement activities, and does not include MNC enterprises (which are not law enforcement agencies). In practice, foreign law firms and their representative offices are usually engaged by foreign MNC headquarters to conduct internal FCPA investigations of their subsidiaries in China, and it is rarely heard that they are commissioned by foreign governments (such as the SEC or DOJ) to conduct such investigations; therefore, we tend to believe that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 does not apply to activities in which foreign law firms and their representative offices, engaged by foreign MNC headquarters, conduct internal FCPA investigations of their subsidiaries in China. The conduct of such internal corporate investigations by MNC headquarters and the foreign lawyers they engage is not "law enforcement activity," and therefore does not require the prior consent of the Chinese government.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26: Without the consent of the relevant Chinese organs, foreign institutions, organizations and individuals may not conduct anti-cross-border corruption investigations or other law enforcement activities within China by themselves or through others, and institutions, organizations and individuals within China may not provide evidentiary materials or other relevant assistance to foreign institutions, organizations and individuals. The wording and legislative purpose here also require particularly careful study. First, with respect to the act of domestic subjects providing evidentiary materials to foreign subjects, the expression "foreign institutions, organizations and individuals" is likewise used; according to the foregoing analysis, in the same sentence, the recipients here, namely foreign institutions, organizations and individuals, refer to institutions and individuals with public power law enforcement functions, and do not include ordinary foreign enterprises and their employees. Moreover, Article 36 of the Data Security Law is also directed at the situation of providing data stored within China to foreign judicial or law enforcement agencies. Therefore, we tend to believe that this article still does not apply to the situation in an internal investigation initiated by an MNC itself where its subsidiary in China provides evidentiary materials to the MNC's overseas headquarters (including the foreign law firms it engages). In this paragraph, there is still some question whether institutions, organizations and individuals within China include all institutions, organizations, enterprises and individuals within China, because the foreign institutions, organizations and individuals referred to above only mean functional departments and individuals with public power. If the legislature wishes to cover all institutions, organizations, enterprises and individuals within China, then the wording should be suggested to be amended to eliminate misunderstanding: institutions, organizations, enterprises and institutions and individuals within China may not provide evidentiary materials or other relevant assistance to foreign institutions, organizations and individuals.
In addition, Article 26 uses "with the consent of the relevant Chinese organs" as a precondition for engaging in relevant activities, but has not yet clarified the specific accepting organ, application procedures and review standards. For conduct that violates the provisions, this article proposes that corresponding measures such as blocking may be taken and liability pursued in accordance with law. Article 6 of the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law and Articles 8 and 13 of the Regulations on Countering Unlawful Extraterritorial Jurisdiction already provide countermeasures and blocking measures such as asset freezing, restrictions on transactions and cooperation, and injunctions against enforcement, but the specific conditions and scope of application of the "corresponding measures such as blocking" referred to in Article 26 of the CBACL Draft still need to be clarified. In addition, the act of providing domestic data to foreign judicial or law enforcement agencies without approval may also trigger the legal liability provided in Articles 36 and 48 of the Data Security Law.
In summary, with respect to Article 26, paragraph 2, we tend to believe that it applies only to (i) situations in which foreign law enforcement agencies and public officials conduct cross-border anti-corruption investigations in China; and (ii) situations in which institutions, organizations, enterprises and public institutions, and individuals within China provide evidentiary materials and assistance to foreign law enforcement agencies and public officials; that is, these two situations require the consent of the Chinese authorities. As for internal anti-corruption investigations independently carried out by foreign MNCs and the provision of relevant evidentiary materials and assistance by their subsidiaries to the foreign MNC headquarters (including the foreign law firms they engage), we believe that the restrictions of this article do not apply, i.e., the consent of the Chinese government authorities is not required. We believe that this understanding is relatively consistent with the wording and legislative intent of the statutory provision. If we adopted the opposite understanding and brought all internal anti-corruption investigation activities of domestic foreign-invested enterprises led by MNC overseas headquarters within the scope of examination and approval by the Chinese government authorities, this would not only greatly increase the compliance costs of foreign-invested enterprises, but would also substantively affect the timeliness, enthusiasm and operability of their internal anti-corruption investigations, which could run counter to the purpose of combating cross-border corruption.
Of course, in reality there are also many internal anti-corruption investigation activities initiated by foreign MNCs that are carried out in accordance with the specific requirements of foreign law enforcement agencies, and we believe that this should not substantively affect our above analysis and judgment. This is because even in such circumstances, the internal anti-corruption investigation activities carried out by the foreign MNC remain the acts of a civil subject, rather than administrative or criminal law enforcement acts on behalf of foreign public authority institutions and organizations. Moreover, judging from China's relevant legislative records, China's legislature has consistently emphasized strict regulation and restraint of the official law enforcement activities of foreign public authority institutions and individuals in China, rather than strictly targeting and restricting internal anti-corruption investigation activities conducted by multinational enterprise groups.
Article 27: For cross-border corruption cases in which China is conducting investigation, detection, prosecution or trial, in which an effective judgment has already been made, in which criminal proceedings have been terminated, in which the limitation period for prosecution of the crime has expired, or in which there exist other circumstances under which judicial assistance may lawfully not be provided, the relevant authorities may refuse to provide assistance to the relevant foreign institutions.
Article 27 of the CBACL Draft is basically consistent with Article 14 of the International Criminal Judicial Assistance Law regarding the provisions on refusing to provide judicial assistance. The use of the expression "the relevant authorities may refuse" in this article means that even if statutory grounds for refusal exist, the relevant Chinese authorities still enjoy a certain degree of discretion and are not necessarily required to refuse judicial assistance requests from foreign institutions (public authority institutions).
In reality, such cases have already occurred, namely where the Chinese subsidiary of an MNC has already been criminally prosecuted and sentenced by the Chinese judicial authorities for corrupt conduct, while foreign law enforcement agencies (such as the SEC and the DOJ) still pursue liability under the FCPA. In such circumstances, if the foreign law enforcement agencies so request, the Chinese government will not necessarily refuse to provide the necessary judicial assistance.
Chapter IV Integrity Compliance (the provisions of the entire chapter are relatively long and are not quoted in full here)
An important change in Chapter IV of the CBACL Draft is that integrity compliance requirements, which were previously more often reflected as policy advocacy and corporate self-discipline, are expressly made statutory obligations that enterprises should perform, and corresponding legal liability is provided for through Article 45. This means that integrity compliance is no longer merely an autonomous choice of internal corporate management; failure to implement its institutional development and actual execution in place will also be subject to legal punishment, without the need for the precondition that the enterprise has engaged in specific cross-border corrupt conduct.
The specific requirements of Chapter IV and their impact on enterprises are shown in the following table:
The legal consequences of violating the integrity compliance obligations in Chapter IV are directly reflected in Article 45:
"Where an enterprise engaged in cross-border business operations fails to perform the integrity compliance obligations stipulated in this Law, the relevant competent authorities shall order it to make corrections within a specified period; if it refuses to make corrections, it may be ordered to suspend the relevant business, to suspend business for rectification, or to have the relevant business license revoked. Where the above acts also violate the provisions of other laws and regulations, legal liability shall be pursued in accordance with law."
The triggering of liability under this article does not presuppose that the enterprise has actually carried out cross-border corrupt conduct; where an enterprise fails to perform the integrity compliance obligations stipulated in Articles 29 to 34, the legal liability stipulated in this article may be triggered. At the same time, this article adopts a progressive structure of "ordering correction within a specified period—taking further measures after refusal to correct," which shows that the integrity compliance obligations of enterprises already have independent legal binding force. The CBACL Draft does not clearly stipulate the specific conditions for applying measures such as suspension of business, suspension of business for rectification, or even revocation of licenses, and the actual range of penalties is to a certain extent left to the discretion of the competent authorities.
Part II: Cross-Border Corruption Simulated Case Demonstrations and Q&A Analysis
When cross-border corruption issues actually arise in enterprise business management, they often do not appear in the form of a single legal issue, but rather present highly complex and intersecting case characteristics and involve the jurisdiction of different legal systems. In order to more intuitively explain the possible impact of the CBACL Draft on anti-corruption compliance practice for enterprises engaged in cross-border operations, the following sections start respectively from two scenarios—foreign law enforcement authorities investigating corrupt conduct in the China business of a foreign MNC, and Chinese enterprises engaging in overseas operations involving corruption—and analyze the practical issues enterprises may face through simulated cases. For the statement regarding the simulated cases, please see the preface of this article.
Simulated Case One
Company A is a listed pharmaceutical and medical device group headquartered in the United States, with a wholly-owned subsidiary, A-CHINA, in China. A-CHINA's China business mainly conducts market promotion and hospital business through distributors and consulting companies. Company A's internal reporting channel received a complaint reflecting that some sales personnel of A-CHINA may have provided improper benefits to relevant personnel of Chinese public hospitals through third-party overseas channels. A subsequent internal audit found that some consulting fees, conference sponsorships and travel expenses lacked sufficient business basis, that the timing of certain payments was relatively close to the advancement of hospital procurement projects, and that the actual services of some distributors and consulting companies were difficult to verify.
Company A's global compliance department decided to initiate an internal investigation and engaged US law firm B to participate in the investigation. Company A's headquarters required A-CHINA to preserve the emails and Enterprise WeChat records of relevant employees, distributor and consulting agreements, invoices and payment vouchers, and arranged interviews with the head of China sales and relevant employees. In the early stage of the investigation, the investigation was mainly driven by the group's global compliance department and law firm B (including US lawyers at its China representative office); A-CHINA's legal department then became involved and exercised control over law firm B's conduct of interviews in China, the collection of investigation materials and their subsequent transfer.
As the investigation progressed, the US lawyers of law firm B required A-CHINA to upload some emails, chat records, financial materials and interview records to the electronic discovery platform used by Company A overseas, and to report the investigation results to the headquarters on a regular basis. Thereafter, the investigation further found that some distributor payments highly overlapped with hospital procurement milestones, and that the communication records of certain employees contained unusual expressions concerning "coordinating hospital relationships" and fee arrangements. Company A began to assess whether it needed to report the relevant circumstances found in the investigation to the relevant Chinese authorities.
Because Company A is a US-listed company, the matter subsequently attracted the attention of US regulatory authorities. The DOJ and SEC required the group to further explain the investigation of the China business and to provide certain transaction and internal investigation materials. At the same time, the relevant Chinese authorities also contacted A-CHINA regarding the relevant transactions and required it to preserve and provide certain documents. Company A's existing anti-corruption investigation system and procedures did not specifically provide for the manner of participation of foreign lawyers in investigations within China, nor did they make detailed arrangements for the procedures that should be performed when domestic investigation materials are provided to the headquarters, foreign lawyers or foreign regulatory authorities.
Q&A analysis based on the CBACL Draft:
Q1: Can the US lawyers of US law firm B, in accordance with Company A's engagement requirements, directly interview relevant employees and obtain internal investigation materials in China without the prior consent of the relevant Chinese authorities?
A1: Based on our analysis of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the CBACL Draft above, we tend to believe that this is an internal anti-corruption investigation independently initiated by Company A, rather than an act of cross-border anti-corruption law enforcement conducted in China by a foreign public authority institution, organization or individual, and that law firm B has accepted the engagement of Company A (rather than the engagement of the DOJ or SEC). Therefore, we believe that the above acts of the US lawyers of law firm B do not require the prior consent of the Chinese government, and that doing so does not violate the provisions of the CBACL Draft. In addition, whether it is consistent with the Regulations on the Administration of Representative Offices of Foreign Law Firms in China for the US lawyers of law firm B's China representative office to accept Company A's engagement to engage in internal anti-corruption investigation and evidence collection activities is outside the scope of discussion of this article. We note that such legal practice (in particular FCPA investigations conducted by US law firms' China representative offices upon client engagement) currently exists in large quantities, but the Chinese judicial authorities have not expressly prohibited it.
Q2: Can A-CHINA, in accordance with the requirements of its overseas headquarters Company A, directly provide internal investigation materials to Company A?
A2: Based on our analysis of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the CBACL Draft above, we believe that this paragraph restricts A-CHINA from providing evidentiary materials and assistance to foreign public authority institutions, organizations or individuals (for example, providing them directly to the DOJ or SEC, in which case the consent of the Chinese government is required), but does not restrict it from directly providing evidentiary materials to its own overseas headquarters. Therefore, we believe that A-CHINA's conduct of the above acts does not violate the provisions of the CBACL Draft and does not require the prior consent of the Chinese government.
Q3: Do the emails, Enterprise WeChat records, payment vouchers and interview minutes collected by A-CHINA in the investigation all fall within the "evidentiary materials" referred to in Article 26 of the CBACL Draft?
A3: The "evidentiary materials and other related assistance" referred to in Article 26 of the CBACL Draft do not set out a specific scope, but generally speaking, emails, Enterprise WeChat records, payment vouchers and interview minutes related to anti-corruption investigations fall within the scope of evidence.
Q4: If A-CHINA first provides the investigation materials to its overseas headquarters Company A, and Company A then submits them to the DOJ and SEC, might this still be affected by Article 26 of the CBACL Draft, i.e., require the consent of the Chinese government?
A4: In this case, we believe that the DOJ's and SEC's requirement that Company A provide them with the internal investigation materials it obtained from China should not, on the whole, be understood as the DOJ and SEC engaging in cross-border anti-corruption law enforcement activities in China. If A-CHINA, as a domestic entity, has not directly provided evidentiary materials to the DOJ and SEC, but has only provided materials to its overseas headquarters Company A, this situation does not require the consent of the Chinese government. In addition, the situation in which Company A, as an overseas enterprise, provides case evidentiary materials to the DOJ and SEC is also not a matter within the jurisdiction of Article 26 of the CBACL Draft.
Q5: A-CHINA has discovered abnormal payments and employee communications involving third-party cross-border channels. Should it immediately report to the relevant Chinese authorities?
A5: Article 31 of the CBACL Draft requires enterprises to report in accordance with the law after discovering suspected cross-border corruption issues, and Article 45 sets out the legal liability provisions. Therefore, we believe that A-CHINA should report to the relevant Chinese authorities in accordance with the law.
Q6: After the DOJ, the SEC and the relevant Chinese authorities have all intervened in this case, can Company A and A-CHINA still arrange employee interviews and collect evidence according to the original plan?
A6: As answered in the questions above, we believe that in principle Company A and A-CHINA can arrange employee interviews and collect evidence according to the original plan. However, A-CHINA may not, without obtaining the consent of the relevant Chinese authorities, directly provide case evidence to the SEC or the DOJ, nor may it directly accept instructions from the SEC or the DOJ to cooperate with anti-corruption investigations.
Q7: When the relevant Chinese authorities and the DOJ and the SEC simultaneously require A-CHINA to provide the same evidentiary materials, how should this be handled?
A7: First, A-CHINA should first provide the evidentiary materials directly to the relevant Chinese authorities; second, A-CHINA should refuse to provide evidentiary materials directly to the DOJ or the SEC before obtaining the consent of the relevant Chinese authorities; third, if the overseas headquarters Company A genuinely needs to provide evidence in cooperation with the SEC and the DOJ, A-CHINA may provide the relevant evidence directly to Company A, and Company A may then decide on its own whether and how to submit the relevant evidence to the SEC and the DOJ.
Q8: If the relevant Chinese authorities require Company A to provide evidentiary materials relating to this case that are stored overseas, is Company A required to cooperate?
A8: Article 18, paragraph 2 of the CBACL Draft is directed at major cross-border corruption cases and provides that the relevant authorities "may, in accordance with the principle of reciprocity, require in accordance with the law" foreign enterprises and other organizations to cooperate. There are two limitations worth noting here: first, the criteria for determining a "major cross-border corruption case" have not yet been clarified; second, "may require" is an authorizing formulation, which does not mean that overseas enterprises bear an unconditional obligation to cooperate, nor does it clarify the legal consequences for overseas enterprises that do not cooperate. Therefore, if Company A refuses to provide materials stored overseas, the legal penalties that the relevant Chinese authorities can take against Company A are extremely limited. This is also the reason why we recommend that the CBACL Draft add relevant penalty measures.
Q9: How should Company A adjust its internal investigation process for cross-border corruption targeting China?
A9: In order to avoid as much as possible the risk of compliance conflicts between different jurisdictions, we recommend that Company A's headquarters may, in light of the characteristics of its China business, adjust its internal investigation process for cross-border corruption as follows:
1. Promptly initiate internal investigation and reporting obligations. After receiving a report or discovering an abnormal matter, ensure that A-CHINA's legal and compliance personnel can participate in risk assessment and investigation arrangements in a timely manner, and perform the reporting obligation to the relevant Chinese authorities as appropriate.
2. Clearly define the scope of participation of overseas lawyers. Clearly define the engagement relationship with overseas lawyers, the purpose of the investigation and the scope of activities in China, and absolutely avoid confusion with the law enforcement investigation activities of overseas authorities.
3. Promptly engage Chinese lawyers to intervene. When investigating corruption involving A-CHINA, engage Chinese lawyers to intervene in the case as early as possible, rather than giving priority to satisfying the regulatory requirements of overseas law enforcement authorities, and promptly assess the Chinese legal risks of the case and the additional risks that may arise from conflicts between Chinese and foreign law enforcement.
4. Properly conduct classified management of evidentiary materials. Classify the evidentiary materials obtained through the internal investigation, and correctly distinguish materials for internal compliance use from materials intended to be provided for use in overseas regulatory investigations. Strictly restrict or prohibit A-CHINA from directly providing evidentiary materials to overseas law enforcement authorities or directly cooperating with law enforcement.
5. Specifically provide for the reporting obligation to Chinese authorities. It should be clearly stipulated in the internal compliance system: after suspected cross-border corruption leads are discovered in the China business, who reports, at what point in time, and to which authority, so as to perform the reporting obligation in accordance with the law in a timely manner, and clearly explain the role and functional allocation of Chinese legal and compliance personnel.
6. Properly respond to parallel investigations by Chinese and foreign law enforcement authorities. It is likely that Chinese and overseas regulatory authorities will simultaneously intervene in cross-border corruption cases with high frequency in the future. Company A needs to make institutional provisions as early as possible to better respond to the complex situations of dual Chinese and foreign law enforcement in the future, and in particular to clarify the specific division of labor between the legal and compliance departments of the overseas headquarters and the Chinese subsidiary.
The above adjustment arrangements may be sorted out and prepared in advance in accordance with the current provisions of the CBACL Draft, and the final documents may be formed in accordance with the Anti-Cross-Border Corruption Law formally promulgated and effective in the future.
Simulated Case Two
Company B is a Chinese private energy equipment manufacturing enterprise. In recent years, it has actively expanded into overseas markets, established a sales subsidiary in a Middle Eastern country, and participated in local energy infrastructure projects. Because the local market environment and business rules are relatively complex, Company B engaged a local consulting company C to assist in advancing the project, mainly responsible for market information collection, government communications and bid coordination. The two parties signed a service agreement, agreeing that after the project succeeded, Company B would pay Company C a service fee at a certain percentage of the project amount.
During the cooperation, Company C repeatedly stated to Company B that it had long-term cooperative relationships with local government departments and project-related parties and could help the enterprise resolve communication problems in advancing the project. However, Company B's review of Company C remained at the basic information level, such as business registration, basic qualification documents and anti-corruption commitments, and did not further verify Company C's actual controller, affiliated relationships or past compliance records.
During the advancement of the project, Company C requested an increase in the success commission percentage and proposed paying part of the funds to other affiliated accounts. Personnel within Company B raised questions about this, believing that Company C's actual services did not match the fee level. However, due to fierce competition for the project, Company B's overseas team hoped to continue relying on Company C to push the project forward. At the same time, Company B's headquarters believed that overseas projects were operated by overseas subsidiaries and that agents were also selected by local teams, so it mainly focused on project progress and commercial results.
At some point after the project was won, local media publicly reported that the project involved improper benefit arrangements, which shocked Company B. Company B internally began to re-examine Company C's cooperation background, payment arrangements and the overseas subsidiary's third-party management process, and found that the existing overseas business management system mainly focused on business objectives but lacked specific requirements for due diligence, ongoing supervision and abnormal payment review procedures for agents and other third parties.
Q&A analysis based on the CBACL Draft:
Q1: Company B's overseas subsidiary has independent legal personality. Does the headquarters still need to manage its overseas integrity compliance and bear legal liability?
A1: Yes. Article 29 of the CBACL Draft explicitly incorporates domestic enterprises' urging and guidance of overseas branches and subsidiaries into integrity compliance requirements. Company B's headquarters cannot claim exemption merely on the ground that the overseas subsidiary operates independently. Even if Company B completely entrusts its overseas business to the local team, it still needs to ensure that overseas institutions are incorporated into the overall integrity compliance system. Article 45 of the CBACL Draft provides for the legal consequences of cross-border operating enterprises violating integrity compliance obligations.
Q2: If Company B's headquarters did not participate in the selection of the agent, but the overseas subsidiary engaged the agent on its own, may the headquarters still be deemed to have failed to perform its integrity compliance management obligations?
A2: Company B's headquarters faces compliance risks. The CBACL Draft does not require domestic enterprises to directly participate in every business decision of overseas institutions, but it does require domestic enterprises to guide and supervise the integrity compliance management of overseas branches and subsidiaries. For Company B, the key is whether it has established a third-party management system applicable to overseas business, whether it has clarified approval, reporting and supervision mechanisms, and whether it can promptly discover and handle relevant risks.
Q3: Does Company B's requirement that the agent sign an anti-corruption commitment letter satisfy the third-party management obligation required by Article 33 of the CBACL Draft?
A3: Merely requiring a third-party agent to sign an anti-corruption commitment letter is not equivalent to completing the third-party management obligation required by the CBACL Draft. Article 33 of the CBACL Draft requires enterprises to conduct due diligence and supervision and management on third-party institutions or individuals engaged, and an anti-corruption commitment letter can only serve as one management measure and cannot replace review of the third party's background, actual control relationships, service content and payment arrangements. In particular, where Company C has already proposed increasing the commission and requested payment to affiliated accounts, Company B should re-assess its risks.
Q4: If Company C is suspected of channeling benefits to foreign public officials through third parties, but Company B did not directly participate in the relevant conduct, may it still face compliance or even criminal risks?
A4: In such circumstances, on the one hand, Company B may bear legal liability because Company C's corrupt conduct is attributed to it; on the other hand, it may also bear liability for violating Article 33 of the CBACL Draft, but in most cases such legal liability is a penalty under administrative law. Whether bribery of foreign government officials carried out by agents and other third parties causes Company B or its employees to bear criminal liability still needs to be judged in light of the degree of Company B's and its employees' participation in and knowledge of the bribery, in particular whether there was instigation or intentional acquiescence. Article 164, paragraph 2 of China's Criminal Law explicitly provides for the criminal liability for bribery of foreign public officials and officials of international public organizations.
Q5: If Company C itself engages other consultants or intermediaries to advance the project, does Company B's third-party management obligation need to extend to these "downstream third parties"?
A5: Article 33 of the CBACL Draft requires enterprises to conduct due diligence and supervision and management on third-party institutions or individuals engaged, but it does not clarify whether subcontractors, intermediaries and other entities engaged by the agent itself fall within the scope of the enterprise's management. In practice, cross-border corruption risks may be transmitted through multi-layer agency relationships. For Company B, if it knows or should know that Company C will also use other entities to carry out high-risk work such as government communications and project coordination, it is necessary to conduct due diligence and compliance control on such downstream entities.
Q6: If the first to discover the abnormality is Company B's overseas subsidiary, is the obligation to report to the relevant Chinese authorities borne by the overseas subsidiary, the domestic headquarters, or both separately?
A6: Article 31 of the CBACL Draft requires enterprises to report in accordance with the law after discovering suspected cross-border corruption issues, but in a group operating scenario, if the issue first arises and is discovered at an overseas subsidiary, the CBACL Draft has not yet clarified which entity should bear the reporting obligation. Before the rules are clarified, the group may establish an internal management mechanism of "whoever discovers, notifies": after an overseas subsidiary discovers an anomaly, it should immediately notify the compliance department at headquarters, and headquarters should uniformly report to the relevant Chinese authorities, avoiding situations where an overseas team handles the matter on its own while headquarters remains unaware.
Q7: For Company B's existing overseas anti-corruption compliance system, how should it be adjusted and improved in accordance with the CBACL Draft?
A7: The CBACL Draft has already made it an explicit statutory obligation of enterprises for the Chinese headquarters to manage overseas institutions, for third-party supervision, and for internal reporting and investigation mechanisms. Because Company B's existing overseas anti-corruption compliance system is very incomplete, it has already caused serious adverse consequences of inadequate control over Company C. Company B should re-examine its existing compliance system in light of the specific requirements of the CBACL Draft, to ensure that the newly revised anti-cross-border-corruption compliance system can comprehensively cover the cross-border operation and management responsibilities of Chinese enterprises emphasized by the CBACL Draft. Therefore, it is recommended that Company B engage Chinese lawyers to complete a comprehensive revision as soon as possible.
Q8: If Company B has limited scale and budget and cannot establish a compliance team of the same scale as a large multinational group, how should it meet the requirements of the CBACL Draft?
A8: The CBACL Draft does not require all enterprises to establish integrity compliance systems of exactly the same quality, but emphasizes that enterprises should establish corresponding mechanisms in light of their own scale, business scope and risk characteristics. Company B does not have to replicate the compliance architecture of a large multinational enterprise; it should conduct risk-tiered management according to its own business model, ensuring that key risks are effectively managed while controlling compliance costs. Where the company's scale and budget are limited, engaging external lawyers for compliance system development and implementation monitoring is a cost-effective choice.
Summary
The proposal and deliberation of the Anti-Cross-Border Corruption Law (Draft) will further promote the unification and improvement of the institutional framework for cross-border corruption governance in China, and also clearly express the Chinese government's tremendous determination to govern cross-border corruption. This is something cross-border operating enterprises (whether foreign-invested or Chinese-invested) need to pay special attention to, and they must not harbor any hope of getting away with cross-border corruption. This article provides a relatively in-depth analysis of the core provisions and requirements of the CBACL Draft, and also points out content that is still relatively vague or missing in the draft, in the hope that it will be helpful to the final improvement and finalization of the draft. At the same time, through two simulated cases, we have also answered, from the author's personal perspective, the main questions that cross-border operating enterprises urgently hope to understand and clarify regarding the CBACL Draft.
Finally, readers are once again reminded to pay special attention: all analyses, views and suggestions in this article are merely the author's personal opinions and have no official or legal effect. For the specific disclaimer, please see the foreword of this article. We very much welcome readers to write to us for friendly discussion.
*Note: Gao Keai, LLM, University of Bristol, made important contributions to this article
Questions and answers
Does the Cross-Border Anti-Corruption Law (Draft) require Chinese government consent for internal FCPA investigations conducted by foreign law firms in China?
No. Article 26(2) restricts foreign law enforcement activities, not internal corporate investigations. Foreign law firms engaged by multinational headquarters to conduct internal FCPA investigations are not exercising public power, so prior Chinese government consent is not required.
Can a Chinese subsidiary of a multinational provide internal investigation materials to its overseas headquarters under the Cross-Border Anti-Corruption Law (Draft)?
Yes. Article 26(2) prohibits providing evidentiary materials to foreign law enforcement agencies, but does not restrict transfers to an overseas parent company. Providing materials to the headquarters does not require Chinese government consent.
Does the Cross-Border Anti-Corruption Law (Draft) require Chinese companies to manage the integrity compliance of their overseas subsidiaries?
Yes. Article 29 includes domestic enterprises' urging and guidance of overseas branches and subsidiaries within integrity compliance requirements. Headquarters cannot claim exemption merely because the overseas subsidiary operates independently.
What are the limitations on cooperation obligations for foreign enterprises under Article 18 of the Cross-Border Anti-Corruption Law (Draft)?
Article 18(2) applies to major cross-border corruption cases and allows authorities to require cooperation 'in accordance with the principle of reciprocity.' The criteria for 'major' are unclear, and the provision is discretionary, with no clear penalties for non-cooperation.
Laws and cases cited
Laws
- Cross-Border Anti-Corruption Law of the PRC (Draft Version)
- Criminal Law
- Supervision Law
- Anti-Unfair Competition Law
- Data Security Law
- International Criminal Judicial Assistance Law
- Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law
Regulations
- Regulations on Countering Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of Foreign Countries
- Measures for the Administration of Outbound Investment
- Measures for the Administration of Overseas Investment
- Regulations on the Administration of Foreign Contracted Projects
- Regulations on the Administration of Foreign Labor Cooperation
- Regulations on the Administration of Representative Offices of Foreign Law Firms in China
Policy documents
- Guidelines for Integrity Compliance in Enterprises' Overseas Operations
Treaties
- United Nations Convention against Corruption
