01. The HeyCyan Investigation and the Development of the Smart Glasses Market
On 7 October 2026, the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) announced that it had formally opened an investigation into the developer of the HeyCyan smart glasses mobile application (the "HeyCyan app"). The company name given in the OAIC announcement is Shenzhen Qingcheng Future Technology Co. Ltd; the Chinese name listed on the Google Play page is "深圳市青橙未来科技有限公司" (Shenzhen Qingcheng Future Technology Co., Ltd., hereinafter "Qingcheng Future"). The OAIC had previously, from 12 August 2026, sent preliminary inquiries to a number of smart glasses-related companies, requiring them to explain how the devices record information, who can access the recorded content and where the information is stored. Qingcheng Future did not respond to that round of inquiries; the OAIC also referred to concerns raised by third-party technical analysis and privacy policies, and decided to commence an investigation so as to further exercise its statutory evidence-gathering powers.[1]
The identity of the investigation target is the most noteworthy aspect of this matter. Kmart (an Australian retailer) sells Anko (its own brand) smart glasses, and channels such as Big W Marketplace (Big W's online marketplace) and Amazon also sell other low-priced products; these glasses use the HeyCyan app provided by Qingcheng Future. Qingcheng Future plays the role of software service provider, and is not the brand owner or retailer of the above glasses. In its preliminary inquiries the OAIC contacted both the retailers and Qingcheng Future, and subsequently opened a formal investigation into Qingcheng Future. According to the OAIC announcement, a number of products require connection to this app in order to use some functions such as music, calls and voice assistant, and the information obtained by the glasses is also collected and processed through the app.[2] The product chain, in which products are sold under different brands and share software that receives the information, has thus come within the regulator's view.
This investigation comes at a time when smart glasses are expanding rapidly. According to International Data Corporation (IDC), global smart glasses shipments in the first quarter of 2026 were approximately 2.25 million units, a year-on-year increase of 167%; in 2025, China's audio and audio-capture glasses shipments were 1.726 million units, a year-on-year increase of 122%.[3] Market growth is accompanied by a divergence in product functions. RayNeo iO adopts a camera-free design and offers functions such as voice recording, meeting notes, translation and "Lifelog"; Meta Platforms, Inc. (hereinafter "Meta") launched a new generation of smart glasses and expanded its audio product line, while Rokid Style smart glasses retain a first-person camera and visual recognition functions.[4] [5]
The approaches differ, yet the problems converge on the information processing chain: a camera may capture people who are not using the device, and a microphone may pick up the voices of those conversing; transcription, summarisation and visual analysis may also generate new identifiable information from the original recordings. If the data further enters mobile apps, the cloud or third-party artificial intelligence (AI) services, the number of processing entities and the destinations of the data will also increase. The next questions must be answered one by one: whose information each function collects, under what rules it is processed, whether it is handed over to AI services, and under what conditions it flows across borders. The HeyCyan incident presents these questions together in a supply chain connected by multi-brand hardware and common software.
02. Why a Software Service Provider Became the Target of an Australian Investigation
When publishing the results of its preliminary inquiries, the OAIC specifically distinguished several types of companies in the smart glasses supply chain: Kmart and BDI Technology (an Australian glasses retailer) sell products but do not develop or operate the underlying software used by the devices; Qingcheng Future provides the underlying software to a number of low-priced glasses brands, including the HeyCyan app; Meta provides both the device and the software.[6] This classification explains why the formal investigation in this case fell on a Chinese app development company. The content recorded by the glasses enters the subsequent processing flow through the app, so the software provider may therefore be closer to the relevant information than the retail brands familiar to consumers. Retailers still need to pay attention to the privacy risks of the products they sell, but as regards the information recorded by the glasses, the first question is which company actually collects, holds and uses that information.
The fact that Qingcheng Future is established in China does not stop Australian privacy law at the border. Section 5B of the Australian Privacy Act 1988 (hereinafter the "Privacy Act") applies the Act to overseas organisations that have a statutory connection with Australia; for an enterprise established outside Australia, the key condition is that it carries on business in Australia.[7] On this condition, the Federal Court of Australia in Facebook Inc v Australian Information Commissioner examined the activities of an overseas company in managing cookies (website identification files), login interfaces and the Graph API (social graph application programming interface). Although the relevant servers were located in the United States and Sweden, these software functions operated in the devices of Australian users and in the businesses of local developers. The Court pointed out that whether an overseas enterprise carries on business in Australia depends on the nature of its business and the activities carried on in Australia, and that "there is no one size fits all answer".[8] This reasoning shifts the focus from the location of servers and offices to how the digital service operates locally.
Applying this to HeyCyan, what is worth ascertaining is how Australian users use the app, who operates the accounts and the voice assistant, how the recordings of the glasses enter the backend, whether the software provider can determine the functions and the purposes of the data, and its service arrangements with the brands. These facts bear both on the territorial connection under section 5B and on who should perform each of the Australian Privacy Principles. The 2022 amendments removed the additional condition that an overseas enterprise must also collect or hold personal information in Australia, making the specific assessment of "carrying on business in Australia" all the more important.
Comparative law offers another perspective on the responsibility of the software layer. In the IAB Europe case, the Court of Justice of the European Union held that an organisation that sets technical rules for data processing may bear joint controller responsibility even if it "does not itself have direct access" to personal data, because it participates in determining the purposes and means of specific processing; the scope of its responsibility still corresponds to the processing stages in which it actually participates in the determination.[9] China's Personal Information Protection Law of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter the "Personal Information Protection Law") also separately provides for joint processing, entrusted processing and the provision of information to other processors.[10] The three regimes use different concepts, but all require looking beyond commercial labels such as "developer" and "brand owner" to the contracts, interface permissions, processing purposes and actual data flows. This is precisely the practical lesson of the HeyCyan investigation: shared software connects multiple brands and also brings the software service provider to the centre of regulatory responsibility.
03. Are Bystanders Other Than the Wearer Protected?
Smart glasses are operated by the wearer, but people who come into the lens or the microphone may be completely unaware. Pedestrians on the street, shop assistants at the counter and speakers in a meeting may all become part of the recorded content. Devices with cameras capture images; devices without cameras may also record conversations and then generate transcripts, translations and summaries. Therefore, to determine whose personal information a glasses function involves, one must look not only at who purchased, registered for or wore the device, but also at whom the recordings and the content subsequently generated point.
Section 6 of the Australian Privacy Act includes in "personal information" information or an opinion about an identified individual, or an individual who is reasonably identifiable.[11] Assessing identifiability requires considering the context in which the information appears: faces, badges and locations visible in an image, and names, positions or specific experiences mentioned in a conversation, may all make a person who has not registered an account identifiable. In the Clearview AI case, the OAIC emphasised that even if the processor itself does not know the name, information may still be personal information if it can reasonably be linked to a specific individual by another person or machine; the original wording is "reasonably identifiable by another person (or machine)". That case found that facial images obtained online were personal information, showing that the public source of an image does not exclude protection for the person in the image.[12] Applied to the smart glasses scenario, a passer-by briefly appearing in the frame, a conversant's voice or a transcribed sentence should all be assessed in light of clarity, context and other linkable information.
Identifiable images and voices must further be distinguished as to whether they enter biometric use. Section 6 of the Privacy Act includes in "sensitive information" biometric information intended for automated biometric verification or identification, as well as biometric templates. In the 7-Eleven Stores case, customers took photographs to participate in an in-store questionnaire, and the system generated facial feature values from the photographs; the OAIC pointed out that the matching tool enabled one person to be "distinguished from other individuals" on the server, and on that basis treated the facial images and feature values used for automated identification as sensitive information.[13] The key facts in that case were automated comparison and the purpose of identification. When smart glasses record ordinary photographs or voices, identifiability should first be examined; only if facial or voiceprint features are further extracted for identity comparison do the information category and the corresponding obligations change.
Article 4 of the EU General Data Protection Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2016/679, GDPR) likewise takes as its starting point an identified or identifiable natural person, and Article 9 provides special protection for biometric data processed "for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person"; Article 4 of China's Personal Information Protection Law covers all kinds of information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person, while Article 28 lists biometrics as sensitive personal information. [14] [15] The three sets of rules differ in wording, but in eyewear applications all of them require distinguishing raw recordings, transcriptions and translations, summaries or labels, and the identity-recognition features that may be generated. The same meeting recording may capture the wearer's questions and also the names, voices and views of other speakers; if an AI-generated summary retains associations such as "so-and-so said ...", it will continue to point to that speaker.
This identification exercise determines the object of the subsequent obligations. If a product designs its privacy notice only around the wearer's registered account, it will struggle to explain how bystanders who happen to be in frame, the people whose conversations are recorded, and their information enter the application and the cloud. Australian Privacy Principles (APP) 1, 3 and 5, Articles 13–14 of the GDPR and Article 17 of China's Personal Information Protection Law each impose requirements from the perspectives of transparency, collection and notification. [16] The next step is to test by specific function and scenario: to what extent the authorisations and explanations given to the wearer can cover these people who never operate the device.
04. The legal basis for continuous recording and the practical dilemma
Part Three confirms that the information processed by smart glasses may belong simultaneously to the wearer and to the people around them. The problem then becomes sharper: if commercial smart glasses continuously photograph and record in open settings such as streets, offices and restaurants, the wearer's click on "agree" in the application cannot cover the other people who keep entering the lens and the microphone; nor can bystanders readily learn, at the moment they are recorded, who the processing entity is, what the purpose is and where the information goes. [17] The authors consider that, at the present stage, user agreements, privacy policies and device indicator lights are not yet sufficient to provide a generally replicable compliance path for this kind of routine, indiscriminate, real-time recording. [18] This is the practical conflict between smart glasses product design and the current personal information protection rules.
APP 3.2 requires an organisation collecting non-sensitive personal information to do so only as reasonably necessary for its functions or activities, and APP 3.5 requires collection to be lawful and fair; for sensitive information used for automated biometric identification, APP 3.3 generally also requires the individual's consent, and the collection must still be reasonably necessary unless a statutory circumstance under APP 3.4 applies. Using the content for another purpose after collection must additionally be tested separately under APP 6. Although the Privacy Act does not set a uniform consent precondition for all ordinary images and sounds, neither does it give products a general licence to record the people around them around the clock. Instant translation, long-term retention of an entire conversation, using meeting recordings to improve a model, and extracting identity features from passers-by's images each require their own justification of necessity and processing basis.
In the 7-Eleven Stores case, customers voluntarily used in-store questionnaire devices, but the system generated facial feature values after taking photographs, in order to exclude duplicate feedback. The OAIC pointed out that a business "cannot infer consent simply because it has published a policy"; its in-store notices and website policy did not clearly explain this processing, and customers had not given valid consent to the collection of sensitive information. The regulator also considered that collecting facial features on a large scale to improve questionnaire authenticity was not reasonably necessary, since less intrusive methods could achieve a similar purpose, and therefore found breaches of APP 3.3 and APP 5 respectively. [19] If even customers who walk into a fixed store and actively touch a device are not given adequate explanation, it is all the harder for bystanders in mobile settings to learn from the wearer's application agreement how their own information is processed.
The review outcome in the Bunnings case, by contrast, shows the strict factual conditions for the statutory exception. That case involved specific, serious in-store violence and theft, and the business used facial recognition to identify known repeat offenders; on that basis the Administrative Review Tribunal found the exception under APP 3.4 established and set aside the finding of an APP 3.3 breach. The fact that the system processed non-matching individuals' information only very briefly and deleted it promptly also entered the Tribunal's risk weighing. However, the Tribunal expressly held that brief processing still constitutes collection. One version of the entrance notice stated only that "video surveillance is utilised", and a later notice said only that surveillance "may include" facial recognition; neither adequately explained the actual processing and its purpose. The Tribunal therefore upheld the findings of breaches of APP 5.1 and APP 1. [20] If even this managed in-store scenario required such detailed proof of an exception, limits on processing and discharge of notification, consumer-grade glasses recording continuously in unfixed public places clearly cannot simply borrow its security rationale.
The EU and Chinese approaches should be analysed separately. Article 6 of the GDPR requires a basis for each processing of personal data, which may be valid consent or, where necessity and balancing conditions are met, legitimate interests; Article 9 imposes further restrictions on biometric data processed for the purpose of uniquely identifying a person. In the Meta Platforms case, the Court of Justice of the European Union summarised legitimate interests as "three cumulative conditions", covering the interest itself, the necessity of the processing and the balancing against the individual's rights. [21] Article 13 of China's Personal Information Protection Law lists the bases for processing, Article 6 requires clear purposes and minimum necessity, and Article 17 provides for notification; where sensitive personal information such as biometrics is involved, the requirements of specific purpose, full necessity and separate consent under Articles 28–30 must also be checked. [22] The information and processing corresponding to the wearer and to bystanders must each find their own basis; the wearer's consent to the application agreement cannot make choices on behalf of others.
The rules and cases above point to an unresolved product problem: in settings where the surrounding people constantly change, how can those being recorded genuinely know when they are being photographed or recorded, who processes their information, and have a real choice? Restricting the places and times of use, requiring the wearer to activate the device, prioritising on-device processing, and reducing uploads and retention may all lower risk, but none can by itself make up for the processing basis and notification. For continuous recording functions that cannot explain the necessity of collection to non-users and cannot provide feasible notification, it is difficult at this stage to prove compliance as a default mode of operation. In future, technical prompts, scenario rules and legal institutions may together form a new compromise arrangement; until then, bystander protection remains a substantive threshold for the large-scale adoption of smart glasses.
05. Model invocation and governance responsibility in the AI service chain
When smart glasses connect to AI, what changes first is the service chain. HeyCyan's current privacy policy describes three paths: voice Q&A, image understanding and summarisation call generative AI services provided by Microsoft through HeyCyan's backend; speech recognition and translation use Microsoft speech interfaces; and real-time conversation connects the application to Agora, and may connect to AI or voice service providers configured by Agora. The policy also states that the overseas backend is located in Amazon Web Services (AWS) in the United States, but the processing locations of Microsoft and Agora depend on their respective service configurations. [23] It is therefore not enough to ask only "where the glasses' data is uploaded"; one must also ask separately: who develops the model, who provides the service, in which region inference is performed, and which account invokes it under what licence. The public policy does not yet give the specific model names, versions, deployment regions, or the models connected to Agora sessions.
This also shows that "AI governance" should not simply be replaced by personal information protection rules. Speech transcription, machine translation, visual recognition, generative Q&A and model training are different technical and legal activities. Even without training one's own model, third-party inference may still receive bystanders' voices, images and conversations and generate transcriptions, descriptions or summaries about them; if the system further identifies individuals, analyses emotions or makes judgments affecting individuals' rights, the risk category changes again. HeyCyan needs to map, for each function, the invocation chain "device/application—backend—speech or model service—returned result", and verify supplier contracts, the boundaries of model capabilities, input and output retention and the actual switches, rather than covering all scenarios with one general "AI functions" description.
Australia currently has no unified pre-launch model filing or registration system for general commercial AI applications. The National AI Centre's Guidance for AI Adoption sets out six governance practices, including defining responsibilities, identifying risks, checking the supply chain, testing and continuous monitoring; the guidance is voluntary and cannot be written as a licensing condition. The OAIC investigation to which HeyCyan is subject still uses the Privacy Act as its statutory framework: if AI integration involves Australians' personal information, the collection, purpose, disclosure, security and cross-border rules continue to apply as normal. [24] Thus in Australia the question is not first obtaining a general "AI licence", but whether a business can explain the actual service providers and processing arrangements for each function and demonstrate that existing statutory obligations are met.
The EU comparison should turn to the EU Artificial Intelligence Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, Artificial Intelligence Act, hereinafter the "AI Act"). That law allocates obligations by role—providers, deployers, model providers—and by prohibited, high-risk and specific transparency scenarios. For ordinary voice Q&A, Article 50's human-machine interaction notice and marking of generated content may first be implicated; if the product adds functions such as remote biometric identification, Article 5 prohibitions and Annex III high-risk classification must be further checked. The Article 49 EU database registration targets specific situations such as the systems listed in Annex III, and not every glasses application that connects to a model must register; the Article 53 obligations concerning technical documentation for general-purpose AI models are directed first at model providers and cannot be directly transposed into the full obligations of the caller. The Act as amended in July 2026 has applied generally since 2 August of that year, but the main requirements for Annex III high-risk systems are deferred to 2 December 2027.[25] A Chinese company providing services only in Australia does not automatically fall under EU law on that basis; only where it enters the EU market, deploys in the EU, or meets a territorial connecting point such as "output used in the EU" does it become necessary to continue assessing specific obligations.
China adopts a different set of access and operating rules. Article 2 of the Interim Measures for the Administration of Generative Artificial Intelligence Services takes "providing generative content services to the public within the territory of the People's Republic of China" as the starting point for application; Article 17 requires services with public-opinion attributes or social mobilization capacity to conduct a security assessment and perform algorithm filing. Article 24 of the Provisions on the Administration of Algorithm Recommendations for Internet Information Services sets the filing deadline at ten working days from the date the service is provided; Articles 19 and 20 of the Provisions on the Administration of Deep Synthesis of Internet Information Services separately impose requirements on qualifying service providers, technical supporters and security assessments of new functions. A 2026 announcement by the Cyberspace Administration of China further distinguishes: filing of generative AI services, and registration with local cyberspace administrations of applications or functions that directly call already-filed models, and requires launched applications to publicly display the name and number of the model used.[26] Filing, registration and security assessment each have their own applicable conditions and timing requirements and cannot be summarized as "all use of AI in China requires prior filing". If HeyCyan provides this function only to the Australian public, the domestic-public element in Article 2 of the Interim Measures for the Administration of Generative Artificial Intelligence Services must be checked separately; if the same application is also directed at the Chinese public, the filing, registration and display obligations should be checked item by item.
On the existing materials, Qingcheng Weilai calls AI services provided by Microsoft, and Microsoft is the direct supplier that must first be examined in this case. The public policies do not state whether the underlying model is developed by Microsoft itself or is another model offered within Microsoft's services; this layer of technical choice cannot in turn alter the disclosed direct service relationship. Microsoft's model services themselves involve different models, subscription terms and deployment regions. Therefore, Qingcheng Weilai's Microsoft service account and contract should first be checked: which entity is the contracting party, whether embedding the function in a glasses application for Australian consumers is permitted, which accounts and service regions the selected model and application programming interface (API) endpoint support, where inference is performed, and whether resale or redistribution is restricted.[27] Only where the actual model list or contract shows that an independent model rights holder or service provider also exists should its licensing terms be further examined; the AI services connected to Agora's real-time sessions should also be separately verified.
The core issue of Part Five thus comes down to the "accountability" of the software service provider: even if Qingcheng Weilai does not develop foundation models, it decides, in function design and supplier selection, which images and sounds enter which AI services. In the 7-Eleven Stores case, a third party "used an application programming interface" (API) to process store customer photographs and generate facial feature values, and the regulator still pressed the retailer on its own responsibility for the purposes and methods of processing; the software vendor of smart glasses likewise needs to understand the call chain and cannot let the chain of responsibility break after connecting to an external model.[28] Model access, product functions and supplier licensing are the AI governance issues of this section; where bystander data actually flows, and the statutory cross-border transfer obligations thereby triggered, are addressed in the next part.
06. Server location and remote access in cross-border processing
HeyCyan's current policy states that its overseas backend is located on AWS in the United States, and some voice and image functions also connect to Microsoft or Agora. Looking only at server location easily misses a more critical layer: whether Qingcheng Weilai in Shenzhen can log into the backend to read, retrieve or further process information of Australian users and bystanders. In its preliminary inquiries, the OAIC asked the companies concerned to explain separately "who can access" the recorded information and where the information is "stored", investigating accessors and storage location as two distinct questions.[29] If personnel within China can actually remotely access information on US servers, then from the Australian perspective, although the data may not physically land in China, a cross-border pathway opening personal information to China may still arise.
Australian law must first determine who opened data to whom. Chapter 8 of the OAIC's Australian Privacy Principles Guidelines expressly uses the example of an Australian business giving an overseas parent company access to its Australian customer database to explain that overseas access can constitute disclosure. Therefore, if an Australian brand or retailer holding glasses data grants independent Qingcheng Weilai backend access, then even if the server is located in the United States, the APP 8 obligation concerning disclosure to an overseas recipient should be examined; if the recipient then has other service providers process the data, subcontracting and onward disclosure are also involved.[30] Conversely, if a retailer only sells the glasses and does not collect or control the relevant information, it cannot be found merely from the sales relationship that it disclosed data to Qingcheng Weilai.
Another pathway is for Qingcheng Weilai to collect information directly through the HeyCyan app and then have its own Shenzhen employees access the company's backend. In that case Qingcheng Weilai must still bear the applicable collection, notice, purpose and security obligations for its processing of personal information in Australia; overseas access within the same legal entity is generally not disclosure to "another overseas recipient" under APP 8. As for handing information to an independent AWS service entity, Microsoft or Agora, whether that constitutes overseas disclosure should be assessed separately. The conclusion here is that APP 8 must be applied to the specific discloser, recipient and access permissions, and company location, server location and disclosure conduct cannot be conflated.
Australia's cross-border regime is also not the EU-style "once a country receives an adequacy decision, transfers are free". APP 8.2 allows businesses to rely on an exception where they reasonably believe the overseas recipient is subject to substantially similar laws or binding mechanisms and individuals have effective redress; the 2024 amendments also allow countries or mechanisms to be prescribed by regulation. But the OAIC has made clear there is no list of "substantially similar countries", and the current Privacy Regulations 2025 do not list the United States or China as prescribed countries directly available in this case. Ordinary commercial smart glasses data exports have no unified prior reporting, approval or filing procedure; what genuinely needs to be done before disclosure is a recipient assessment, reasonable safeguards and enforceable contractual arrangements, together with purpose limitation, privacy policy and collection notice. If what is collected is sensitive information such as biometric data used to uniquely identify individuals, APP 3.3 imposes higher requirements on consent to collection and necessity, and the reasonable measures under APP 8 should be raised accordingly.[31]
The EU's "adequacy decision" can only be used where the GDPR applies and the transfer constitutes a Chapter V transfer, and cannot be borrowed for Australian operations. The EU currently has no GDPR Article 45 adequacy decision for Australia or China; for the United States there is a limited decision covering only US organizations on the EU–US Data Privacy Framework list, not all US servers or US companies. If there is also EU business, the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) requires first examining whether the exporter is subject to the GDPR, whether it opens data to another controller or processor, and whether the recipient is located in a third country; remote access may likewise satisfy the condition of "making data available".[32] Where no adequacy decision applies, appropriate safeguards such as standard contractual clauses should then be considered, rather than an administrative authorization necessarily being required.
From the perspective of Chinese law, if Shenzhen personnel actually remotely read, annotate or process Australians' information, that processing activity occurs within China, and the general processing rules set out in Articles 3 and 4 of the Personal Information Protection Law need to be considered; the location of the US server does not make domestic processing disappear. If information collected overseas enters China for processing and is then provided overseas again, the outbound rules in Articles 38–40 should then be checked. Article 4 of the 2024 Provisions on Promoting and Regulating Cross-Border Data Flows exempts the return of overseas-sourced information that does not introduce domestic personal information or important data from the three mechanisms of security assessment, standard contract and certification, but does not exempt applicable notice and security obligations. If the OAIC requires a company to submit personal information stored within China, the restrictions in Article 41 on evidence-taking by foreign judicial or law enforcement authorities are a separate issue requiring separate treatment.[33]
07. Consequences of the investigation and the software service provider's response
HeyCyan is still at the investigation stage. After commencing an own-motion investigation under section 40(2) of the Privacy Act, the OAIC may issue a written notice under section 44 requiring the relevant entity to provide information, documents or attend to answer questions. Qingcheng Weilai's earlier failure to reply to the preliminary inquiry is an important background to the commencement of the formal investigation; what is more legally significant next is whether it can explain the real data flows among the glasses, the app, the backend and external services, and whether it can respond to formal evidence-gathering requirements with evidence-supported answers. The OAIC has also written to retailers selling the relevant glasses asking them to consider whether to continue selling.[34] This will transmit the investigation's impact to channel partners; the legal responsibility of each party must still be assessed separately according to the data processing activities in which it participates.
An investigation may also end with the facts established and remediation implemented. The 7-Eleven Stores case provides a concrete reference: in 2021, the company had received a decision for breaching APP 3.3 and APP 5 after customer feedback indicated that devices were collecting facial images and features. Subsequently, during device maintenance, the service provider accidentally re-enabled the facial recognition function, and 54 stores again captured approximately 45,874 facial images within about 12 months. In response to this separate incident, 7-Eleven proactively reported it, required the service provider to delete the retained images, set a global off switch covering the configuration of individual devices, and check the function status hourly. In 2024, the OAIC considered that the entity had "adequately addressed the privacy deficiencies" and closed the matter without taking further action.[35] The lesson of this outcome for HeyCyan is that where the risk comes from third-party software or remote configuration, verifiable shutdown authority, proof of deletion and continuous monitoring are needed beyond paper policies.
If the investigation confirms unlawful processing, the consequences may directly target product functions and data already obtained. Paragraph 2 of the decision in the Clearview AI case required the company to "must cease to collect" the relevant images and feature vectors of Australian individuals, and to destroy the collected materials within 90 days and confirm in writing. Paragraph 2 of the 2021 decision in the 7-Eleven Stores case likewise required it to stop repeating the relevant conduct and to destroy the facial features obtained through the customer feedback devices. Both cases involved specific facts of processing biometric data for the purpose of identifying individuals, and ordinary photography cannot be equated with facial recognition; but they clearly show that a regulatory decision can require changes to collection methods, the cessation of specific functions and the handling of historical data, not merely amendments to a privacy policy. The review in the Bunnings case further reminds entities that even where a specific in-store security scenario satisfies an exception for the collection of sensitive information, privacy governance and collection notice may still separately breach APP 1 and APP 5.[36]
The current Australian law provides tools of differing strength. Section 52 of the Privacy Act allows the OAIC, after an investigation on its own initiative, to make decisions requiring the cessation of repeated conduct, the taking of measures within a time limit, and remediation of damage; the regulator may also accept enforceable undertakings given by an entity. Where what is found is a specified matter under section 13K, such as the privacy policy obligations listed in APP 1.3 or APP 1.4, the compliance notice or infringement notice pathway may also be available. A higher tier is civil penalties: section 13G targets "serious" interferences with privacy and requires the regulator to apply to a court, and the court may take into account factors such as the sensitivity of the information, the number of individuals affected, the persistence of the conduct and governance deficiencies. For a body corporate, the maximum under that section is the greater of AUD 50 million, three times the value of any benefit obtained, or, where the value of the benefit cannot be determined, 30% of adjusted turnover in the relevant period.[37] This is the penalty ceiling after the statutory elements are satisfied and court proceedings are completed, and a fine for HeyCyan cannot be calculated directly from an investigation announcement.
For Qingcheng Future and the partner brands, the most valuable work at present is to turn supply-chain responsibilities into evidence. A data map of "glasses—phone—cloud—AI services" should be drawn by product model and app version, distinguishing wearers from bystanders, and recording item by item whether capture, recording, transcription, summarisation, backup and training occur; at the same time, it should be verified who can remotely access the US servers, what data is accessed, and who decides the retention period.[38] Contracts between the brand and the software vendor must also specify responsibilities for function control, subcontracting, cross-border access, deletion instructions, auditing and regulatory assistance. For functions that cannot continuously provide effective notice to bystanders or lack an appropriate basis for processing, priority should be given to testing whether default-off settings, scenario restrictions, on-device processing, prominent collection prompts and short-term automatic deletion can genuinely reduce risk; existing configurations, logs and communications records should be properly retained so that the facts can be reconstructed and regulators answered.
What the HeyCyan incident ultimately has to answer is not who sells the glasses under whose brand, but who designs and controls the process by which information enters the app, the backend and the AI services. A software service provider, even if located overseas, will become an independent object of scrutiny so long as it actually participates in Australian business and the processing of personal information. Smart glasses still have room to develop in the future; but continuously recording bystanders' images and voices in open scenarios cannot be made compliant solely by a one-time authorisation from the wearer. This also turns the investigative question in the individual case into a product design and supply-chain question that Chinese AI devices and software services must resolve before entering overseas markets.
08. From HeyCyan to compliance for Chinese AI devices and software services going overseas
Extending from the HeyCyan case to other products, underlying app, cloud platform or model service providers may come within the local regulator's view because of their participation in continuous operations even if they do not manufacture the terminal device.[39] AI toys that can converse with children, recognition and dispatch systems embedded in logistics equipment, and standalone software provided to overseas enterprises may all involve hardware, software, data and third-party models jointly delivering a service. The risks they face are not the same, and compliance work needs to start from the target market, the product's use and the enterprise's actual role in the supply chain.
First, it should be determined which market the product enters, and in what form and for what use. Toys sold for children must, in addition to privacy and AI rules, satisfy toy safety and market placement requirements; industrial equipment involved in warehouse handling, sorting or transport control should first identify mechanical safety, personal injury and control system failure risks; standalone software products and software services provided continuously online may also fall under different product safety and cybersecurity rules. In the EU, for example, the Directive 2009/48/EC on the safety of toys, the Directive 2006/42/EC on machinery and the Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Cyber Resilience Act each have their own scope and implementation dates; Australia's Cyber Security (Security Standards for Smart Devices) Rules 2025 mainly target qualifying consumer-grade products and cannot be directly applied to industrial equipment.[40] Enterprises need to confirm, product category by product category, the local market access, testing, conformity assessment and post-market obligations, and then determine how privacy and AI governance is embedded in them.
After product classification, the transaction chain and the technology chain must be viewed together. An enterprise may be a complete-device manufacturer, or may only provide a white-label app, embedded algorithms, remote operations and maintenance, or a model interface; locally there will also be importers, brand owners, distributors and the actual user enterprises. Contractual labels such as "technical support" or "contract manufacturing" cannot replace verification of control over accounts, function switches, data uses, model invocation and security updates. The same enterprise may bear manufacturer obligations under product safety law, may be an independent controller or a processor under privacy law, and may also be a system provider or deployer under AI rules.[41] HeyCyan being brought into the investigation is precisely a real-world reminder of this multi-party responsibility chain. Before going overseas, what each party actually decides, what it can access, and who is responsible for notice, updates, incident reporting and regulatory responses should be written into enforceable contracts and operating procedures.
Next, risk should be assessed according to the specific use. AI toys require assessment of the content children are exposed to, voice and profile processing and physical product safety; industrial equipment requires asking whether algorithms participate in safety control, whether manual takeover is possible on failure, and whether worker or customer information is recorded; enterprise software requires looking at whether it processes customer business data, employee data, or runs only locally. The EU Artificial Intelligence Act's determination of high-risk systems is also related to the intended use and the relationship with specific products and safety components, and a product cannot be deemed high-risk simply because it has AI functions.[42] Only after risk identification can an enterprise determine what impact assessments, testing, human oversight and instructions for use are needed.
The model and data supply chain should be examined separately. Whether a model is self-developed, procured or invoked through a cloud platform determines whether the enterprise can explain the model's source, licensed region, input and output retention, secondary training and fault handling; the location of servers also cannot answer who can remotely access data from abroad. If local personal information enters other jurisdictions, the enterprise must also review the applicable cross-border rules according to the actual provision or access path, and verify the respective responsibilities of local customers, cloud service providers and the Chinese technical team. China's algorithm and generative AI filing or registration rules should also be judged according to whether the service is aimed at the Chinese public and its specific functions, and "the enterprise is registered in China" cannot itself be treated as a uniform filing trigger for all overseas products.[43]
Based on the author's experience in several cases assisting Chinese technology enterprises with overseas compliance, these judgments should ultimately be translated into a set of materials usable for launch decisions: a product category and applicable rules table for each target market, a responsibility and data flow diagram for each key function, and retained records of security testing, supplier terms, cross-border access permissions and incident handling.[44] Once a toy's child interaction method, an industrial device's safety control logic, or a software's model or cloud provider changes, the original conclusions must be re-examined. If the safety failure of a function cannot be controlled, key data flows are unclear, or the local market access procedures required have not been completed, the function should be adjusted or the launch in that market postponed. Only a launch and change mechanism established in this way can turn the "separation of seller and technical service provider" problem revealed by the HeyCyan case into an overseas compliance method usable for different AI products.
Appendix
Questions and answers
Why did the OAIC investigate Shenzhen Qingcheng Future rather than the retailers selling the smart glasses?
The OAIC distinguished companies in the smart glasses supply chain. Retailers like Kmart sell products but do not develop or operate the underlying software. Qingcheng Future provides the HeyCyan app used across multiple brands, and the glasses' recorded content enters processing through that app, making the software provider closer to the information.
Does the Australian Privacy Act apply to a Chinese company that provides an app to Australian users?
Yes, if the company carries on business in Australia. Section 5B of the Privacy Act applies to overseas organisations with a statutory connection to Australia. The Federal Court in Facebook Inc v Australian Information Commissioner held that whether an overseas enterprise carries on business in Australia depends on the nature of its business and activities in Australia, not just server location.
Are bystanders recorded by smart glasses protected under Australian privacy law?
Yes. Section 6 of the Privacy Act defines personal information to include information about an identified or reasonably identifiable individual. Bystanders whose images or voices are captured may be identifiable. The Clearview AI case confirmed that even if the processor does not know the name, information can be personal information if reasonably identifiable by another person or machine.
What are the consequences if the OAIC finds a breach after the HeyCyan investigation?
The OAIC may issue a decision under section 52 requiring cessation of conduct, remedial measures, or accept enforceable undertakings. For serious interferences, it may seek civil penalties in court, with maximum penalties for bodies corporate of the greater of AUD 50 million, three times the benefit obtained, or 30% of adjusted turnover. The Clearview AI and 7-Eleven cases show decisions can require ceasing collection and destroying data.
How does cross-border data transfer apply when a Chinese company remotely accesses data stored on US servers?
Under Australian law, if an Australian entity gives an overseas recipient access to personal information, that can constitute disclosure under APP 8, even if the server is in the US. If Qingcheng Future collects data directly through the app and its Shenzhen staff access it, that is generally not disclosure to another overseas recipient, but obligations for collection, notice, purpose and security still apply.
Laws and cases cited
Laws
- Australian Privacy Act 1988
- Personal Information Protection Law of the People's Republic of China
Regulations
- General Data Protection Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2016/679, GDPR)
- EU Artificial Intelligence Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689)
- Interim Measures for the Administration of Generative Artificial Intelligence Services
- Provisions on the Administration of Algorithm Recommendations for Internet Information Services
- Provisions on the Administration of Deep Synthesis of Internet Information Services
- Provisions on Promoting and Regulating Cross-Border Data Flows
- Cyber Security (Security Standards for Smart Devices) Rules 2025
- Directive 2009/48/EC on the safety of toys
Cases
- Facebook Inc v Australian Information Commissioner
- Clearview AI case
- 7-Eleven Stores case
- Bunnings case
- Meta Platforms case
References
- Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, OAIC opens investigation into maker of HeyCyan smart glasses phone app, 7 October 2026; Google Play, HeyCyan app developer page.
- Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Smart glasses under the microscope, 7 October 2026; Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, OAIC opens investigation into maker of HeyCyan smart glasses phone app, 7 October 2026.
- International Data Corporation, Augmented and Virtual Reality Headsets Market Insights, Q1 2026 statistics; "China's smart glasses market grew 87.1% year-on-year in 2025, with the industry moving from hardware rollout to value validation".
- RayNeo, RayNeo iO AI Glasses | Smart Glasses with Invisible Display product page; Meta Platforms, Inc., Introducing Ray-Ban Meta Audio and More AI Glasses Styles, September 2026.
- Rokid, Rokid AI Glasses Style | Smart AI Glasses with AI Assistance product page.
- Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Smart glasses under the microscope, 7 October 2026; Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, OAIC opens investigation into maker of HeyCyan smart glasses phone app, 7 October 2026.
- Australia, Privacy Act 1988, compilation No. 104 of 4 June 2026, section 5B.
- Facebook Inc v Australian Information Commissioner, [2022] FCAFC 9, paragraphs 64–75. The case examined the prima facie case basis for overseas service, applying section 5B of the Privacy Act as then in force.
- IAB Europe v Gegevensbeschermingsautoriteit, C-604/22, judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, paragraphs 68–76; EU Regulation (EU) 2016/679, General Data Protection Regulation, Articles 4, 26 and 28.
- Personal Information Protection Law of the People's Republic of China, Articles 20–23.
- Australia, Privacy Act 1988, compilation No. 104 of 4 June 2026, section 6.
- Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Commissioner initiated investigation into Clearview AI, Inc. (Privacy), [2021] AICmr 54, paragraphs 91–103; Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Smart glasses under the microscope, 7 October 2026.
- Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Commissioner initiated investigation into 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd (Privacy), [2021] AICmr 50, paragraphs 77–84.
- EU Regulation (EU) 2016/679, General Data Protection Regulation, Article 4(1) and (14) and Article 9.
- Personal Information Protection Law of the People's Republic of China, Articles 4 and 28.
- Australia, Privacy Act 1988, compilation No. 104 of 4 June 2026, Schedule 1, Australian Privacy Principles 1, 3 and 5; EU Regulation (EU) 2016/679, General Data Protection Regulation, Articles 13–14; Personal Information Protection Law of the People's Republic of China, Article 17.
- Australia, Privacy Act 1988, compilation No. 104 of 4 June 2026, Schedule 1, Australian Privacy Principles 3, 5 and 6 and section 16A; Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Australian Privacy Principles Guidelines, Chapter 3: APP 3 Collection of solicited personal information.
- Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Smart glasses under the microscope, 7 October 2026.
- Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Commissioner initiated investigation into 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd (Privacy), [2021] AICmr 50, paragraphs 85–107 and 115–125.
- Bunnings Group Limited and Privacy Commissioner, [2026] ARTA 130, paragraphs 165–174, 202–211 and 235–239 (third-party retained copy of the decision); Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, OAIC statement on Administrative Review Tribunal's Bunnings decision, 4 February 2026.
- EU Regulation (EU) 2016/679, General Data Protection Regulation, Articles 5–7 and 9; Meta Platforms Inc. v Bundeskartellamt, C-252/21, judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, paragraphs 105–110.
- Personal Information Protection Law of the People's Republic of China, Articles 6, 13, 17 and 28–30.
- Qingcheng Weilai, HeyCyan Privacy Policy, sections 3.6, 3.8–3.10 and 7.
- National AI Centre of Australia, Guidance for AI adoption: implementation guidance; Australian Government, AI and Australian law; Australia, Privacy Act 1988, compilation No. 104 of 4 June 2026.
- EU Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, Artificial Intelligence Act, compilation of 27 July 2026, Articles 2, 3, 5, 6, 49, 50, 53 and 113 and Annex III; European Commission, AI Omnibus enters into force, 27 July 2026.
- Interim Measures for the Administration of Generative Artificial Intelligence Services, Articles 2 and 17; Provisions on the Administration of Algorithm Recommendations for Internet Information Services, Article 24; Provisions on the Administration of Deep Synthesis of Internet Information Services, Articles 19 and 20; Cyberspace Administration of China, announcement of 9 January 2026 on filing and registration of generative artificial intelligence services.
- Microsoft, Data, privacy, and security for Foundry Models sold by Azure in Microsoft Foundry, Region availability for Foundry Models sold by Azure, Understanding deployment types in Microsoft Foundry Models, and Microsoft Azure (Microsoft Azure Product Terms).
- Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Commissioner initiated investigation into 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd (Privacy), [2021] AICmr 50, paras. 5–9, 77–84.
- Qingcheng Future, HeyCyan Privacy Policy, sections 3.6, 3.8–3.10 and 7; Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, OAIC opens investigation into maker of HeyCyan smart glasses phone app, 7 October 2026.
- Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Australian Privacy Principles Guidelines, Chapter 8: APP 8 Cross-border disclosure of personal information, paras. 8.5–8.15; Australian Privacy Act 1988, compilation No. 104 of 4 June 2026, Schedule 1 Australian Privacy Principles 1, 3, 5, 6, 8 and 11, and sections 5B and 16C.
- Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Australian Privacy Principles Guidelines, Chapter 8: APP 8 Cross-border disclosure of personal information, paras. 8.16–8.35; Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Sending personal information overseas; Australian Privacy Regulations 2025; Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Australian Privacy Principles Guidelines, Chapter 3: APP 3 Collection of solicited personal information.
- European Commission, Adequacy decisions; Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/1795, Article 1; European Data Protection Board, Guidelines 05/2021 on the Interplay between the application of Article 3 and the provisions on international transfers as per Chapter V of the GDPR, final version.
- Personal Information Protection Law of the People's Republic of China, Articles 3–4 and 38–41; Provisions on Promoting and Regulating Cross-Border Data Flows, Articles 4 and 10–11.
- Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, OAIC opens investigation into maker of HeyCyan smart glasses phone app, 7 October 2026; Australian Privacy Act 1988, compilation No. 104 of 4 June 2026, sections 40 and 44.
- Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Commissioner initiated investigation into 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd (Privacy), [2021] AICmr 50, decision paras. 1–2; Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, OAIC closes investigation into 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd following uplift of privacy practices, 27 September 2024.
- Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Commissioner initiated investigation into Clearview AI, Inc. (Privacy), [2021] AICmr 54, decision para. 2; Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Commissioner initiated investigation into 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd (Privacy), [2021] AICmr 50, decision para. 2; Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, OAIC statement on Administrative Review Tribunal's Bunnings decision, 4 February 2026; Bunnings Group Limited and Privacy Commissioner, [2026] ARTA 130, orders (third-party retained copy); Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Statement on Clearview AI.
- Australian Privacy Act 1988, compilation No. 104 of 4 June 2026, sections 13G, 13K, 52, 80U–80V and 80UB–80UC; Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Guide to privacy regulatory action, Chapters 4–5.
- Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, OAIC opens investigation into maker of HeyCyan smart glasses phone app, 7 October 2026; Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, OAIC closes investigation into 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd following uplift of privacy practices, 27 September 2024.
- Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Smart glasses under the microscope, 7 October 2026; Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, OAIC opens investigation into maker of HeyCyan smart glasses phone app, 7 October 2026.
- EU Directive 2009/48/EC on the safety of toys (《玩具安全指令》), consolidated version of 29 August 2026; EU Directive 2006/42/EC on machinery (《机械指令》), consolidated version of 30 May 2026; EU Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Cyber Resilience Act (《网络韧性法》); European Commission, thematic notes on Toy Safety in the EU (《欧盟玩具安全》), Machinery (《机械产品》) and the Cyber Resilience Act (《网络韧性法》); Australia Cyber Security (Security Standards for Smart Devices) Rules 2025 (《2025年网络安全(智能设备安全标准)规则》), F2025L00276; Australian Department of Home Affairs, Security Standards for Smart Devices (《智能设备安全标准》).
- Australia Privacy Act 1988 (《1988年隐私法》), Act No. 104 of 2026, compiled 4 June 2026, sections 5B, 6 and 15 and Schedule 1, Australian Privacy Principles 1, 3, 5, 6, 8 and 11; EU Regulation (EU) 2016/679, General Data Protection Regulation (《通用数据保护条例》), Articles 4, 26 and 28; EU Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, Artificial Intelligence Act (《人工智能法案》), consolidated version of 27 July 2026, Article 3.
- EU Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, Artificial Intelligence Act (《人工智能法案》), consolidated version of 27 July 2026, Article 6 and Annexes I and III; European Commission, AI Omnibus enters into force (《人工智能综合修正法案生效》), 27 July 2026.
- Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Australian Privacy Principles Guidelines, Chapter 8: APP 8 Cross-border disclosure of personal information (《澳大利亚隐私原则指南第8章:跨境披露个人信息》); European Data Protection Board, Guidelines 05/2021 on the Interplay between the application of Article 3 and the provisions on international transfers as per Chapter V of the GDPR (《关于GDPR第3条地域适用与第五章国际传输规则关系的指南05/2021》), final version; Articles 2 and 17 of the Interim Measures for the Administration of Generative Artificial Intelligence Services (《生成式人工智能服务管理暂行办法》); Cyberspace Administration of China, announcement of 9 January 2026 on the filing and registration of generative artificial intelligence services.
- Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Guide to undertaking privacy impact assessments (《隐私影响评估指南》); European Commission, thematic note on the Cyber Resilience Act (《网络韧性法》).
